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ABSTRACT

The demand for forensic anthropologists and archaeologists to investigate violations of
human rights and international humanitarian law is increasing. The International Criminal Court,
established in 1998, has jurisdiction over the crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, and
war crimes. The development of a permanent tribunal with jurisdiction over these crimes as well
as the numerous State Parties to the treaty is a reflection of the international community‟s
commitment to the prosecution of these crimes. Forensic evidence can and will assume an
essential role in future international criminal courts.
Forensic evidence made a significant contribution to the prosecution of genocide and
several other crimes in trials held by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia. This study examines three cases in which the defendants were indicted for
committing the crime of genocide in Srebrenica, Bosnia and Herzegovina, in 1995 during the
Bosnian War. These cases demonstrate three main concerns for forensic experts involved in a
forensic investigation. First, forensic experts must testify to evidence that can satisfy the legal
definitions of crimes. Second, the forensic expert must conduct an investigation using methods
and standards that produce scientific evidence that is accepted by the Court as such. Third, the
forensic expert must adhere to professional and ethical standards in an effort to maintain their
personal integrity and to protect the legitimacy of the investigation and resultant evidence.
An examination of these three topics with direct references to the trial transcripts of
forensic anthropologists, archaeologists, and pathologists‟ testimony provides insight into the
prosecution of genocide as it relates to forensic evidence, identifies methodological practices and
standard operating procedures that are particularly susceptible to judicial scrutiny, and highlights
ethical and professional issues that must be considered by the forensic expert prior to
participating in a criminal investigation. This study offers the potential to improve the utility of
forensic evidence in future investigations. A deeper understanding of the legal aspects of
forensic investigations may also invigorate research geared towards addressing the needs of court
systems and maximizing the potential of forensic evidence in future trials.
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INTRODUCTION

Forensic evidence often provides unequivocal corroboration to what would otherwise be
suspect or dubious evidence.1 (Graham Blewitt, Deputy Prosecutor of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia)
The demand for forensic anthropologists and archaeologists to investigate violations of
human rights and international humanitarian law is increasing as the international community
demands justice for crimes committed that may have not garnered such attention in the past.
Two international criminal tribunals were established in the early 1990s to address these crimes,
including genocide, in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia.2 The forensic investigation of mass
graves in the former Yugoslavia made a significant contribution to the trials and demonstrated
the great value of forensic evidence. The International Criminal Court (ICC), established in
1998 by the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, entered into force on 1 July 2002
and ratified by 108 States, has jurisdiction over the crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity,
and war crimes.3 The development of a permanent tribunal with jurisdiction over these crimes
and the numerous State Parties to the treaty is a reflection of the international community‟s
commitment to the prosecution of these crimes. Forensic evidence can and will be an integral
part of future international criminal trials.
1

Blewitt G. The role of forensic investigations in genocide prosecutions before an international Tribunal. Medical
Science Law 1997;37(4):284.
2
The International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 (hereafter
“ICTY”) was established by the United Nations Security Council on 25 May 1993 to prosecute individuals
responsible for crimes committed within the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991 including grave breaches
of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, violation of the laws or customs of war, genocide, and crimes against humanity;
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (hereafter “ICTR”) was established by the United Nations Security
Council on 8 November 1994 to prosecute individuals responsible for crimes committed in 1994 in Rwanda or by
Rwandan citizens in other nearby states including genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes as defined in
Common Article Three and Additional Protocol II of the Geneva Conventions.
3
International Criminal Court, A/CONF.183/09, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (17 July 1998)
(hereafter “Rome Statute”), available at <http://untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/statute/english/rome_statute(e). pdf>
(accessed 1 February 2009); International Criminal Court, Signatories to the Rome Statute, available at
<http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ASP/states+parties/The+States+Parties+to+the+Rome+Statute.htm> (accessed 30
March 2009).

1

In 2002 The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) adopted a series of
guidelines pertaining to forensic investigations of missing persons.4 Prior to any exhumation or
analysis of human remains the forensic expert must ask questions regarding the relationship
between their work and the legal system in which it will be employed, namely:
1. How does criminal justice function in the domestic and/or international context in
which violations of international humanitarian law / human rights law are being
investigated?
2. How will their work affect the legal and political process?5
Forensic archaeologists and anthropologists involved in international investigations of human
rights violations must be aware of how the collected forensic data will be used in legal
proceedings. Those responsible for the organization of the forensic criminal investigation,
compiling reports to be submitted as evidence, and/or testifying to the forensic evidence in court
need a much more in-depth understanding of the legal process. The judicial system, as well as
legal terminology and concepts, must be understood in order to interact effectively with the legal
process.6 Otherwise, the product of the investigation may not withstand the rigors of trial,
making the judicial purpose of the whole investigation fruitless.
This study utilizes a series of court cases from the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia (ICTY) to demonstrate three main concerns for forensic anthropologists and
archaeologists involved in a forensic investigation.7 Although the case studies all focus on the
events that occurred in Srebrenica, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the crime of genocide, the

International Committee of the Red Cross (hereafter “ICRC”). The missing: action to resolve the problem of
people unaccounted for as a result of armed conflict or internal violence and to assist their families (hereafter “The
Missing”). Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, 2003.
5
The Missing, 13.
6
Komar DA, Buikstra JE. Forensic anthropology: contemporary theory and practice. New York: Oxford University
Press, 2008;44.
7
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstić, Case IT-98-33 (hereafter “Prosecutor v. Krstić); ICTY, Prosecutor v. Vidoje
Blagojević and Dragan Jokić, Case IT-02-60 (hereafter “Prosecutor v. Blagojević and Jokić); ICTY, Prosecutor v.
Vujadin Popović, Ljubiša Beara, Drago Nikolić, Ljubomir Borovčanin, Radivoje Miletić, Milan Gvero, & Vinko
Pandurević, Case IT-05-88 (hereafter “Prosecutor v. Popović et al.”).
4

2

information has much wider application. The following three topics are relevant to all forensic
investigations of any crime at any level of court system.
One, forensic experts must testify on evidence that can satisfy legal definitions of crimes.
The legal definition of the indicted crime must be understood prior to the investigation because
of its implications on the type of evidence being sought. This will ensure that the crime is fully
investigated, legal stipulations of the crimes may be satisfied if the evidence allows, and the
evidence can be presented to the Court in an effective manner.
Two, the forensic expert must conduct an investigation with methods and standards that
produce evidence that is accepted by the Court. Each component of the investigation must be
considered scientifically sound. The forensic expert must be prepared to explain the methods
used in the investigation, their relevancy, and accuracy. The standard operating procedures must
maintain the scientific nature of the investigation and protect the legality of the evidence.
Three, the forensic expert must adhere to professional and ethical standards to maintain
personal legitimacy throughout the course of the investigation and legal proceedings. One of
these professional standards is to understand the legal process in an effort to prevent the misuse
or manipulation of their work, the evidence, by both the Prosecution and the Defense.8 Another
is to make legitimate interpretation of the forensic evidence based on prior professional
experience and evidence based opinions. Ethics have legal and humanitarian considerations.
Legally, the forensic expert must consider the source of his funding and maintain neutrality
throughout the investigation.9 The investigation must also include the humanitarian purpose of
identifying the victims, even if this is not necessary for evidentiary purposes.10 The forensic
methods and standard operating procedures, as well as professional and ethical guidelines,
adhered to throughout an international criminal investigation ought to be developed within an

8

The Missing, 13.
The Missing, 14.
10
The Missing, 10.
9

3

interdisciplinary group of professionals prior to the investigation. This protocol can ensure the
legality and legitimacy of the investigation and resultant evidence.11
A greater appreciation of each of these three topics and a deeper understanding of the
legal aspect of forensic investigations may also invigorate research geared towards addressing
the needs of court systems and maximizing the potential of forensic evidence in future trials.

Project Rationale

Forensic anthropologists and archaeologists are uniquely equipped with the skills
required for the investigation of violations of human rights, and in particular, the investigation of
mass graves as a result of genocide.12 Although the crime of genocide does not require a
massive loss of life, historically this is the situation that attracts the attention of the international
community and results in a criminal investigation. Often, the result of genocide is clandestine
mass graves filled with the decomposing or skeletonized bodies of victims. The demand for
forensic anthropologists and forensic archaeologists to investigate mass graves will increase as
more violations of human rights and international humanitarian law are identified and
investigated by international courts. These disciplines must recognize this growing area of work
by examining their role, function, and legal, professional, and ethical responsibilities in
international criminal courts and respond by increased interdisciplinary training and development
of relevant research.
An exercise for analyzing the potential use of forensic anthropology and archaeology in
genocide and other criminal investigations made by the ICC and other ad hoc tribunals
established by the United Nations (UN) is to reflect on these disciplines‟ applications in
international tribunals, particularly the ICTY. There are two main reasons for this approach.
One, the reasons why the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) for the ICTY initiated an international
11

Cordner S, McKelvie H. Developing standards in international forensic work to identify missing persons. IRRC
2000;84(848):882-883.
12
Ferllini R. The role of forensic anthropology in human rights issues. In: Fairgrieve SI, editor. Forensic
osteological analysis. Springfield: Charles C Thomas, 1999;290.

4

forensic investigation will likely be shared by other forensic investigations, such as those
initiated by the ICC, due to the type of cases the ICC was created to prosecute. This will result
in many similarities between the ICTY investigations and potential future investigations. Two,
the ICC and other future courts may rely on the criminal law developed by the ICTY as a basis
for its rulings, including interpretations of the crime of genocide.

International Jurisdiction
Several ad hoc criminal tribunals have been established to provide justice to the people of
a State unable or unwilling to seek justice itself. Similarly, the ICC has jurisdiction to
investigate and prosecute individuals for serious crimes only when a national judicial system
fails to prosecute appropriately.13 There are several reasons why a State may not or cannot
prosecute an individual for a crime leading to involvement by the ICC. These can be categorized
as judicial, personnel-, or resource-related. It is most commonly a combination of the three that
lead to an international forensic investigation being the most appropriate way to investigate the
crime.
A legal investigation of a crime can only be initiated when the judicial system finds that a
crime may have been committed. In a State suffering from recent and/or long term turmoil, the
judicial system may not be able to conduct a thorough investigation.14 The judicial system may
never have been well established or suffered losses, whether personnel-, resource-, or
infrastructure-related, during the time the crime took place. A newly established judicial system
following a regime change may choose not to prosecute in order to placate the old regime and
focus resources on reconciliation instead. The judicial system may also be corrupt, have been
involved in the crime itself, and therefore not likely to prosecute themselves. The State is often
the very perpetrator of massive human rights violations.15

13

Rome Statute, Article 17 Issues of Admissibility, 12.
Fondebrider L. Reflections on the scientific documentation of human rights violations. IRRC 2002;84(848):887.
15
Fondebrider, Reflections on the scientific documentation of human rights violations, 887.
14

5

Investigations must be performed by qualified forensic experts free from any personal,
social, or political pressure to testify to anything other than factual evidence. First, not all States
have a developed network of forensic experts to investigate crimes. Second, a corrupt judicial
system may be linked to other dysfunctional systems such as police or medical systems, resulting
in a less than non-partial investigation.16 The families of the victims are also not likely to trust
an investigation headed by the State that may have been involved in the alleged crimes.17 Third,
native forensic experts may feel personally threatened due to their involvement in an
investigation and unable to speak to their professional opinion for fear of retribution.18
An investigation of mass graves and missing persons is a large financial investment and
requires material resources and appropriate infrastructure. Mass graves may be purposely made
in desolate areas where they are intended not to be found. Investigations of these graves may
require roads to be laid in order for equipment and personnel to access the site; housing,
laboratory and storage areas to be built; and electricity and water brought to the site. Heavy
equipment may be needed as well as scientific equipment and consumables. Following an event
requiring an investigation, it is likely an affected State cannot take on the financial burden of the
investigation.
Each of the above scenarios highlights the need for forensic experts to perform criminal
investigations of international humanitarian and human rights violations. An international
forensic investigation provides professional forensic experts that offer legitimacy to the legal
investigation. The involvement of international agencies also contributes financial and tangible
resources to repair infrastructure and supply the material resources needed to conduct a scientific
investigation.19

16

Kirschner R, Hannibal K. The application of the forensic sciences to human rights investigations. Medicine and
Law 1994;13:457.
17
Fondebrider, Reflections on the scientific documentation of human rights violations, 887.
18
Kirschner, Hannibal, The application of the forensic sciences to human rights investigations, 457.
19
Bernardi P, Fondebrider L. Forensic archaeology and the scientific documentation of human rights violations: an
Argentinian example from the early 1980s. In: Ferllini R, editor. Forensic archaeology and human rights violations.
Springfield, IL: Charles C Thomas Publisher, LTD, 2007;206-208.

6

Case Law
Each time a case is heard and the presiding Judges render decisions and judgments, case
law is developed. Law is actively established in trials, especially when the indicted crime, such
as genocide, has few prior instances of judgment. As the ICTY and the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) concurrently tried persons for various human rights and
international humanitarian law violations, each court relied on its own and the other court‟s prior
judgments as case law. The body of law developed by these two ad hoc tribunals may be drawn
on in future cases. Forensic experts can learn what is required of the forensic investigation and
what can be anticipated in trial by the study of these past cases.
The many advantages of an international forensic investigation, staffed with the best
forensic experts and supplied with all of the necessary resources, can be negated by neglecting
any one of the following legal or discipline-related considerations that must be made prior to and
throughout the investigation. First is an understanding of the legal arena in which the forensic
expert is participating. The depth of knowledge required is based partly on the responsibility
level of the expert in the investigation. Second, a clear, coordinated approach among all experts
whilst maintaining standards and adhering to rigorous scientific methods is required to maximize
the evidentiary results from the inevitably complex investigation. Last, each involved expert
must maintain a high level of professional and ethical integrity. Without attention to these
details, the legal integrity of the investigation and the evidence can be jeopardized.20

The Study

Several of the factors described above contributed to the need for an international
forensic investigation to be conducted in the former Yugoslavia in the mid 1990s. The ICTY
OTP initiated a forensic investigation of mass graves to compile evidence and produce
indictments against those responsible for grave crimes. The complicated time- and labor20

Hunter J, Simpson B. Preparing the ground: archaeology in a war zone. In: Ferllini R, editor. Forensic
archaeology and human rights violations. Springfield, IL: Charles C Thomas Publisher, LTD, 2007;268.

7

intensive forensic investigation continued as trials were held, judgments made, and defendants
sentenced. The OTP relied extensively on forensic evidence and the testimony of forensic
experts to prove the crime of genocide was committed against the people of Srebrenica, Bosnia
and Herzegovina. A study of a series of ICTY cases, in which the Prosecution presented forensic
evidence to support an indictment for the crime of genocide, exemplifies the potential of forensic
evidence in international criminal courts, its application to international human rights and
humanitarian law, the importance of professional and ethical integrity in a legal arena, and offers
lessons to improve the utility of forensic evidence in future investigations.

The Cases
In the first case heard by the ICTY concerning Srebrenica, Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstić,
the Prosecution had to establish for the first time that genocide occurred in Srebrenica.21
Forensic reports submitted to the Court by forensic anthropologists, archaeologists, pathologists,
and various other forensic scientists provided evidence for the Prosecution to prove genocide
occurred. Court testimony of the forensic anthropologists, archaeologists, and pathologists
exemplified what forensic evidence the Prosecution believed fulfilled the legal definition of
genocide. Their testimony also revealed the types of interpretations of the evidence forensic
experts were asked to make. The cross-examination of the forensic experts by the Defense
revealed shortcomings, real and perceived, in the methodology applied and standards maintained
throughout the forensic investigation. The judgment by the Trial Chambers exemplified the
usefulness of forensic evidence in supporting multiple interpretations of the crime of genocide
and proving genocide occurred in Srebrenica.
The three studied cases exemplify an evolution of the use of forensic evidence in an
international court. The Prosecution relied on the forensic evidence and the testimony of the
experts to support the indictment while the Defense increasingly scrutinized the methods and
standards used and the professional and ethical standards adhered to by the forensic experts.

21

ICTY, Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case IT-98-33.

8

Throughout the Krstić trial, the Defense focused on very few points and was generally reserved
in their cross-examination of the forensic experts. In the second case concerning Srebrenica,
Prosecutor v. Blagojević and Jokić, the Defense waived their right to cross-examine the forensic
experts. However, in the third trial, Prosecutor v. Popović et al., the Defense questioned the
forensic experts on the methods and standard operating procedures used in the investigations and
were more rigorous in challenging interpretations of the forensic evidence. In some instances the
forensic experts were able to provide strong forensic evidence to refute the Defense, but in
others, the Defense interjected reasonable doubt. The Defense has become much more adept at
cross-examination of forensic experts and the disciplines must be prepared for this scrutiny.
Each challenge reveals an area of the discipline that must be strengthened to maximize the
potential that forensic evidence has in criminal courts.
In addition to scrutinizing the evidence, the Defense also questioned the credibility of
the forensic experts in both cases. Their ethical involvement and professional handling of the
investigation were questioned. These issues are as equally important for the forensic expert to
consider prior to their involvement in an international criminal investigation as the methods used
to recover and analyze the evidence. Without strong individual credibility throughout the
investigation, the entire product of the investigation may be regarded as less than scientific or
credible.

Methods
Critical evaluation of trial testimony transcripts allowed for individual components of the
forensic investigation and specific forensic evidence to be evaluated for their contribution to the
prosecution of genocide. The Prosecution‟s direct examination and the Defense‟s crossexamination suggested what was relevant to demonstrating whether or not genocide had occurred
and whether or not the indicted was guilty. The court testimony transcripts also provided insight
into what elements defined the quality of the investigation and thus revealed its strengths and
weaknesses.

9

The court transcripts regarding forensic evidence were examined for both the Prosecutor
v. Krstić and Prosecutor v. Popović et al. trials. This examination included the testimony of
every forensic anthropologist, archaeologist, and pathologist that testified, the relevant testimony
given by the persons holding the positions of Chief Investigator for the ICTY and Investigator
for the Office of the Prosecution, a forensic demographer, and one individual responsible for
maintaining chain of custody of forensic evidence. Portions of the transcripts were identified
and grouped according to the particular concept being discussed. Testimony that pertained to the
following concepts were sought: 1) evidence that contributed to fulfilling components of the law
of genocide, including individual criminal responsibility (performed for the Krstić case only), 2)
forensic methods, 3) standard operating procedures, 4) professionalism, 5) ethics, and 6)
interpretations of evidence regarding execution versus combat deaths and organization of the
crime. The first five concepts were intentionally sought; the sixth group regarding
interpretations of evidence was borne from the disproportionate amount of testimony dedicated
to these two topics. The testimony concerning the circumstances surrounding death and the
organization required to produce the associated mass graves clearly demanded scrutiny due to
the forensic evidence‟s large contribution to the establishment of these vitally important legal
components of the crime of genocide.
Examining the cases in chronological order revealed an evolution of the forensic experts‟
technical testimony and the Defense‟s more directed and educated cross-examination from the
first to the third case. Reading the transcripts chronologically allowed for repeated patterns in
the testimony to be recognized across cases. Isolating the testimony according to concept
revealed style differences among experts testifying to the same concepts and allowed comparison
of how concepts were addressed between the two cases.
It was the intent of this study to reveal the weaknesses of forensic disciplines in order to
demonstrate which areas might be improved. Particular attention was given to exchanges that
proved detrimental to the forensic expert‟s initial presentation or interpretation of evidence and
to dialogue regarding the quality of the investigation. The following are some indicators that
signaled a potential problem in the investigation or the interpretation of the evidence: a lengthy
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cross-examination that resulted in the forensic expert‟s inability to refute an alternative scenario,
the forensic expert‟s admittance of a particular weakness, and direct acknowledgement by the
Trial Chamber of the lack of forensic evidence to establish a particular point.
Other additional documents were referenced for further information and to clarify the
subject being discussed. Four forensic evidence summary reports submitted by the Prosecution
were utilized to obtain numerical values referred to during testimony given by the forensic
experts. Two written rebuttals of the forensic experts‟ reports and testimony submitted by the
Defense were considered alongside the Defense‟s cross-examination as their argument against
the forensic investigation. The Trial Chamber Judgments and Appeals Chamber Judgments, as
well as transcripts from judgment day, supplied the opinion of the Trial and Appeals Chamber,
respectively. Supporting documents were also examined as needed and included the ICTY
Statute, the ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence (multiple versions), Decisions and Orders
made by the Trial Chamber, and other legal documents of the ICTR, ICTY, and ICC.
My academic background in both biological anthropology and archaeology allowed me
to critically assess the testimony of experts of these disciplines. Seven seasons of archaeological
field work, including mortuary archaeology, and serving in a managerial role for an international
archaeology project allowed for an appreciation of the excavation process as well as the
administration of a large multi-national project. In particular, participation in the Mass Grave
Excavation and Mass Fatality Incident Mortuary practicum offered by the Inforce Foundation
provided a foundation for the recognition of the unique requirements and challenges of an
investigation of mass graves.22 Experience in a Medical Examiner system and working
alongside forensic pathologists provided an informed perspective when evaluating the
pathologist‟s testimony.
Through analysis of these three criminal trials, I present three lines of information: 1) a
clearer understanding of the crime of genocide as it relates to forensic evidence, 2)
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methodological practices and standard operating procedures of forensic anthropology and
archaeology that are particularly susceptible to scrutiny in the context of a criminal trial, and 3)
the special demands of international criminal law – ethical and professional – that require
forethought on the part of forensic experts prior to participating in a criminal investigation. This
new information demonstrates the need for forensic anthropology and archaeology to adapt to
the needs of human rights investigations. Recommendations are then made for how this best can
be accomplished through directed research and the development of methods and standards,
interdisciplinary training, and international collaboration.

Structure
This work is organized into two parts. Chapters one through six provide a historical
perspective of forensic investigations for international criminal courts, introduces the Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide Convention), and briefly
addresses the Bosnian War and the events that occurred in Srebrenica, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
that were considered as the crime of genocide. The Genocide Convention is broken down into
smaller components and forensic evidence is outlined according to the contribution it made to
establish the various legal requirements of genocide.23 Special attention is applied to the forensic
evidence used to prove individual criminal responsibility. What might be considered the most
difficult part of genocide to prove, the requirement for intent to destroy, is examined in further
detail by considering 1) what interpretations of forensic evidence were provided by the forensic
experts that demonstrate intent and 2) how the forensic experts presented this particular type of
testimony. These early chapters essentially define what genocide is and describe how it has been
successfully proven in an international criminal court. This background information is necessary
to critically assess the areas of forensic anthropology and archaeology that need further research
and development in regard to their application to criminal forensic investigations of genocide.

23

The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide was adopted by the United Nations
General Assembly on 9 December 1948 and entered into force 12 January 1951; it is currently ratified by 140 States
(8 May 2009).
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Chapters seven through twelve are paired chapters that deconstruct various aspects of the
forensic investigation – their methods, standard operating procedures, and professional and
ethical guidelines. For each topic, the first chapter considers how the topic was treated or
performed in the Srebrenica investigation and subsequently addressed throughout the testimony
in two ICTY cases. Then, legal requirements and the disciplines‟ individual standards are
discussed. Deficiencies revealed in the ICTY cases are matched with necessary disciplinespecific developments to better address the unique needs of international criminal forensic
investigations.
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Chapter One
HISTORICAL REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL FORENSIC INVESTIGATIONS
The Agreement shall commence on 11 December 1992 and shall, unless earlier
terminated by either Party, expire on a date to be agreed upon by the Parties upon
completion of the investigation of the mass grave near Vukovar and of such other mass
grave sites and places where mass killing are reported to have taken place.24
(Cooperation Service Agreement between the United Nations and Physicians for Human
Rights, 1993)
The use of forensic sciences in investigations of heinous crimes has developed alongside
advances in international humanitarian law and human rights law. As law develops the forensic
investigation of crimes is required to meet new and higher standards. The time period in which
both were pressed to advance quickly occurred immediately following World War II. Human
rights law was developed following the War‟s massive loss of life and invasive impact on
civilian life. An investigation into mass graves was performed and presented during the
Nuremberg trials. The extensive use of forensic anthropology and archaeology in the 1980‟s
following the breakdown of repressive regimes in South America proved the dead could speak of
the crimes committed against them. The relationship between forensic science and law was
firmly established as forensic evidence proved it could contribute greatly to the maintenance of
justice. The 1990‟s saw the largest forensic investigation of mass graves in the former
Yugoslavia take place concurrently with a smaller scale investigation in Rwanda.25 The potential
for forensic science in international criminal law was demonstrated, its expectations defined, and
its significant role established. The evolution of law and forensic sciences will continue as long
as human rights are upheld and their abuses not tolerated by the international community.

24

UN, Commission on Human Rights, E/CN. 4/1993/20, Cooperation Service Agreement between the United
Nations and Physicians for Human Rights (5 February 1993).
25
Stover, Ryan, Breaking bread with the dead, 23.
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First Forensic Investigation for an International Court

An early investigation of human rights violations by forensic experts was the 1943
exhumations of mass graves in the Katyn Forest in Soviet territory.26 Victims in a mass grave
were believed to be officers of the Polish military and Polish elite that had gone missing years
before, but the identity of the perpetrators was contested. Pinpointing the timing of the
massacres would indicate which nation was responsible – if the event occurred prior to 1941 the
Soviets were guilty, but after 1941 Germany had invaded and controlled the Katyn Forest region.

The Katyn Forest Forensic Investigations
A commission of twelve forensic experts from eleven European nations was assembled
by Germany‟s initiative to exhume the mass graves.27 International organizations including the
International Red Cross and the international press were invited to witness the exhumations.28
Exams by pathologists exposed systematic, execution-style gunshot wounds to the head with less
than 8mm caliber bullets and bound arms.29 Artifacts collected from the bodies included Polish
bank notes, cigarettes, and matches; winter clothing including typical Polish hats; and documents
including diaries, correspondence, and newspapers. The oldest document found on the bodies
dated to the fall of 1939 and the most recent was dated 22 April 1940. All twelve forensic
experts signed a document confirming these findings and dated the massacres to the months of
March and April 1940, effectively implicating the Soviets of the crime.
The Soviets responded by forming the Special Commission for Determination and
Investigation of the Shooting of Polish Prisoners of War by German-Fascist Invaders in Katyn

26

Ferllini R. The development of human rights investigations since 1945. Science & Justice 2003;43(4):221; see
also Haglund WD. Recent mass graves, an introduction. In: Haglund WD, editor. Advances in forensic taphonomy:
method, theory and archaeological perspectives. Boca Raton: CRC Press, 2002;245-246.
27
International Katyn Commission Findings, Der Massenmord in Walde von Katyn Ein Tatsachenbericht (The
Mass-Murder in the Katyn Forest, a Documentary Account of Evidence) (30 April 1943), available at
<http://www.warsawuprising.com/doc/katyn_documents1.htm> (accessed 1 February 2009).
28
Ferllini, The development of human rights investigations since 1945, 221.
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Forest and conducting their own investigation and exhumation of the mass graves in January
1944.30 The name of this Special Commission left little to guess of what their investigation
would reveal. Their submitted report of findings concluded the massacres took place in June
1941 based on documents found on the bodies dating up to 20 June 1941 and the
decompositional state of the bodies.31 The method of execution was also purported to be
consistent with German mass shootings of Soviet citizens. The report concludes that the mass
shooting of Polish prisoners of war in the Katyn Forest was committed by the German armed
forces.

Katyn Forest in the Nuremberg Trial
The Charter of the International Military Tribunal was developed in 1945 to prosecute
crimes committed by the European Axis Powers, including crimes against peace, war crimes, and
crimes against humanity.32 The Katyn Forest massacres were introduced at the Nuremberg trial
by the Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the USSR, Colonel Pokrovsky, during the Prosecution‟s
presentation of evidence of war crimes committed by the Germans.33 Pokrovsky stated:
One of the most important criminal acts for which the major war criminals are
responsible was the mass execution of Polish prisoners of war, shot in the Katyn Forest
near Smolensk by the German fascist invaders.34
Despite evidence that the perpetrators were the Soviets themselves, the judges allowed the Soviet
Prosecution to submit into evidence the report made by the Soviet Special Commission and call
witnesses to testify.

30
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The Prosecution representing the Soviet Union called two forensic experts to the stand,
one from the German created commission and one from the Soviet created commission. Dr.
Marko Antonov Markov, a professor in the department of Forensic Medicine and Criminology at
the University of Sofia in Bulgaria, testified to the handling of the German investigation and its
conclusions.35 Although Markov signed the International Commission‟s report that outlined
evidence against the Soviets, Markov‟s testimony emphasized the political motivations behind
the exhumations, the minimal medico-legal investigation performed by the commission, and
coercion by the Germans to affirm evidentiary conclusions as a condition of their release.
Political pressure and personal fear may explain Markov‟s change in interpretation of the
evidence – Bulgaria had just switched alliances from Nazi Germany to Russia four days after
Russia declared war on Bulgaria and Germans were being tried for war crimes.36 Victor Il‟ich
Prosorovski, the Chief Medical Expert of the Ministry of Public Health of the Soviet Union,
testified to the Soviet investigation.37 Prosorovski‟s testimony emphasized the date of death
being in the autumn of 1941, thus clearly implicating Germany.
The Defense for the Germans provided convincing evidence to refute the Soviet‟s claims.
The United States and United Kingdom offered no support to the Soviets. The Soviets were also
unable to place criminal responsibility for the Katyn massacres on any of the German
defendants.

Judgment
There was no mention of the Katyn Forest in any judgment rendered by the Tribunal.
Four decades after the crimes were committed, Mikhail Gorbachev admitted the role of the
Peoples Commissariat for Internal Affairs, at that time the Soviet Union‟s secret police agency,
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in the Katyn Forest massacres, thus validating the results of the first international forensic
investigation.38
The key characteristics that lent validity to the German investigation of the massacres –
an international team of qualified experts, complete written and photographic documentation,
and accessibility to the investigation by international organizations and the foreign media –
persist as standards of an impartial forensic criminal investigation. Other components of the
investigation required significant improvement, particularly the exhumation of the victims prior
to the Commission‟s arrival to the site and the complete autopsy of only nine victims.

Establishing the Role of Forensic Anthropology
and Archaeology in International Criminal Investigations
International Forensic Training
A significant advancement of international forensic investigations took place with the
training of local forensic teams in South American countries suffering from missing persons as a
result of repressive regimes in the 1970s - 1980s.39 Argentina was the first South American
country to receive forensic training following seven years of the Junta military regime. From
1976 to 1983, at least 10,000 Argentineans “disappeared” – kidnapped and were never heard
from again.40 Bodies were disposed of from planes over bodies of water, buried in clandestine
mass graves and in cemeteries as unidentified persons.41 Following the fall of the military
regime, exhumations of mass graves began for judicial and humanitarian purposes. Bulldozers
plowed through mass graves, unearthing skeletons but confounding the ability to identify the
Mikhail Gorbachev publically announced that the Soviet Union‟s accepted responsibility for the Katyn Forest
massacres on 13 April 1990 with a statement that ended, “The Soviet side, expressing profound regret over the
Katyn tragedy, declares that this was one of the gravest crimes of Stalinism.”; Crozier B. Remembering Katyn.
Hoover Digest 2000; no.2, available at <http://www.hoover.org/publications/digest/3486292.html> (accessed 22
April 2009).
39
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40
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Springfield, IL: Charles C Thomas Publisher, LTD, 2007;210.
41
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victims. Two groups – the National Commission on the Disappeared of Argentina and the
Abuelas (Grandmothers) of Plaza de Mayo – lobbied the Argentinean government to stop
exhumations until they could be exhumed scientifically. The American Association for the
Advancement of Science (AAAS) was asked to assist in the exhumation and identification of the
disappeared.42
In 1984 the AAAS sent a team of forensic anthropologists to Argentina.43 They
established dialogue with judges, morgue workers, human rights activists, lawyers, and relatives
of the disappeared.44 The AAAS recommended all exhumations be halted until personnel were
trained to excavate the graves scientifically. Dr. Clyde Snow organized training courses on
exhumation and identification methods for a group of volunteer graduate students. Subsequent
exhumations led to personal identifications and gathered evidence was used in courts of law.
This newly trained group of students eventually evolved into the Equipo Argentino de
Antropologia Forense (EAAF). The AAAS continued to train teams to investigate human rights
abuses in other Central and South American countries.45 Today the EAAF and the Fundacion de
Antropologia Forense de Guatemala (FAFG) perform investigations in their own countries and
provide technical assistance to other countries around the world.46

International Law for Forensic Investigations
The United Nations General Assembly responded to the increase in forensic
investigations of human rights abuses by adopting a series of resolutions in the 1980s involving
the development of international standards for investigations of all suspicious deaths, summary,
or arbitrary executions.47 This led to the “Principles on the Effective Prevention and
42
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Investigation of Extra-legal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions” being adopted by the United
Nations Economic and Social Council and endorsed by the General Assembly in 1989.48 The
“Principles” were supplemented by the “UN Manual on the Effective Prevention and
Investigation of Extra-legal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions” with technical standards for
legal investigations, autopsies, and the disinterment and analysis of skeletal remains in 1991.49
This Manual was adapted from a document developed by the Minnesota Lawyers International
Human Rights Committee, a group of international experts from multiple disciplines, including
forensic science, law, and human rights, who came together to initiate a set of standards that
could be applied in the investigation of forensic cases.
The UN began contracting with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to conduct
investigations on its behalf. Resolution 780 of the UN Security Council called for a Commission
of Experts to investigate grave breaches of Geneva Conventions and violations of international
humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia.50 An agreement was made between the UN and
Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) to perform an investigation of mass graves in this country.51
A 1994 Report of the Secretary-General on human rights and forensic science stresses the need
to:
articulate a standard arrangement such as a cooperation service agreement regulating the
status of experts, their methods of work, and other relevant matters including issues of
finance and confidentiality.52
48
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Cooperation Service Agreements made between the UN and teams of forensic experts outline the
obligations of the UN and the legal, professional, and ethical obligations of the forensic experts.

Forensic Investigations of the 1990s
Forensic investigations of human rights violations continued to expand in the 1990s as
forensic anthropology and forensic archaeology became more established disciplines and their
merits became increasingly recognized by criminal courts.53 Four of the most active
organizations participating in international human rights investigations in the 1990s included the
EAAF, FAFG, PHR, and the ICTY. These four organizations sent forensic anthropologists
and/or archaeologists to a minimum of 1,283 sites for survey, exhumation, or skeletal analysis
and excavated 179 mass graves in 33 countries between 1990 and 1999.54 The ICTY
investigations became the single largest forensic investigation deploying an international team of
forensic experts to coordinate extensive investigations of mass graves and execution sites.
The use of forensic experts in investigations of human rights abuses is now well
established. In order to maintain the validity of forensic investigations and the resultant evidence
of crimes, high standards of scientific methodology, standard operating procedures,
professionalism, and ethics must be maintained. The three ICTY trials examined in this study
highlight the importance of maintaining these standards to ensure that the forensic evidence can
speak for the victims and bring justice to the perpetrators.
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Chapter Two
THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION

New conceptions require new terms. By "genocide" we mean the destruction of a nation
or of an ethnic group. This new word, coined by the author to denote an old practice in
its modern development, is made from the ancient Greek word genos (race, tribe) and the
Latin cide (killing)…55 (Raphael Lemkin, 1944)
Indictments served against 22 defendants in October 1945 in the Nuremberg Trials
included one or more of four charges: Count One - conspiracy to wage aggressive war, Count
Two - waging aggressive war or crimes against peace, Count Three - war crimes, and Count Four
- crimes against humanity. As a part of Count Three, war crimes, under the sub-heading
“Murder and Ill-treatment of Civilian Populations of or in Occupied Territory and on the High
Sea,” the Offense (Prosecution) made the first reference to genocide as a crime in a formal legal
preceding:
They conducted deliberate and systematic genocide, viz., the extermination of racial and
national groups, against the civilian populations of certain occupied territories in order to
destroy particular races and classes of people and national, racial, or religious groups,
particularly Jews, Poles, and Gypsies and others.56
The term „genocide‟ had only been introduced the previous year by Raphael Lemkin, a PolishJewish jurist, in his book Axis Rule in Occupied Europe.57 Lemkin‟s concept of genocide was
stimulated by the massacre of Armenians during World War I and of the Jews during World War
II. Lemkin believed there was a need for a new word that would describe these crimes as crimes
specifically directed against a group of people and advocated for genocide to be codified in law.
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After World War II, the newly established UN quickly accepted the task of developing
international treaties that addressed human rights in times of war and peace. A convention on
genocide was an early initiative. On 11 December 1946, the UN General Assembly passed
resolution 96(1) acknowledging genocide as, “a denial of the right of existence of entire human
groups, as homicide is the denial of the right to live of individual human beings.”58 The same
resolution tasked the Economic and Social Council to draft a convention on the crime of
genocide.
Two distinct aspects of genocide needed to be defined – mens rea, the mental aspect of
the crime and actus reas, the physical acts of the crime. Both components underwent
considerable debate before an agreement was made by the then fifty-eight member states of the
UN. The political environment of the time, particularly the recent Holocaust and the beginning
of the Cold War, heavily influenced the drafters.59 Other influences included state sovereignty
and the desire to protect current political leaders and States from being implicated in genocide.60
Political compromises were struck among the drafting Delegates.61 These influences are
reflected in the final draft, the same version that exists unchanged today.
The ICTY, ICTR, and ICC adopted Article 2 of the Genocide Convention verbatim into
their Statutes to define the crime of genocide and related punishable acts. Article 4(2) of the
ICTY Statute states:
2. Genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in
whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) killing members of the group;
(b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring
about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
58
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(d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.62
A Prosecution team must use this legal definition as the basis of their indictments and
present evidence that supports the charge. The Trial Chamber must also use this definition to
determine if the acts proven constitute genocide. The development and drafting process of the
Genocide Convention is very relevant in its interpretation today; previous drafts, discussions
held which illuminated the drafters‟ intentions, and the historical context at the time of the
drafting, is a legitimate source of information used to interpret the true meaning of the Genocide
Convention and the crime of genocide itself.63 Therefore, a summary of its development,
highlighting contentious decisions and negotiations, is relevant to understanding the true purpose
of the Genocide Convention and who and from what it was designed to protect.

Defining Mens Rea

Protected Groups
At the time of its development, the concept of genocide was unique as a crime against a
group of people. Which groups would be protected by the future genocide convention was
especially contentious during the drafting process. Lemkin‟s introduction of genocide described
various “techniques” of genocide including political, social, cultural, economic, biological,
physical, religious, and moral acts.64 UN General Assembly Resolution 96(1) states:
Many instances of such crime of genocide have occurred when racial, religious, political,
and other groups have been destroyed, entirely or in part.65
The first draft of the Genocide Convention, produced by the Economic and Social Council, the
Division of Human Rights, and three experts including Raphael Lemkin, limited the protected
62
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groups to racial, national, linguistic, religious, or political groups.66 The second draft submitted
by the newly formed Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide omitted linguistic groups.67 In the final
text, submitted by the UN General Assembly‟s (Legal) Sixth Committee on 9 December 1948,
political groups were also excluded. Understanding how the protected groups were whittled
down to the four protected by the Genocide Convention – national, ethnical, racial, and religious
– provides insight into why other groups failed to be included and how potentially ambiguous
groups today might receive protected status.68
National, ethnical, racial, and religious groups made the final cut because they were
considered historically targeted groups that could be defined by cohesiveness, homogeneity,
inevitability of membership, stability, and tradition.69 There was particular emphasis placed on
the distinction between permanent and voluntary groups.70 In contrast, political groups were
excluded because they were considered a matter of individual choice and lacking homogeneity
and stability.71 Those opposed to this decision made several objections. The United Kingdom
delegate argued that religion is also a choice not unlike political affiliation; Cuba claimed
passions were more apparent in political struggles and political groups were therefore in great
danger; and the Dutch pointed out that Nazis targeted political groups.72
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The inclusion of political groups was also perceived by many as a roadblock to
ratification of the Convention. Delegates noted that some States may be averse to ratifying a
convention that limited the right to suppress internal disturbance.73 The United States suggested
political groups could be excluded temporarily in order to gain ratification and the convention
could be improved at a later date, by their inclusion. In the 100th meeting of the drafters,
protection for political groups was voted out, but as a negotiated trade-off, reference to an
international tribunal, previously voted out, was reinstated.74
Other groups discussed and eventually excluded from the protected groups were
linguistic and cultural groups.75 Although it was the intent of Lemkin and the Genocide
Convention to protect a group‟s culture alongside their existence, its inclusion was also seen as a
potential barrier to ratification. A prohibition on cultural genocide may have been interpreted as
criminalization of cultural or linguistic assimilation. Similar to the inclusion of political groups,
cultural genocide was set aside to be considered later in a supplemental convention.76

As Such
The last two words of the mens rea for genocide, genocide means any of the following
acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious
group, as such, emphasize the protected group and its right to persist. Genocide is not murder of
a group of individuals, but the destruction of a group through the targeting of individuals by
virtue of their membership in a group. Lemkin introduced genocide as a crime:
directed against the national group as an entity, and the actions involved are directed
against individuals, not in their individual capacity, but as members of the national
group.77
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The UN Resolution 96 (I) defines genocide as “a denial of the right of existence of entire human
groups.”78 The concept is simple and it is what separates genocide from other crimes.

Intent to Destroy, In Whole or In Part
The mens rea of genocide also requires “intent to destroy, in whole or in part,” one of the
four protected groups. Intent infers prior thought. Lemkin commonly referred to a “plan” when
describing genocide, as in “a coordinated plan of different actions” and “to destroy nations
according to a previously prepared plan.”79 The Soviet Union considered the inclusion of
“intent” as a loophole by which perpetrators could claim a lack of specific intent to destroy a
group.80 The United States countered that the intent to destroy a group differentiated genocide
from homicide. “In whole or in part” acknowledges that genocide does not require the
destruction of a whole group, but merely the intent to destroy all or part of that group, however
successful the attempt.

Defining Actus Reas

Similar to the protected groups, the acts that constituted genocide were debated and
refined throughout the drafting process.81 Lemkin‟s “techniques of genocide” in his 1944 book
included offences against a group‟s political, social, cultural, economic, biological, physical,
religious, or moral life.82 The first draft of the Genocide Convention describes physical,
biological, and cultural acts of genocide in alignment with Lemkin‟s examples of genocidal acts
based upon Nazi imposed measures during World War II:
1. [Physical genocide] Causing the death of members of a group or injuring their
health or physical integrity by:
78
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(a) group massacres or individual executions; or
(b) subjection to conditions of life which, by lack of proper housing, clothing,
food, hygiene and medical care, or excessive work or physical exertion are
likely to result in the debilitation or death of the individuals; or
(c) mutilations and biological experiments imposed for other than curative
purposes; or
(d) deprivation of all means of livelihood, by confiscation of property, looting,
curtailment of work, denial of housing and of supplies otherwise available to
the other inhabitants of the territory concerned.
2. [Biological genocide] Restricting births by:
(a) sterilization and/or compulsory abortion; or
(b) segregation of the sexes; or
(c) obstacles to marriage.
3. [Cultural genocide] Destroying the specific characteristics of the group by:
(a) forcible transfer of children to another human group; or
(b) forced and systematic exile of individuals representing the culture of a
group; or
(c) prohibition of the use of the national language even in private intercourse; or
(d) systematic destruction of books printed in the national language or of
religious works or prohibition of new publications; or
(e) systematic destruction of historical or religious monuments or their diversion
to alien uses, destruction or dispersion of documents and objects of
historical, artistic, or religious value and of objects used in religious
worship.83
In the second draft prepared by the Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, physical and
biological genocidal acts were condensed and grouped together, but still described, as were
cultural genocidal acts.84 In the final draft, physical and biological genocidal acts were listed in
more generalized wording, instead of descriptively. This was done to serve two purposes: 1) to
comply with the nulla poena sine lege principle – one cannot be prosecuted for an act not
specified as a crime and 2) to standardize national criminal codes that incorporated the crime of
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genocide as required for ratification of the Genocide Convention.85 Cultural genocide was again
omitted, again due to its potential for barring ratification. Therefore, Article 2 of the final draft
of the Genocide Convention enumerates only five acts of genocide relating to physical and
biological destruction:
(a) killing members of the group;
(b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring
about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.86
Interpreting the Genocide Convention
The Genocide Convention‟s scant use of words to define genocide created a crime that is
easily overlooked when convenient and difficult to prosecute. The initiators of the Genocide
Convention, Western nations, have acted to punish genocide only three times – at Nuremberg, in
the former Yugoslavia, and Rwanda – and acted to stop genocide only twice – in Kosovo and
Bosnia and Herzegovina.87 As the first international criminal courts to make judgments on the
crime of genocide post ratification of the Genocide Convention, the ICTY and ICTR faced two
arduous tasks: clarifying the constituent elements of genocide, both the actus reas and mens rea,
and developing substantive criminal law for genocide. The Trial Chambers of the ICTY and
ICTR were forced to actively interpret the objective and subjective elements of the crime of
genocide while the Prosecution brought forth indictments and evidence to prosecute individuals.

85

Lippman, A road map to the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 182;
see also Fournet, The crime of destruction and the law of genocide, 40-42.
86
UN, General Assembly Resolution 260 (III), Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Article 2 (9
December 1948).
87
Kelly M. Nowhere to hide: defeat of the sovereign immunity defense for crimes of genocide and the trials of
Slobodan Milosević and Saddam Hussein. New York: Peter Land Publishings, Inc., 2005;4.

29

The legal approaches of the ICTR and ICTY must be synchronous between the two
courts.88 Continuity between the two courts is essential because the rulings delivered by the
courts establish precedent, become case law, and contribute to the development of international
law, particularly suited for future use by the ICC. Any contradictions between the two courts
would threaten the legality of the decisions and confuse future application of the crime of
genocide. For this reason, the Tribunals share the same prosecutor and members of the Appeals
Chamber.
The Trial Chamber of the ICTY interpreted genocide based on the rules for interpretation
of treaties provided in Article 31 and 32 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties.89 Several sources were relied upon, including the drafting process of the Genocide
Convention and previous ICTY and ICTR rulings. The International Law Commission (ILC),
which serves the function of codifying international law, reported on genocide in the 1996 Draft
Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind.90 The work of other relevant UN
committees including the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of
Minorities of the UN Commission on Human Rights was referenced. The 1985 Whitaker
Report, which provided recommendations on the prevention and punishment of genocide, despite
never being submitted to the UN General Assembly, was
used as a source of interpretation.91 Drafts of the Rome Statute were considered as a basis of
opinio juris of States. Finally, legislative and judicial interpretations and decisions of States
were also relied upon.
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Other Crimes Under Jurisdiction of the ICC

The crime of genocide is perhaps the most difficult of crimes to recognize and prove due
to its mens rea requirement. By providing evidence that meets the requirements for genocide
many other crimes may be proved to have occurred. The ICC has jurisdiction over genocide,
crimes against humanity, and war crimes. Each crime is defined in the Rome Statute.
Crimes against humanity are defined as:
any of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack
directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)
(h)

(i)
(j)
(k)

murder;
extermination;
enslavement;
deportation or forced transfer of population;
imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of
fundamental rules of international law;
torture;
rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization,
or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity;
persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national,
ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in paragraph 3, or other grounds that are
universally recognized as impermissible under international law, in connection with
any act referred to in this paragraph or any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court;
enforced disappearance of persons;
the crime of apartheid;
other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering or
serious injury to body or to mental or physical health.92

A crime against humanity has a much simpler mens rea than genocide, lacking the requirement
of intent and no need for the crime to be committed against any specific, definable, protected
group. The actus reas of crimes against humanity overlap acts of genocide and include
additional acts. For a particular indicted crime of genocide, if in trial proof of intent is lacking or
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the victims are not considered as a protected group, the crimes committed are likely to still fall
under crimes against humanity.
War crimes originate from the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and are defined in the Rome
Statue as:
any of the following acts against persons or property protected under the provisions of the
relevant Geneva Convention:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)
(h)

willful killing;
torture or inhumane treatment, including biological experiments;
willfully causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or health;
extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity
and carried out unlawfully and wantonly;
compelling a prisoner of war or other protected person to serve in the forces of a
hostile Power;
willfully depriving a prisoner of war or other protected person of the rights of fair and
regular trial;
unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement;
taking of hostages.93

The Court has jurisdiction over these crimes when they are committed as “part of a plan or
policy or as a part of a large-scale commission of such crimes.”94 Twenty-six other acts are
described and considered war crimes as:
other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in international armed
conflict, within the established framework of international law.95
Additional acts considered war crimes are described for “armed conflicts not of an international
character”: four acts committed against persons “taking no active part in the hostilities” and an
additional twelve acts that may be committed on civilians, persons involved in peacekeeping or
humanitarian aid work, children, and physical materials, buildings, and property.96 Similar to
crimes against humanity, the evidence collected to prove genocide can also be used to prove war
crimes were committed.
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It is notable that in the Rome Statute, crimes against humanity and war crimes are given
significant amount of clarification. Each act of crimes against humanity is followed by a
description of what may qualify as that act, and war crimes are explicitly detailed in a
considerably long list. The crime of genocide received no similar extra consideration; it was
simply defined with the exact adoption of the crime‟s definition as originally written in the
Genocide Convention. The crime of genocide is very ambiguous; the study of case law is one
way to understand its true legal meaning.
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Chapter Three
THE BOSNIAN WAR:
SREBRENICA, BOSNIA and HERZEGOVINA
In just a couple of days, Sarajevo will be gone and there will be five hundred thousand
dead, in one month Muslims will be annihilated in Bosnia and Herzegovina.97 (Radovan
Karadžić, future president of Republika Srpska, speaking to Momcilo Mandic, Justice
Minister of Republika Sprska, 13 October 1991)
This study relies on the events that occurred in Srebrenica, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
during the Bosnian War; it explores the relationship between forensic evidence collected from
execution sites and mass graves and the prosecution of the crime of genocide in an international
criminal court. Srebrenica is both a municipality in eastern Bosnia and Herzegovina and a
distinct city within the municipality. The conflict there began early in the war and culminated
with the execution of more than 7,000 Bosnian Muslim men just months prior to the end of the
Bosnian War.98
The Bosnian War began in March 1992 following the break-up of the Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia in 1990 was made up of six Socialist Republics: Slovenia,
Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia (Figure 1). Following the
fall of communism in Eastern Europe and the break-up of the USSR, Yugoslavia struggled with
ethnic tensions, a rise of nationalism, and conflicting opinions on the future of the republic.99
The disintegration of the Republic began with Croatia and Slovenia‟s declaration of
independence on 25 June 1991, followed by Macedonia‟s in September 1991.
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Figure 1. The Former Yugoslavia in 1992.
Source: The History Place, Genocide in the 20th Century, Former Yugoslavia, available
at <http://www.historyplace.com/worldhistory/genocide/former-yugo.jpg> (accessed
1 February 2009); amended by the labeling of Srebrenica, Bosnia and Herzegovina.
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Independence did not come without conflict. The Yugoslav National Army (JNA) was
overpowered in Slovenia during a ten day war following their declaration of independence.100 In
Croatia, the Serbian area of Krajina in western Croatia seceded from the republic and the JNA,
with 70% Serbian officers, supported the Serbian population. By November 1991, one-third of
Croatia was controlled by the Serbs. The UN monitored a truce allowing the Serbian held
territory to remain separate and protected from Croatia. Serbian leaders were thus able to direct
their full attention to Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina was complicated by its population‟s
diverse national and religious identifications. It was the only Yugoslavian Republic without a
national or religious majority. In 1991, Bosnia and Herzegovina was 43.7% Bosnian, 31.4%
Serb, and 17.3% Croat. Generally, Bosnians were Muslim, Serbs Orthodox, and Croats
Catholic.101 The impending independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina, favored by both Croats
and Bosnians, was not supported by the Serbian population who favored remaining a part of
Yugoslavia. In October 1991, the Serb members of the Bosnian and Herzegovinian parliament
formed the Bosnian Serb Assembly, a referendum was held, and the Bosnian Serb population
voted to remain a part of Yugoslavia. The Bosnian Serb Assembly designated as territories of
the federal Yugoslav state the voting regions, municipalities, and cities that favored remaining a
part of Yugoslavia. Independence was declared 1 March 1992 by the Bosnian Government and
Bosnian Serbs countered this declaration by asserting independence for the Serbian Republic
(Republika Srpska) within Bosnia on 27 March 1992.102 The war in Bosnia began ten days later.
The two remaining states of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Serbia and
Montenegro, joined together to form the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on 27 April 1992.
Throughout the Bosnian War, Serbs, Croats, and Bosnian forces fought and formed
allegiances. The JNA, no longer an army of the fractured Yugoslavia, was split between the
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newly formed Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Army of the Republika Srpska or Vojska
Republike Srpske (VRS). The VRS was the main aggressor of the Bosnian War, having the clear
goal of forming a contiguous Serbian state by joining the Serbian population of Bosnia and
Herzegovina with Serbia.103 Serbs populated both western and eastern Bosnia and Herzegovina;
Serbian forces pressed to capture and join these territories.
Srebrenica, 1992 – June 1995

Serbian forces began a directed attack against the non-Serbian civilian population of
Bosnia and Herzegovina in early 1992.104 Serbian forces took control of Srebrenica in April, but
it was recaptured by May 1992. Srebrenica, Žepa, and Cerska, all Bosnian Muslim cities, were
contiguous but remained separated from Bosnian-held territory further west. In January 1993,
Serbian forces captured Cerska and Konjevic Polje, effectively isolating Srebrenica. The
Srebrenica enclave territory shrunk from 900 to 150 square kilometers while the population
increased to over 50,000 people.105
In April 1993, in response to Serbian threats of attack, the UN Security Council passed
Resolution 819 declaring Srebrenica a “safe area” free from armed attacks.106 A United Nations
Protection Force (UNPROFOR) was stationed in the municipality. Each side was accused of
breaking the “safe area” agreement; Serbian soldiers made attacks directed towards the area, and
Bosnian forces used the area for staging their own attacks.107 UNPROFOR troops lacked the
manpower and weapons necessary to protect the people or halt the Serbian force‟s advance on
the “safe” territory.
At the start of 1995, the isolation of the Srebrenica enclave from other Bosnian controlled
territory resulted in shortages of food, medicine, ammunition, and fuel for the UNPROFOR
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troops.108 In March, Radovan Karadžić, the President of Republika Srpska, issued Directive 7 to
the VRS:
Complete the physical separation of Srebrenica from Žepa as soon as possible, preventing
even communication between individuals in the two enclaves. By planned and wellthought out combat operations, create an unbearable situation of total insecurity with no
hope of further survival or life for the inhabitants of Srebrenica.109
This directive was shortly followed by a more aggressive plan to attack the enclave.

July 1995
On 2 July 1995 the VRS operation “Krivaja 95” was ordered by the commander of the
Drina Corps.110 Over the course of 10 days in July, VRS forces invaded Srebrenica, forcibly
removed the Bosnian Muslims population from the region, and executed 7,000 – 8,000 men.
The VRS offensive began on 6 July as troops approached Srebrenica and began pressing in
toward the main city.111 Faced with little resistance in the first few days, Serbian President
Karadžić ordered the VRS Drina Corps, one of six geographically defined Corps, to capture the
town of Srebrenica.112 The Bosnian Muslim population fled to Potocari, a town 6 km northwest
of Srebrenica and the location of a UN compound.113
By 11 July Srebrenica was emptied and the number of refugees at Potocari swelled to
20,000 to 25,000 persons.114 There conditions continued to deteriorate. Food and water were
sparse. Serbian soldiers performed seemingly random acts of violence including executions,
rapes, and burning houses.115 That night, the Bosnian men made the decision to flee by foot
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through the surrounding forest to Bosnian held territory.116 The largest group of men, estimated
at 10,000 to 15,000 men, headed north towards the Bosnian controlled city of Tuzla; two smaller
groups of less than 1000 men each headed southwest and east. Less than 1000 men remained
with the women, children, and older men unable to make the trek.117
Forced deportation from Potocari began on 12 July.118 The VRS provided buses to
relocate women, children, and the elderly to Bosnian held territory. The men who had remained
at Potocari were separated from the group, some were executed there, and the remainder
transported to and detained in Bratunac, the municipality just north of Srebrenica.119 This
operation was completed by the evening of 13 July.
The column of men in the forest met their first ambush between Konjevic Polje and Nova
Kasaba on 12 July.120 The column was interrupted; only one-third of the men were able to cross
past the ambush. The thousands of men captured were brought to two detention areas in
Bratunac, the Sandici Meadow and the Nova Kasaba football field, where men from Potocari
were also being detained.121 The one-third of men who evaded capture at Konjevic Polje pressed
on but faced another ambush shortly after.122
Well organized mass executions of the captured men began 13 July and terminated on or
about 17 July.123 The groups of men were organized into smaller groups and transported from
initial detention areas to several secondary detention sites via the same buses used to evacuate
Potocari of women, children, and the elderly.124 At secondary detention sites, mainly schools
and warehouses, resistance was minimized by applying ligatures and blindfolds.125 From there,
men were marched or transported to nearby fields, lined up, and shot. At some execution sites,
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large graves were being dug as the men were being executed. Others graves were dug shortly
after the executions and then filled with bodies.

The Peace Agreements

The momentum of the war turned sharply after the Srebrenica massacres through a series
of events that placed pressure on Serbia. Allied Bosnian and Croat forces took back western
Bosnian territory from the Serbs. These same forces threatened the Bosnian Serb capital of
Republika Srpska, Banja Luka. A mortar shell dropped by Serbian forces on 28 August 1995 at
a marketplace in Sarajevo, killing 37 and wounding 88, prompted North American Treaty
Organization (NATO) air strikes.126 The ICTY issued indictments for Bosnian Serb military and
government leaders. World powers pressured the leaders of Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia and
Herzegovina to enter negotiations.
The three sides met in Dayton, Ohio; attendees included Serbian President Slobodan
Milošević, Croatian President Franjo Tuđman, and Bosnian President Alija Izetbegović.
Radovan Karadžić, President of Republika Srpska, did not attend. The conference took place
over the first 21 days of November, concluding with the Dayton Peace Accords on 21 November
1995. The agreement was later formally signed in Paris, France, on 14 December 1995.127
As a result of the Dayton Peace Accords, two political entities compose Bosnia and
Herzegovina, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska. They are
separated by the Inter-Entity Boundary Line, defined in the Dayton Peace Accords, and resemble
the military lines at the end of the war. The Republic of Srpska covers 49% of Bosnia and
Herzegovina and includes the Srebrenica municipality. The Brčko District, the only municipality
that belongs to both entities, separates western and eastern Republica Srpska (Figure 2).
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Figure 2. Map of Bosnia and Herzegovina after the Dayton Peace Accords.

Source: United States Institute of Peace, available at <http://www.usip.org/
events/pre2002/images/Bosnia_Herzegovina.jpg> (accessed 23 April 2009);
amended for clarity only.
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Chapter Four
GENOCIDE IN SREBRENICA

Thus, the Trial Chamber concentrates on setting forth, in detail, the facts surrounding this
compacted nine days of hell and avoids expressing rhetorical indignation that these
events should ever have occurred at all. In the end, no words of comment can lay bare the
saga of Srebrenica more graphically than a plain narrative of the events themselves, or
expose more poignantly the waste of war and ethnic hatreds and the long road that must
still be travelled to ease their bitter legacy.128 (Trial Chamber, Krstić Judgment)
It is the burden of the Prosecution to provide evidence that the crime of genocide was
committed. Two constitutive elements of the definition of genocide must be satisfied: the mens
rea and actus reas. The mens rea of genocide requires the Prosecution to prove that there was
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such, by
one of the five enumerated acts of genocide. The actus reas of the crime is perhaps the easier of
the two elements to satisfy with forensic evidence, but forensic evidence can also be relied upon
for proving mens rea. Forensic evidence was used by the Prosecution to describe the crimes
committed, including 1) the identity of the victims, 2) their manner and cause of death, 3)
patterns of injury, 4) time of death, and 5) how mass graves were made. The forensic evidence
also corroborated testimony of survivors regarding times, places, and the events that occurred at
these sites.
Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstić was the first ICTY trial that forensic experts testified to
evidence collected in Srebrenica (Figure 3). The Prosecution‟s initial presentation of the forensic
evidence through testimony of the forensic experts, the Defense‟s cross-examination of the
experts, and the Trial Chamber‟s direct questions to the forensic experts serve to exemplify the
most useful forensic evidence relevant to the crime of genocide.
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Figure 3. Photograph of Radislav Krstić.
Source: ICTY, Krstić Case IT-98-33, Case Information Sheet, available at
<http://www.icty.org/x/cases/Krstić/cis/en/cis_Krstić.pdf> (accessed 21
April 2009). Photograph provided courtesy of the ICTY.
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The testimony of the forensic experts also demonstrates how forensic evidence was collected,
summarized, and presented in a criminal court to satisfy the definition of genocide.
Forensic evidence is interwoven into the Trial Chamber‟s judgment along with
reflections on preparatory work, case law produced by the ICTR and ICTY, and several other
sources of interpretation to find Radislav Krstić guilty of genocide. The Trial Chamber relied
upon the forensic evidence to meet multiple legal requirements of genocide. This judgment
becomes a part of international criminal jurisprudence, establishing a precedent for the use of
forensic evidence to prove certain aspects of genocide. Future Prosecutors can reference the
Krstić case to demonstrate the successful use of forensic evidence in cases of genocide.

Summary of Forensic Evidence

The forensic experts holding the position of Chief of Exhumations or Chief Pathologist
for the investigation testified to the work performed by the forensic teams under their direction.
The following forensic experts testified at the Krstić trial:


Bill Haglund, Chief of Exhumation 1996, forensic anthropologist



Richard Wright, Chief of Exhumation 1998 and early 1999, forensic archaeologist



Jose-Pablo Baraybar, Chief of Exhumation late 1999, forensic anthropologist



Christopher Lawrence, Chief Pathologist 1998, forensic pathologist



John Clark, Chief Pathologist 1999 – 2001, forensic pathologist

Two investigators for the Prosecution also testified regarding the forensic evidence collected:


Jene-Rene Ruez, Chief Investigator for the ICTY



Dean Manning, Investigator for the Office of the Prosecution

In addition to testimony by these forensic experts, two reports were submitted by Dean
Manning that summarized the volumes of reports submitted by these experts and others who
performed investigative work. The first report, entitled “Srebrenica Investigation. Summary of
Forensic Evidence – Execution Points and Mass Graves” (Manning Report), summarizes the
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forensic evidence collected at execution sites and mass graves from 1996 through 1999.129 This
report includes the evidence that the forensic experts testified to in late May 2000. The second
report, entitled “Srebrenica Investigation. Summary of Forensic Evidence Mass Graves Exhumed
in 2000, Lazete 1, Lazete 2C, Ravince, Glogova 1” (Additional Manning Report), summarizes
the forensic evidence collected in 2000.130 This second report was not admitted into evidence
until 4 April 2001, almost a full year after the last forensic experts testified for the Krstić case.
The Trial Chamber took all of the forensic evidence admitted from 1996 through 2001 into
consideration when making their judgment.
Forensic evidence was collected from 21 exhumed gravesites: 14 primary graves, 8 of
which were disturbed [disturbed graves indicated with * (Cerska, Nova Kasaba 96 and 99,
Lazete 1*, 2*, and 2C*, Pilica*, Petkovci Dam*, Kozluk*, Konjevic Polje 1 and 2, Glogova 1*
and 2*, Ravnice)], and seven secondary graves (Cancari Road 3 and 12, Hodzici Road 3, 4, and
5, Liplje 2, Zeleni Jadar 5). The Manning Report provides a definition of “primary” and
“secondary” graves:
A primary grave is a grave in which the individuals were placed soon after death or
indeed where the individuals were executed and then buried. A secondary grave is one in
which the individuals, removed or “robbed” from a primary grave were later placed.131
Eight execution sites were identified: two buildings, the Kravica Warehouse and Pilica Dom, and
six open air sites (Nova Kasaba, Cerska, Orahovac, Branjevo Military Farm, Dam near Petkovci,
Kozluk) (Table 1). An additional 20 secondary mass graves were not exhumed, but only
examined for the presence of human remains, their size, and primary or secondary status.132

Manning D. Srebrenica Investigation: Summary of Forensic Evidence – Execution Points and Mass Graves.
ICTY Evidence Report, Unpublished document Property of the United Nations, ICTY (16 May 2000) (hereafter
“Manning Report”).
130
Manning D. Srebrenica Investigation. Summary of Forensic Evidence – Mass Graves Exhumed in 2000, Lazete
1, Lazete 2C, Ravince, Glogova 1, ICTY Evidence Report, Unpublished document Property of the United Nations,
ICTY (February 2001) (hereafter “Additional Manning Report”).
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Table 1. Twenty-one exhumed mass graves in Srebrenica testified to in the Krstić case.
Exhumed Mass Graves

Exhumed

Primary

Disturbed

Secondary

Linked Graves

Cerska Valley

1996

X

Cerska

Konjevic Polje 1

1999

X

Undetermined

Konjevic Polje 2

1999

X

Undetermined

Nova Kasaba 1996

1996

X

Undetermined

Nova Kasaba 1999

1999

X

Undetermined

Ravnice

2000

X

Undetermined

Branjevo Military Farm

1996

X

X

Glogova 1

2000

X

X

Glogova 2

1999

X

X

Zeleni Jadar 5

Kravica Warehouse

Kozluk

1999

X

X

Cancari Road 3

Kozluk

Lazete 1

2000

X

X

Hodzici Road 3 and 4

Orahovac

Lazete 2

1996

X

X

Hodzici Road 3,4,5

Orahovac

Lazete 2C

2000

X

X

Hodzici Road 3 and 4

Orahovac

Petkovci Dam

1998

X

X

Liplje 2

Petkovci Dam

Cancari Road 3

1998

X

Kozluk

Kozluk

Cancari Road 12

1998

X

Branjevo Military Farm

Branjevo Military Farm

Hodzici Road 3

1998

X

Lazete 1 and 2

Orahovac

Hodzici Road 4

1998

X

Lazete 1 and 2

Orahovac

Hodzici Road 5

1998

X

Lazete 2

Orahovac

Liplje 2

1998

X

Petkovci Dam

Petkovci Dam

Zeleni Jadar 5

1998

X

Glogova 2

Kravica Warehouse

Cancari Road 12

Linked Execution Sites

Branjevo Farm
Kravica Warehouse

46

Many of the execution sites and mass grave sites were located by aerial reconnaissance
photographs taken in 1995 by the United States.133 Photographs depict mass groups of people
and shortly thereafter in the same place, disturbed earth.134 Heavy earthmoving equipment, used
to dig graves and move bodies, was also captured in some ofthe photographs.135 Primary and
secondary graves were located from before-and-after pictures showing freshly disturbed ground
(Figure 4 and 5).136 The aerial photographs were able to narrow the timing of events, including
executions, primary burials, and the movement of bodies from primary graves to secondary
graves. Nova Kasaba was located from information provided by refugees in Germany.137
A forensic investigation was conducted at the two execution site buildings.138 Blood,
hair, and tissue samples were collected from the buildings (Figure 6). The Netherlands Forensic
Institute tested these samples for the presence of human DNA.139 Samples of suspected
explosives residue was also collected from each building and tested at the Netherlands Forensic
Institute.140
Ground survey was performed utilizing metal detectors to locate shell casings and metal
fragments on the ground surface at suspected execution sites and shell cases were collected for
comparative analysis from the surface of these sites and primary and secondary graves.141
Forensic archaeological techniques were used to excavate each grave as a piece of evidence. The
construction of the grave was determined by size and slope of the ground floor, tool marks, and
soil impressions on the floor and walls of the graves. The construction method was linked to the
known use of heavy equipment by the Drina Corps, evidenced by aerial photographs and written
documents, during the same time period as the grave preparation.142
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Figure 4. Before-and-after aerial photographs of Kozluk. On the left, Kozluk on 5 July 1995; on
the right, Kozluk on 17 July 1995 of disturbed ground corresponding to the creation of mass
graves.
Source: ICTY, Krstić Case IT-98-33, Exhibits – OTP, available at <http://www.un.org
/icty/cases-e/cis/Krstić/exhibits/16.jpg> (accessed 13 December 2008).
Photograph provided courtesy of the ICTY.
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Figure 5. Before and after aerial photographs of Cerska. On the left, Cerska on 5 July 1995; on
the right, Cerska on 27 July 1995. The yellow rectangle indicates the location of a mass grave.
Source: ICTY, Krstić Case IT-98-33, Exhibits – OTP, available at <http://www.un.org
/icty/cases-e/cis/Krstić/exhibits/1.jpg> (accessed 13 December 2008).
Photograph provided courtesy of the ICTY.
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Figure 6. Interior of the Kravica warehouse.
Source: ICTY, Krstić Case IT-98-33, Exhibits – OTP, available at <http://www.un.org
/icty/cases-e/cis/Krstić/exhibits-e.htm> (accessed 1 February 2009).
Photograph provided courtesy of the ICTY.
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The method by which the bodies were placed in the grave was also deciphered based on the
relationship between the bodies, soil, and vegetation. Victims were counted for the minimum
number of individuals in each grave and amongst all of the graves.143 A demographic profile of
the victims was constructed and included age-at-death and sex distributions.144
Cause of death was determined when possible and the type of weapon, directionality,
range, and any pattern of gunshot wounds assessed. Body position within the grave was
recorded to determine if victims were executed within the grave or placed there after death.
Bullets embedded in the grave floor were recorded as further evidence of possible in situ
executions.
Personal identifications were made of several victims based on comparisons made
between antemortem and postmortem data.145 Personal property found on the bodies greatly
contributed to personal identification. Artifacts found on the victims and loose in the grave also
provided evidence of the victims‟ religious affiliation and geographic origin.146 Artifacts
provided evidence of the victims‟ status as civilians, some of which were handicapped. Selfwinding watches with date windows were examined by Mark Mills, Technical Support Manager
of Seiko, for their potential to date the executions.147 The placement of ligatures and blindfolds
were recorded in situ and the quantity confirmed in a mortuary setting.148
Forensic examinations of soil, shell cases, ligatures, and blindfolds were performed in an
effort to link execution sites, primary graves, and secondary graves.149 Soil samples were
collected from the grave matrix and in close association with bodies, and from each of the
identified execution sites. Tony Brown, a palynologist at the University of Exeter, United
Kingdom, performed mineral and pollen comparison analysis.150 Shell cases were collected and
143
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ejector marks compared by the United States Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms.151 Cloth
blindfolds and ligatures were compared relative to fabric type, weave, pattern, and color by the
Netherlands Forensic Institute.152 Other collected artifacts contributed to the linking of primary
and secondary graves, such as green glass from a bottling factory, found at the primary disturbed
Kozluk mass grave and a related secondary grave, Cancari Road 3.153

Proving Mens Rea

The mens rea of genocide, the requisite mental intent, is:
Genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or
in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such.154
This phrase is compound, complicated, and yet the crux of genocide. The Prosecution and the
Defense interpreted these words quite differently and each argued their version of genocide. The
mens rea of genocide was broken down into its parts, considered for its original object and
purpose, and its words given meaning by the Trial Chamber.155 Portions of the Trial Chamber
Judgment are discussed alongside testimony given by the forensic experts to demonstrate how
the forensic evidence was used to fulfill a legal interpretation of the crime of genocide.
The Trial Chamber concluded that genocide against Bosnian Muslims at Srebrenica was
proven beyond a reasonable doubt by the Prosecution.156 The forensic evidence utilized for each
part of the mens rea of genocide can serve as a template for many other cases that share the
general characteristics of mass executions and mass graves.
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National, Ethnical, Racial or Religious Group, As Such
The Genocide Convention lists four groups that can be targeted in an act of genocide –
national, ethnical, racial, and religious groups. The Prosecution focused their attention to the
victims belonging to the same national and religious group – Bosnian Muslims.157 The Defense
also maintained that Bosnian Muslims made up the only protected group to which genocide laws
would apply.
By using the evidence presented to them, particularly forensic evidence, the Trial
Chamber first confirmed the group identity of the victims. Then the determination had to be
made whether this group was protected by the Genocide Convention.
Religious Group – Muslims. The forensic evidence used to demonstrate the victims were
Muslim included religious artifacts found interred with the victims and personal identification of
known Bosnian Muslims. Manning described the type of Muslim related artifacts found in the
mass graves:
In the majority of sites, Muslim religious artefacts were located, such as small copies of
the Koran, et cetera.
This item was removed from Hodzici 3 grave. The "A" and the number indicates it's an
artefact which normally means separate from a body. It was loose in the grave; during the
disturbance it separated. It was a plastic packing which included this script, which is a
long thin sheet of paper with apparent Muslim verses on it; I've been informed that it's of
a religious nature. It's indicative of the sorts of religious texts, or Muslim texts located in
the graves.158
The two Manning Reports individually list each religious item found in each grave. Artifacts
included prayer beads, miniature Korans, individual pages of the Koran, prayers written in
Arabic, embroidered pouches commonly made by Muslim women, and muskas, small triangle
charms that hold verses of the Koran.159 The Trial Chamber affirmed that the forensic evidence
“suggests the presence of victims with Muslim religious affiliation.”160
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National Group – Bosnians. As a national group, the Prosecution focused on proving the
victims were Bosnians by demonstrating the victims were gathered from Srebrenica. This was
done in three fashions: 1) providing artifacts that connected victims to Srebrenica with
circumstantial evidence, 2) personal identification of victims from Srebrenica, and 3)
demographic similarities between the exhumed victims and missing person‟s lists from
Srebrenica.161 Manning described the forensic evidence to establish the victims as persons from
Srebrenica and in turn, members of the Bosnian national group:
[…] In each of the graves that we exhumed, documentation or other items were found
which provided a positive link to Srebrenica. They included licna carte or licence cards,
identification, other. In some instances, they have provided identification of the victims.
Prosecutor: Can you describe, just in -- using a general example, how the discovery of an
artefact in a mass grave site leads to the identification of someone from Srebrenica?
Manning: In the general sense, the licence card may have the address or the opstina of
Srebrenica on it. It may be some other artefact as documentation from factories, offices,
receipts naming Srebrenica or addresses in Srebrenica.162
Manning confirmed that artifacts linking the victims to Srebrenica were found in every primary
mass grave and every secondary grave. He then illustrated the method by which personal
identifications were made by describing the process which led to the identification of a 15 year
old boy from Srebrenica exhumed from the Cerska grave:
It's a pendant, a gold coloured pendant or necklace with an "S" as part of the pattern. You
can also see on the top of the photo a knot in the chain of that pendant. This was removed
from the victim, Cerska 60.
[…] As part of the attempt to interview, to identify the victims from Srebrenica, families
would report the missing to known government organisations such as PHR and the
International Red Cross. In that process, they would provide as much information as they
could on the description of the individual; age, height, injuries. Also personal effects such
as clothing, such as wallets, such as medallions such as this. This particular thing was
identified by a family prior to it being investigated by the OTP. They drew a picture of a
pendant with an S on it and a knot in the chain. On the basis of that, on the basis of the
161
162
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description of the individual, and the post mortem data, they established that the
individual Cerska 60 was the individual that had been identified as wearing this chain and
this pendant.163
Personal artifacts, in combination with antemortem and postmortem data collected by PHR and
ICRC, and identification of personal belongings by family members led to the personal
identification of 45 persons.164 All 45 persons were Muslim men and all were listed as missing
from Srebrenica. These men were exhumed from five separate graves, representing 4 different
executions.165 Other unique artifacts with identification potential collected from the graves
included photographs; various identification cards including bank, school, medical, and
retirement cards; official government documents including passports, birth, and court documents;
and personal effects such as letters, engraved tobacco tins, and an artificial leg.166
Helge Brunborg, a demographer, testified to a missing persons list compiled by the
merging of the ICRC‟s and PHR‟s missing person‟s lists for Srebrenica.167 The combined
missing persons‟ list contained 7,475 missing persons: only five persons were not Muslim, 93%
were from Eastern Bosnia, and 2,280 were reported missing from Potocari.168 The demographic
work in conjunction with the forensic evidence suggested that the persons listed as missing were
indeed the victims exhumed from mass graves.169 Brunborg described a comparative analysis
performed on the anthropological age-at-death estimation of the victims and the missing persons‟
lists:
Here we have compared the age distribution of the missing persons with the age
distribution of the exhumed bodies… the age distributions are fairly similar. Not
surprisingly similar but they are very similar. This indicates that the exhumed bodies
come from the population of missing persons, that they represent the same population,
you could say.170
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Figure 7 was provided to the Court depicting the similarities among three age groups from the
two sources of information.171 Additionally, only one female was identified
during the forensic examination of exhumed bodies, and the majority of missing persons on the
ICRC list for Srebrenica were males.172 These similarities were noted by
the Trial Chamber in the judgment as supporting evidence that the victims were the missing
persons from Srebrenica.173
Additionally, several survivors of executions testified, all of whom professed to be
Bosnian Muslim men from the Srebrenica area prior to its occupation by Serbs.174 These
survivors also described the men with them at the executions as Bosnian Muslim men, some of
which they knew personally.
The forensic evidence supported the fact that the victims were from Srebrenica, thus
Bosnians and affiliated with the Muslim religion. The Trial Chamber was satisfied that the
victims were Bosnian Muslims.175
As Such. “As such” requires the group to have been targeted because of membership in
that group. The Trial Chamber referred to the ILC:
[…] the intention must be to destroy a group and not merely one or more individuals who
are coincidentally members of a particular group. The […] act must be committed against
an individual because of his membership in a particular group and as an incremental step
in the overall objective of destroying the group.176
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Figure 7. Age distribution of missing persons from Srebrenica
and victims exhumed in the ICTY forensic investigation.

Source: Brunborg H, Lyngstad TH, and Urdal H. Accounting for genocide: how
many were killed in Srebrenica. European Journal of Population 2003;19:229248. Permission granted by author for reproduction.
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The Bosnian Serbs‟ war objective was no secret: the Serbian people were to be united in a single
State.177 Srebrenica lay between Serbia and Serbian populations in western
Bosnia; the area was an especially desirable area over which to gain control. By destroying this
group of Bosnian Muslims the Serbs could gain possession of the land
and further eradicate Bosnian Muslims in the area. The multitude of acts committed against the
Bosnian Muslim people of Srebrenica proved to the Trial Chamber that Bosnian Serb forces
targeted the Bosnian Muslim population of Srebrenica by virtue of their membership in the
group.178 These acts included the transfer of women, children, and the elderly outside of the
Bosnian held territory, the deaths of thousands of Bosnian Muslim men, and the numerous other
violent acts that occurred in the commission of the crime.
The Trial Chamber turned to the preparatory work of the drafters of the Genocide
Convention and other human rights instruments for clarity on whether Bosnian Muslims qualify
as a protected group. The drafting process, with the inclusions and exclusions of various groups,
was found by the Trial Chamber to be a method by which the drafters could describe national
minority groups.179 The Trial Chamber ruled that the protected group that could qualify as
victims of genocide were Bosnian Muslims.180 Further evaluation of the phrase “in whole or in
part” was required to determine if the targeted group constituted a protected part.

In Whole or In Part
The Defense did not challenge the allegation that a significant number of Bosnian
Muslims from Srebrenica were killed.181 They did argue, however, that the required intent to
destroy was not satisfied because the whole group, that being Bosnian Muslims, was not
targeted.182 The Defense argued that the intent to destroy must be targeted towards the whole
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group, citing that the phrase “in whole or in part” referred to the destruction. 183 They further
argued that genocide may occur when there is intent to destroy a whole group, but only a part is
actually destroyed. Conversely, the Prosecution interpreted “in whole or in part” in referring to
the targeted group, to mean a “substantial” part of the group was targeted, either quantitatively or
qualitatively.184
The first draft of the Genocide Convention provides a definition of genocide as:
a criminal act directed against any one of the aforesaid groups of human beings, with the
purpose of destroying it in whole or in part or of preventing its preservation or
development.185
The second draft omits this phrase. The Trial Chamber made an interpretation based upon a
plain reading of the Convention.186 The phrase, “in whole or in part” was determined to be in
reference to the intent to destroy, more consistent with the first draft of the convention.
Therefore, intent to destroy a part of a group could be construed as genocide.
What exactly constitutes “a part” of the group required clarification. Several sources
were provided by the Trial Chamber in their interpretation of “in part” and their judgment that
the Srebrenica victims constituted a part of a protected group. Three ways of interpreting “in
part” were expounded upon: geographical, quantitative, and qualitative.187 Forensic evidence
was used to support each interpretation.
Geographical Limit. The Prosecution argued for the part of the protected group to be
defined as Bosnian Muslims of Srebrenica, and referred to the victim group throughout the trial
as such or alternatively, “Bosnian Muslims of Eastern Bosnia”.188
The Prosecution referenced several judgments that ruled genocide could be committed on a
geographically limited group.189 The ICTY ruled as such in Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisic and
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invited the Prosecution to pursue an indictment of genocide against Dragan Nikolić for acts
performed in one region of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The ICTR found Jean-Paul Akayesu guilty
of genocide in the Taba commune of Rwanda.
The Trial Chamber provided several additional instances of a geographically restricted
interpretation of a group.190 Two separate cases against Bosnian Serbs tried by German courts,
those of Nikola Jorgic and Novislav Djajic, found that genocide was committed in the Doboj
region of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the administrative district of Foca, respectively.
The Trial Chamber concluded that prior rulings had firmly established that a protected
group could be defined by geography as long as there was intent to destroy that distinct,
geographically limited group.191 Artifacts found interred with the victims along with the
personal identification of many Srebrenican residents exhumed from graves convinced the Trial
Chamber that the victims were Bosnian Muslims from Srebrenica.192
Quantitative. The Prosecution‟s interpretation of “in part” having a quantitative meaning
was based on draft code prepared by the International Law Commission in 1996:
It is not necessary to intend to achieve the complete annihilation of a group from every
corner of the globe. None the less the crime of genocide by its very nature requires the
intention to destroy at least a substantial part of a particular group.193
The Trial Chamber further quoted two ICTR judgments, Prosecutor v. Clement Kayishema and
Obed Ruzindana and Prosecutor v. Ignace Bagilishema, which relied upon and confirmed the
ILC‟s quantitative description of “in part”.194 There was a clear precedent for a quantitative
interpretation of “in part” for the Trial Chamber to implement.
What a “substantial” part meant quantitatively was not as clear. To make a quantitative
judgment the Trial Chamber considered numerical data provided by forensic experts and the
forensic demographer to determine whether a significant number of Bosnian Muslims from
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Srebrenica was affected.195 Two calculations were provided to the Trial Chamber by forensic
experts quantifying the number of victims in the mass graves. The merged minimum number of
individuals exhumed from the 21 excavated graves was 2,028.196 Richard Wright estimated an
additional 2,571 bodies were contained in 21 secondary graves that were not excavated, but only
probed to determine size and confirmed as secondary graves by the presence of multiple body
parts.197 A third number was provided by Brunborg. Based on missing person‟s lists generated
by PHR and the ICRC, a minimum of 7,475 persons were missing from Srebrenica.198
A significant amount of testimony was given by the forensic experts regarding the
anthropological method for determining the merged minimum number of individuals (MMNI).199
Jose-Pablo Baraybar explained for the court how MMNI is calculated for multiple graves,
including secondary graves filled with partial bodies and robbed primary graves not fully
emptied.200 A simple count of the most represented portion of bone from one side of the body
was not sufficient under these circumstances. An inventory was made of all bones and
recognizable bone fragments for each grave. This list was then partitioned into three age groups:
12 years and under, 13 to 24 years, and 25 years and older. The bone inventories of related
primary and secondary graves were merged. The most represented bone in each of the three age
groups and among the different related graves was counted to create a conservative MMNI
estimate of 2,028 persons.
Wright testified regarding the numerous secondary graves that were located during the
forensic investigation but not exhumed.201 Twenty-one secondary graves were probed to
determine the shape of the grave and its length and width. Each site was examined to confirm
the presence of multiple body parts within the grave. Wright described the method by which the
estimate of 2,571 additional bodies was made:
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[…] I did it on the grounds that the secondary graves, the seven that we did exhume
along the three roads that we've already discussed, were the same size and shape. What I
did was to average the number of bodies found in those seven graves and extend that
average to the 21 places that we had probed and shown to have multiple body parts.202
Provided this forensic testimony, the Trial Chamber judgment recognized the 2,028
persons as a conservative estimate of the number of victims exhumed from graves.203 They then
generalized in their summary of the facts provided by forensic evidence that “thousands of
Bosnian Muslim men from Srebrenica were killed.”204 Combined with the demographic
evidence provided by Brunborg, the Trial Chamber settled on a figure of 7,000 to 8,000 missing
persons and stated, “the majority of missing people were, in fact, executed and buried in the
mass graves.”205
The Prosecution argued that this was a significant part of the overall group of the 38,000
to 42,000 Bosnian Muslim men in Srebrenica.206 The Defense countered that the protected group
was Bosnian Muslims and that “the killing of up to 7,500 members of a group” did not make up
a significant part of the 1.4 million Bosnian Muslim population.207 The Defense added that that
number of victims, when in comparison to the approximately 40,000 Bosnian Muslim men in
Srebrenica, was still not significant.208 The Trial Chamber did not rule on a quantitative part
separate from their decision regarding a qualitative part.
Qualitative. A qualitative interpretation of “in part” considers which segment of the
population was targeted. The Prosecution referenced the ICTY Jelisic judgment to support their
efforts to define the Bosnian Muslim men of military age from Srebrenica as a protected group:
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The intention demonstrated by the accused to destroy a part of the group would therefore
have to affect either a major part of the group or a representative fraction thereof, such as
its leaders.209
The Prosecution argued that Bosnian Muslim men of military age were targeted due to the
impact that the loss of this segment of the population would have on Bosnian Muslims in
Srebrenica as a whole. 210 They argued that military age men were providers for the family, and
the loss of said providers would disrupt the patriarchal society to an extent that threatened the
group as a whole.
The Prosecution used forensic evidence to establish that Bosnian Muslim men of military
age were specifically targeted as a group. The Manning Reports and the forensic testimony
provided victim demographic information, including age-at-death and sex, for each grave
exhumed. After being questioned on the general use of osteological indicators of sex used by
forensic anthropologists, including the pelvis, skull and long bones, Baraybar described the
standards used to determine sex during the Srebrenica investigations:
We have taken a very conservative approach. In other words, whenever the pelvic bones
were not present, sex was not ascertained.211
Forensic anthropologists determined the sex of 1,843 bodies; all but one individual was male.212
The one female, a full skeleton, was exhumed from Konjevic Polje 1.213 Her presence led
Baraybar to reiterate the conservative approach used when determining sex. He testified that
none of the remains classified as undetermined due to fragmentation or other reasons
demonstrated female features.214

Krstić Judgment, para. 582; see also ICTY, Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisic, Case IT-95-10-T, Judgment (14
December 1999), para. 81.
210
Krstić Judgment, para. 592.
211
Prosecutor v. Krstić, Baraybar, T. 3790.
212
Krstić Judgment, para. 74.
213
Manning Report, Annex A, 61.
214
Prosecutor v. Krstić, Baraybar, T. 3885-3886.
209

63

Baraybar, having been involved in the anthropological examination of victims from
Srebrenica throughout the investigation, testified on the most represented age-at-death of victims
exhumed from 1996 through 1999:
The majority of the remains in this case, 1.547 are individuals of 25 or more at death. I
have created a breakdown of this 25-and-more category using some specific indicators
like the pubic bone I mentioned yesterday.
That information still tells us that most of the people are still clustered between the third,
fourth and fifth decade, that the majority of the 24-and-more individuals cluster around
those ages.215
Although the majority of victims were aged 25 years or older, 17.5% of victims aged under 25
years.216 Additionally, at least one child may have been as young as 8 years old, and a number of
victims were over the age of 65 years.217
The Trial Chamber cited other sources with similar conclusions regarding a qualitative
part of a group. The 1985 Whitaker Report described “in part” to include a “significant section
of a group, such as its leadership.”218 The Final Report of the Commission of Experts further
defined leadership to include a group‟s political, administrative, religious, academic, intellectual,
and business leaders.219
As a second element of the qualitative descriptor of “in part”, the Final Report of the
Commission of Experts also took into consideration the actions taken towards the remaining
segment of the population:
the attack on the leadership must be viewed in the context of the fate of what happened to
the rest of the group. If a group suffers extermination of its leadership and in the wake of
that loss, a large number of its members are killed or subjected to other heinous acts, for
example deportation, the cluster of violations ought to be considered in its entirety in
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order to interpret the provisions of the Convention in a spirit consistent with its
purpose.220
The Trial Chamber found that Bosnian Muslim women, children, and the elderly were deported
by force from Potocari.221 Prior to the deportation, acts were committed to terrorize the
population, including selective burning of houses, rape, murder, and verbal demands to leave the
area.222 There was no effort to conceal the crimes, and witnesses testified that the acts clearly
sent the message that Bosnian Muslims would not continue to live in Srebrenica.223
The Trial Chamber judged genocide could be geographically constrained and were
convinced that the combination of the loss of 7,000 – 8,000 men from a patriarchal society, and
the removal of all other Bosnian Muslims from Srebrenica, “would have a lasting impact upon
the entire group.”224 The Trial Chamber determined that a protected group was targeted in part.
The last thing needed to satisfy the mens rea of genocide was to establish intent to destroy the
group.

Intent to Destroy
The Prosecution presented an interpretation of “an intent to destroy” that included a
conscious desire for the acts performed to lead to the destruction of the group or knowledge that
the acts were destroying or likely to destroy the group.225 The Prosecution cited a March 1995
directive from Radovan Karadžić, the President of Republika Srpska, to VRS forces regarding
Srebrenica:
By planned and well-thought out combat operations, create an unbearable situation of
total insecurity with no hope of further survival or life for the inhabitants of
Srebrenica.226
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The deportation of women, children, and the elderly synchronized with the murder of all men of
military age was described as a concomitant act performed to encumber the community‟s ability
to return to the area. 227 The Prosecution argued that it was impossible for the VRS troops not to
predict that the massacre of men would disrupt the cultural and social norms of the community.
The Defense claimed that the crime of genocide requires “a higher form of
premeditation” than was ever made prior to the events that unfolded in Srebrenica.228 The
transfer of women, children, and the elderly was presented as proof that there was no intent to
destroy the group. Had the VRS wanted to destroy the Bosnian Muslim group they would not
have invested the time and effort to safely transfer this portion of the population, defined as those
not of a military threat, from Srebrenica.229 The Defense claimed that the murder of 7,500 men
was the result of intent to eliminate any military threat and executed as retaliation against the
Bosnia and Herzegovina Army for their refusal to surrender to the VRS.230
The Trial Chamber referenced the preparatory work of the Genocide Convention drafters
and numerous other sources for their interpretation of “intent to destroy”, including ICTR cases,
the ILC, and domestic law of certain States.231 The ILC interpreted intent as more stringent than
“a general awareness of the probable consequences,” requiring “a particular state of mind” or
“specific intent” to the overall consequences.232 The other referenced sources were consistent
with their interpretation of genocide to include a specific intent to destroy the group, in whole or
in part, as the goal of committing the acts. The Trial Chamber chose to consider only acts
committed with the goal of destroying all or part of a group as potentially an act of genocide.233
However, the Trial Chamber also asserted that premeditation over a long period of time was not
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required and although the original goal of a particular action may not have been to destroy a
group it is possible for the goal to change.234
Intent is a particular state of mind that can be difficult to prove without a confession.
Intent to destroy part of the Bosnian Muslim group was inferred from the evidence indicating the
killings were planned based on who was targeted; how, when, and where they were killed; the
number of persons killed; and the planning and organization required to carry out such acts.235
Forensic evidence provided much of this information.
Civilian Victims of No Military Threat. The civilian status of the victims shows intent to
destroy the whole group of Bosnian Muslim men, not only those that posed a threat to the
military. The excavations and examinations of the victims revealed that they uniformly wore
and carried civilian clothing, were not armed with weapons, some were handicapped, and in
some instances had received medical attention for injuries just prior to their deaths.
Clothing of the victims was examined at the time of exhumation and again in a morgue
setting. Wright testified to the lack of military clothing found on victims:
Prosecutor: Professor Wright, in your statement about the exhumations in 1998, within
the frameworks of your conclusions you state that none of the 857 individuals were
wearing military uniforms. Can you tell us -- can you explain to us what you mean by the
term "to wear military uniform"? What do you consider that term to mean in your
statement?
Wright: By that statement, I mean that I did not see essentially khaki jackets and khaki
trousers of the sort that I associate internationally with military wear.236
Christopher Lawrence described only one uniform type of clothing observed during autopsy, that
of a blue uniform lacking any military insignia.237 The only piece of clothing with military
significance was a singular Yugoslav National Army jacket removed from Cancari Road 3.238
Baraybar described an abundance of clothing, still folded “as if it was part of somebody‟s
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luggage” at Nova Kasaba 4.239 Testimony describing civilian clothing being found loose in
graves was also given in regards to Konjevic Polje 1 where a bag filled with clothing was
unearthed and at Glogova 02.240
Of all the grave sites exhumed, only one weapon was found. At Glogova 2 a Beretta
7.65mm pistol loaded with 6 rounds of ammunition was found in association with a body.241 The
man was wearing civilian clothing – black leather jacket, green tartan shirt, olive-green T-shirt,
and brown trousers.242
Permanent disabilities and chronic medical conditions were documented during the
pathological and/or anthropological examination of the victims. Men were found with severe
sclerosis of the spine, old unhealed hip fractures, a grossly deformed ulna, and other conditions
that were presumably physically debilitating.243 John Clark described several of the Kozluk
victims‟ permanent disabilities and medical conditions:
[…] They were not a uniformly fit group of people, and a significant number had
physical disabilities or some evidence of chronic disease […] This is a photograph of
somebody's elbow joint, upper arm here and forearm here. Now, the elbow joint, as we
all know, normally moves. This person is completely rigid. The bones are just joined,
fused together, no movement whatsoever. This person would have had a fixed -- fixed
elbow joint. Similarly, one man had a completely fused knee joint. The two bones at the
knee joint are just stuck together. Whether that's from an old injury or from disease it was
difficult to say, but, undoubtedly, he would have walked with a completely straight leg.
He wouldn't have been able to bend it. There were other people. Somebody had a glass
eye. One man had a big plate inside his skull. He'd obviously had previous surgery.
Somebody had evidence of open-heart surgery, coronary artery bypass surgery. Several
had old fracture -- bony fractures. One man had an inhaler, Celbutimol [phoen] inhaler
for asthma and there were a number of other deformities and illnesses.244
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The Trial Chamber made the conclusion that “severely handicapped” victims were “unlikely to
have been combatants.”245
Medical equipment found in graves and on the bodies of victims indicated some victims
were injured and received rudimentary medical attention prior to their deaths. Two stretchers
made from tree branches between which a blanket was tied were exhumed in Nova Kasaba as
well as a splint made from two tree branches and a bandage fashioned to stabilize a fractured
lower leg.246 Bandages were found on limbs, around hands, and wrapped around shrapnel
injuries and non-fatal gunshot wounds.247 Men had suffered gunshot wounds to the legs, yet had
treated and bandaged them prior to death.248
The lack of military clothing and weapons together with the prevalence of physical
deformities, evidence of chronic disease, and perimortem injuries found on bodies dispersed
throughout several graves characterize the group as less than able- bodied and not likely to be
part of a militia. The Trial Chamber found that:
All of the executions systematically targeted Bosnian Muslim men of military age,
regardless of whether they were civilians or soldiers.249
Witness Testimony of Systematic Massacres and Methodical Executions. A main goal of
a forensic investigation is to corroborate or negate witness testimony.250 Witness testimony,
supported by forensic evidence, provided details of when and where the victims were captured,
when and where they were killed, how they were killed, and how and where they were buried.
Each of the actions taken by the perpetrators that required planning or coordination to conduct
the executions or burial of victims contributed to the proving of intent to destroy the group.
Several witnesses testified of highly organized executions. The experiences described by
witnesses at several different execution sites involved the capturing of small groups of Bosnian
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Muslim men, their transportation to detention sites, the consolidation of smaller groups of men
into larger buildings, and executions in an organized fashion. Some massacres took place within
the detention building where the victims were held, such as the Kravica Warehouse and Pilica
Dom Cultural Center. Other executions took place outdoors at a short distance from the
detention area.
Witness J and K were survivors of the Kravica Warehouse, having hid under dead bodies
and playing dead, respectively, until they could escape. Both men were walking to Tuzla after
hearing Srebrenica was captured by the Serbs. Witness J was captured on 13 July 1995 when his
group was ambushed while treating the wounded in the forest.251 He was taken to the Sandici
Meadow where thousands of other Bosnian men were being guarded. Witness K surrendered on
13 July 1995 at the road between Bratunac and Konjevic Polje and was taken to the same
meadow.252 Later that afternoon the thousands of men captured in the forest and brought to the
meadow were transferred to the Kravica Warehouse. Witness J was marched there while
Witness K was transported in a bus. 253 Witness J described the events that occurred minutes
after walking into the Kravica Warehouse:
[…] And all of a sudden there was a lot of shooting in the warehouse, and we didn't know
where it was coming from. There were rifles, grenades, bursts of gunfire and it was -- it
got so dark in the warehouse that we couldn't see anything. People started to scream, to
shout, crying for help. And then there would be a lull, and then all of a sudden it would
start again. And they kept shooting like that until nightfall in the warehouse.254
Witness K was in a different room but recalled the same terror.255
An investigation of the interior of the Kravica Warehouse revealed evidence of gunfire
and explosions.256 The concrete walls were impacted and a doorframe was damaged from an
inward force. Samples of blood, hair, and tissue were collected from the building and examined
by the Netherlands Forensic Science Laboratory for the presence of human DNA; 142 of the 149
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samples contained human DNA.257 The same forensic laboratory examined 23 samples of
explosive residue collected from the warehouse; two tested positive for trinitrotoluene, or
TNT.258 Eleven grenade handles were found, as well as numerous shell casings and
projectiles.259
The Kravica Warehouse victims were buried in the primary Glogova 1 and 2 graves.260
Ejector marks on shell casings collected from in and around the warehouse were analyzed by the
United States Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms for comparison to shell cases collected
from grave sites. Two shell casings matched a single shell casing from the secondary Zeleni
Jadar 5 grave and Zeleni Jadar 5 was linked with the primary Glogova 2 grave by soil and pollen
comparative analysis.261 At Glogova 1, concrete from the walls of the Kravica Warehouse, the
missing pieces of the doorframe, and several grenade fragments were excavated from within the
grave matrix intermixed with the mass of bodies.262 The bodies exhumed from Glogova 1 also
exhibited severe blast and shrapnel injuries in addition to gunshot wounds.263 The Trial
Chamber determined that the forensic evidence corroborated the survivors‟ testimonies.264
Witness N survived the Orahovac executions and Witness Q survived the Branjevo Farm
executions. The beginnings of their stories were very similar to those of Witness J and K
reflecting intent through planning of detention areas and consolidation of several groups of
detainees. The executions Witness N and Q survived occurred on the 14th and 16th of July,
respectively.265
Witness N was separated from his wife and children in Potocari on 12 July.266 He was
first detained in a house and was then transported to a warehouse where he was detained for one
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full day as other men continued to arrive.267 On the night of the 13th, Witness N and the other
prisoners were transported to a second detention site, a school gymnasium in Orahovac.268
Similarly, more men arrived throughout the day.269 On the night of the 14th, small groups of men
were given a drink of water, blindfolded, then transported a short distance in a small truck to a
field.270 Witness N testified to what he witnessed there:
[…] And I was the last one in the truck, so I was taken out first. And they showed me
where I was supposed to stand, next to some dead bodies. And everybody was lined up
like that, in several rows, with their backs facing them.
The tamic left immediately, and immediately after it had left, we heard automatic rifles
being fired. Everybody fell down at that point, and those who were not killed, who were
still giving some signs of life, were shot at individually, were killed individually. I didn't
dare move. I was just looking downwards towards the ground.
[..] They continued bringing people and killing people and this lasted until dusk. Behind
my back there was an excavator who was digging a mass grave.271
Forensic evidence verified Witness N‟s testimony.272 Aerial photographs of the Orahovac
execution site show a disturbance to the ground on 19 July 1995 that was not present on 5 July
1995.273 The disturbed areas cover the primary graves of Lazete 1 and 2. At Lazete 1, the MNI
was 130, 125 of which died of gunshot wounds.274 One hundred and eighty two men were
exhumed from Lazete 2 and the cause of death for 173 men was gunshot wounds.275 Two
hundred and seventy-seven bullets and a representative sample of 1,451 shell casings were
collected from the surface and matrix of the two graves.276 Comparison studies of shell casings,
soil and pollen samples, and ligatures and blindfolds support a relationship between the school at
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which the Orahovac victims were held, Lazete 1, and the secondary grave of Hodzici 5 and link
Lazete 2 and the secondary graves of Hodzici 3 and 4.277 The majority of men in these
secondary graves also died as a result of gunshot wounds and more bullets and shell casings were
collected.278 Witness N testified that men were blindfolded prior to their transport to the
execution site.279 A total of 375 blindfolds were collected from the Lazete 1 and 2 and Hodzici
Road 3, 4, and 5 graves.280
Witness Q survived the Branjevo Farm executions. He had left Potocari on
12 July with the column of men and was captured in the Nova Kasaba area on the morning of 13
July.281 The group of men with whom he was captured was taken to a school where other men
were being held.282 Later that afternoon, all of the men were forced to march to a football
stadium.283 There 1,500 to 2,000 Muslim men were being detained.284 That night the men were
put on buses and joined a caravan of vehicles transporting prisoners.285 In the morning they
arrived at the Pilica School where they joined more men.286 The prisoners spent the nights of 14
and 15 July in the school. Witness Q testified to what he observed on the morning of the 16th:
And as we were leaving the school building, they told us to line up against a wall, put our
hands against our backs, and this is where our hands were tied up.
Three buses were parked there, and we climbed onto the second bus. […] And once the
buses were filled up, they left. They started along the same road we had taken when we
came to the school. At one point we turned right and reached a meadow. On that meadow
I saw a large number of dead bodies. The buses stopped on a road near the meadow, and I
could see a hangar there and people lying about, killed.
When the buses stopped, soldiers started taking out groups of people who were tied up.
They were taking them in one column. They had to put their hands behind their backs.
Those were groups of ten people which were taken to the area where the dead bodies
277
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were, on the meadow, and this is where they were killed. And then they would shoot at
each one of them individually, and this is what I could observe from the bus.287
Aerial photographs taken of the Branjevo Farm on 17 July 1995, the day after the executions
described by Witness Q, shows bodies lying on the ground, soil marks
made by an excavator, and the burial area where the bodies were being buried (Figure 8).288 The
Branjevo Farm grave was linked to the secondary Cancari Road 12 grave through soil and pollen
samples and similar blindfolds and ligatures.289 The MNI for the two graves was 28, and all but
four complete to mostly complete bodies were determined to have died due to gunshot
wounds.290 Witness Q testified that the men‟s hands were tied behind their backs before they
were executed.291 Ninety nine ligatures were collected from the two graves, 88 of which were
still binding the victims‟ arms or wrists.292
The forensic testimony corroborated the survivors‟ testimony of dates, places, use of
blindfolds and ligatures, and cause of death.293 By corroborating the witnesses‟ testimony with
forensic evidence, the witness testimony of how they were captured, who captured them, how the
perpetrators acted, who the other victims were, and the events that took place could all be
admitted as solid evidence. These three very similar testimonies from three separate execution
sites describe actions taken that indicate that there was communication between the perpetrators,
an organized plan, coordinated efforts, and time taken to execute the plan. All of these factors
contribute to establishing intent to destroy.
The Trial Chamber used the words “systematically massacred” and “careful and
methodical mass executions” to describe the death of the 7,000 to 8,000 Bosnian Muslim men.294
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Figure 8. Aerial photograph of Branjevo Farm on 17 July 1995.
Source: ICTY, Krstić Case IT-98-33, Exhibits – OTP, available at <http://www.un.org
/icty/cases-e/cis/Krstić/exhibits/7.jpg> (accessed 13 December 2008).
Photograph provided courtesy of the ICTY.
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Their capture and detention was described as “well organized and comprehensive.”295 The Trial
Chamber was satisfied that the testimony of the survivors regarding their experiences was true
based on the forensic evidence and aerial photography that corroborated their testimony.296
Execution Style Deaths. Forensic evidence was able to demonstrate a systematic
execution of victims interred at Glogova 05, a primary, undisturbed sub-grave of Glogova 2, and
Glogova L, a grave only spatially related to the other Glogova graves. Consistent placement of
gunshot wounds to a particular region of the body was presented as a result of controlled and
orderly killing. John Clark described the high velocity rifle injuries to the victims of Glogova
05:
[…] There was one particular pattern that emerged from the graves, and this again was
GL-05. This was the grave with the preponderance of young men in it. There was a very
typical pattern of injury in these people of a gunshot injury to the back, to the middle of
the spine. Sometimes -- in a lot of cases that have the only injury. In other -- some of the
victims there were additional shots perhaps to the head, but this was a very repetitive
injury and a constant finding of shattered bones in the middle of the spine.297
The MNI for Glogova 05 was 90 and 46 of 73 complete bodies had spinal fractures.298 Grave L
held 12 male victims whose wrists were tied behind their backs and then tied with others in pairs.
All twelve suffered a single gunshot wound to the back or side of the head.299
Prepared Graves. Another indicator of preplanning identified during the forensic
archaeological excavation was the preparation of graves prior to the execution of the victims.
This was inferred from the bodies‟ resting position and the presence of bullets embedded in the
floor of the grave.
The victims‟ body positions in Nova Kasaba grave NKS1 and NKS2, exhumed in 1996,
suggest they were shot while in the grave.300 Thirty three males aged from 15 to 50 years were
exhumed. All but one died of gunshot wounds; the cause of death for this individual was
Krstić Judgment, para. 85.
Krstić Judgment, para. 4, 79.
297
Prosecutor v. Krstić, Clark, T. 3934; see also Manning Report, Annex A, 50.
298
Manning Report, Annex A, 50.
299
Additional Manning Report, 12.
300
Manning Report, Annex A, 13.
295
296

76

massive head wounds inflicted by an undetermined instrument.301 Twenty seven of the men had
their hands bound behind their backs with various materials: 25 wire ligatures, 1 rope, and 1
shoelace.302 Haglund testified how body position can indicate the victims were shot and died in
the grave:
In grave number NSK-2, the grave containing the 19 individuals, some were in kneeling
positions, some were in sitting positions with their heads slumped forward, and these
were positions that, in my experience, would not be -- we would not encounter by
individuals being thrown into a grave. It would be my opinion that they most likely were
in those positions in those graves and shot in the grave.303
Additional evidence of victims being killed within graves was found at Kozluk, Konjevic
Polje 2, and one Nova Kasaba 1999 grave, NK6.304 At each of these sites, the archaeological
excavation of the grave revealed bullets embedded below the surface of the grave floor directly
beneath the bodies. Baraybar described the recovery of bullets embedded in the floor of the
Nova Kasaba 1999 grave:
Individual number 2 -- or under, rather, individual number 2, a number of bullets were
recovered, and by "bullets" I mean fired rounds, slugs. A total of basically five were
recovered from under this individual. […] In all these cases, the bullets were embedded
in the soil. They were not lying on the surface. They were at least an inch or less between
-- let's say half an inch and an inch embedded in the soil. An interpretation we draw from
this is that this individual was most likely shot while lying in the grave.305
It can be deduced that if victims were shot while in the grave, the grave was dug expectantly and
prior to the executions.
Ligatures and Blindfolds. The excavation of so many ligatures and blindfolds from the
graves was particularly damaging to the Defense (Figure 9). Ten sites held 448 blindfolds and
thirteen sites held 423 ligatures (Table 2).306 In total, nine of 14 primary graves held ligatures
and/or blindfolds and some were found in graves that related to all eight known execution sites.
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Figure 9. An exhumed body exhibiting a blindfold and ligature.
Source: ICTY, Krstić Case IT-98-33, Exhibits – OTP, available at <http://www.un.org
/icty/cases-e/cis/Krstić/exhibits-e.htm> (accessed 1 February 2009).
Photograph provided courtesy of the ICTY.
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Table 2. MNI and MMNI calculations compared to number of ligatures and blindfolds collected
at each grave site. (Adapted from Additional Manning Report, p. 12).
Exhumed Mass Graves

MNI

MMNI

Ligatures

Primary Graves, nondisturbed
Cerska
Konjevic Polje 1
Konjevic Polje 2
Nova Kasaba 1996
Nova Kasaba 1999

150
9
3
33
55

150
9
3
33
55

48

90

90

Glogova 051
Ravince

Blindfolds

27

2

Linked Graves, primary disturbed (PD) and secondary (S)
Lazete 2 (PD)
164
243
Lazete 2C (PD)
17
Hodzici Road 5 (S)

57

Lazete 1 (PD)

130

Hodzici Road 3 (S)

45

Hodzici Road 4 (S)

82

Branjevo Military Farm (PD)

132

Cancari Road 12 (S)

174

Petkovci Dam (PD)

43

Liplje 2 (S)

191

Glogova 2 (PD)

49

Zeleni Jadar 5 (S)

145

Kozluk (PD)

340

Cancari Road 3 (S)

158

1

107

4

40

1

34
138

250

16
40

283

219

187

506

Glogova 12 (PD)

83

2

16

8

1
23

2
168

55

37

8

12

Totals

2028

1

423

448

A subgrave of Glogova 2 that was not disturbed.
2
Autopsies and anthropological examinations were not completed prior to the Krstić judgment.
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Ligatures and blindfolds served many purposes for the Prosecution. They proved
valuable in establishing relationships between execution sites, primary graves, and secondary
graves. The Trial Chamber described the presence of ligatures and blindfolds as “inconsistent
with combat casualties.”307 They also aided in establishing the intent to destroy. These items
indicated a clear, controlled overpowering of the victims, and that planning was required to
procure ligatures and blindfolds prior to executions. Survivors‟ testimonies showed the
organization of the blindfolding and/or ligaturing of victims prior to their death.
Witness L survived the executions at Orahovac and testified regarding the prisoners being
blindfolded prior to their transfer to the field where they were killed and buried:
After that, at the opening to the left, there were two Serb soldiers standing there and a
Serb woman in uniform. They brought a pile of rags with which they tied our eyes. […]
There were these pieces of cloth; they were about 60 centimetres long, five or six
centimetres wide; they were mostly patterned so you couldn't see through them.308
Blindfolds were one source of evidence that linked the execution site of Orahovac and the
victims in the primary graves of Lazete 1 and 2, and the secondary graves of Hodzici Road
graves 3, 4, and 5.309 Strips of cloth found outside the gymnasium in which the prisoners were
held prior to their execution were described by the Trial Chambers as “indistinguishable” from
blindfolds recovered from Lazete 2 and those from Lazete 1 had a “striking similarity” with
blindfolds from Lazete 2 and the Hodzici Road graves. 310 The MMNI from the Orahovac
related excavations was 493.311 Three hundred and seventy-five blindfolds were removed from
the six linked graves. The witness testimony agreed with the forensic evidence.312 The presence
of any blindfolds or ligatures counters a Defense that the men were combat casualties, and the
quantity suggests coordinated planning and preparation for executions.
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Concealment of Bodies. The Trial Chamber also considered the concealment of bodies in
mass graves and the subsequent movement of bodies to secondary graves as a further indication
of intent to destroy the Bosnian Muslim population of Srebrenica.313 The location of these
secondary graves and the physical damage done to the victims‟ bodies as a consequence of
moving them to secondary graves were determined to be indications of intent to destroy the
Bosnian Muslims of Srebrenica.314 These actions were found to prevent any survivors the ability
to bury the dead according to religious and ethnic customs, causing distress to the survivors. The
forensic investigation contributed to proving there was an effort to conceal the graves by
providing evidence of the existence of secondary graves and establishing their relationship to
primary execution sites and primary graves associated with the Srebrenica massacres.315
Comparative analysis of cloth ligatures and blindfolds linked execution sites to primary
and secondary graves.316 The fabric type, weave, pattern, color, and other distinguishing
characteristics were used to match cloths. These results paralleled the results of independent
comparative analysis of ejector marks on shell cases collected from execution and grave sites. A
third comparative analysis of soil, rock, and pollen samples produced distinctive mineralogical
and pollen signatures that linked primary and secondary graves.317 These results were also
consistent with the cloth and ejector mark study results.318 Taken together the comparative
analyses established at least one link between all five primary disturbed graves and one or more
of the seven secondary sites examined prior to the forensic experts‟ testimony.319 The only result
that was not consistent with other established links was a match between cloths collected from
the secondary graves Hodzici Road 4 and Liplje 2.320
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Another significant link made between an execution and primary grave site and a
secondary grave involved the transfer of broken green glass bottles and labels. Excavation of
Cancari Road 3 revealed an abundance of green glass dispersed within the grave and among the
bodies.321 Labels reading “Vitinka” were also found which led the forensic investigation to a
bottling factory in Kozluk. There the Kozluk primary disturbed grave was located near a dump
site for broken bottles (Figure 10).322 This artifactual evidence also linked Cancari Road 1, a
secondary grave that was probed but not exhumed, to Kozluk.
The location and the damaging nature of the creation of the secondary graves was
considered as further evidence of the intent to destroy. Secondary graves were created in very
remote areas. Trial Chamber Judge Rodrigues questioned Jene-Rene Ruez on his repetitive
reference to graves being in remote places.323 Ruez answered:
I said remote places. I could also have said isolated places, and even desolated places,
completely destroyed places. The reason why, I believe, this is very important is that this
is part of an operation aimed to conceal the crime, and this massive effort of hiding these
bodies was certainly much more successful if the bodies were taken in areas where
probably no one would have at least resettled for years. At the moment it was done, there
was probably an expectation that no one would resettle in these places before a couple of
years, and this is, indeed, what happened. The first refugees are coming back in this
place, in fact, since last year, and mainly this year. So there was very little risk for the
perpetrators to have someone coming across one of these sites, even by accident.324
In the process of moving the bodies to these more remote locations, bodies were mutilated and
dismembered. Ruez described this process and its impact on the bodies while the Court watched
a film showing the exhumation of a secondary grave:
Since it is a secondary site, there are very few complete bodies in it, due to the way the
initial burial was conducted using heavy equipment, then the unburial using again heavy
equipment, then the transportation in trucks, the dumping from the trucks, the refilling of
the hole with heavy equipment. All this destroys the bodies under. You end up only with
a mixture of body parts.325
321
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Figure 10. Surface remains at Kozluk with broken green glass.
Source: ICTY, Krstić Case IT-98-33, Exhibits – OTP, available at <http://www.un.org
/icty/cases-e/cis/Krstić/exhibits-e.htm> (accessed 1 February 2009).
Photograph provided courtesy of the ICTY.
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Personal identification of the victims was made exceedingly difficult due to the
mutilation of the bodies.326 Survivors were unable to confirm the loss of their loved ones.327
The Trial Chamber found that the creation of secondary graves in remote areas showed intent to
destroy the Bosnian Muslim group by preventing surviving Bosnian Muslims of Srebrenica the
right to bury their fathers, husbands, and brothers according to their religious and ethnic
customs.328 Combined with the destruction of homes of Bosnian Muslims and the mosque in
Srebrenica, the distress this placed on the survivors further inhibited their ability to reestablish as
a community in Srebrenica.329
Intent to destroy was proven by the series of actions taken by Bosnian Serbs at the
Srebrenica enclave, all of which required advance planning and coordination to perform.
Bosnian Serbs terrorized the population of Potocari. Women, children, and the elderly were
transported out of Bosnian Serb held territory. Efforts were made to capture all Bosnian Muslim
men in the region regardless of military or civilian status or health. Those that were captured
were transported to holding areas and then later consolidated in larger detention centers. In an
organized fashion men were blindfolded and ligatured and then systematically executed and
buried in graves concurrently being dug. In some cases graves were prepared beforehand and the
victims were shot in the grave. The graves were then dug up and the bodies reburied in more
remote areas. Forensic evidence was vital to establishing most of these indicators of intent.
The Trial Chamber concluded their examination of intent to destroy:
The Chamber concludes that the intent to kill all the Bosnian Muslim men of military age
in Srebrenica constitutes an intent to destroy in part the Bosnian Muslim group within the
meaning of Article 4 and therefore must be qualified as a genocide.330
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The mens rea of genocide was established; the Prosecution provided the
Evidence to prove that there was an intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a protected group Bosnian Muslims from Srebrenica. The most difficult part of proving genocide was
accomplished.

Proving Actus Reas

The following five acts are acts of genocide:
(a) killing members of the group;
(b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring
about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.331
There was little need to contemplate actus reas. Two of the five acts were found to have
occurred at Srebrenica and Potocari: members of the group were killed, the evidence having been
exhumed from graves, and serious bodily and mental harm was caused, as evidence by testimony
of the few survivors of the executions.332 The Trial Chamber concluded their examination of the
crime of genocide:
[…] the Prosecution has proven beyond all reasonable doubt that genocide, crimes
against humanity and violations of the laws or customs of war were perpetrated against
the Bosnian Muslims, at Srebrenica, in July 1995.333
Characteristics of Genocide

Genocide can be committed in any number of ways. The characteristics of the Srebrenica
genocide are unique to the circumstances of the conflict in which it occurred, but not entirely.
Conflicts that may generate indictments for genocide must share some common features. The
331
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forensic evidence used by the Prosecution to prove genocide, affirmed by the Trial Chamber,
established a pattern for the collection and presentation of evidence that can be adapted to other
situations and cases of genocide. The goals of the forensic investigation remain the same: to
provide evidence regarding 1) the identity of the victims, 2) their manner and cause of death, 3)
patterns of injury, and 4) time of death.334 With this type of information, if genocide did occur,
the Prosecution has the evidence needed to present a case that fulfills the mens rea and actus
reas of genocide.
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Chapter Five
INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY

On the 15th of July in the morning, the security chief of the Main Staff called you and
asked for your help in dealing with 3.500 packages. You knew exactly, you knew exactly,
what was meant by "packages," General Krstić: Bosnian Muslims who were to be
executed.335 (Judge Rodrigues, speaking prior to the judgment of General Krstić in the
Trial Chamber)
Genocide was proven to have taken place but who could be held criminally
responsible for the crime? Evidence presented to establish the crime of genocide must be linked
to the indicted individual. The Statute of the ICTY regulates individual criminal responsibility in
Article 7:
1. A person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and
abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime referred to in
articles 2 to 5 of the present Statute, shall be individually responsible for the
crime.
2. The official position of any accused person, whether as Head of State or
Government or as a responsible Government official, shall not relieve such
person of criminal responsibility nor mitigate punishment.
3. The fact that any of the acts referred to in articles 2 to 5 of the present Statute
was committed by a subordinate does not relieve his superior of criminal
responsibility if he knew or had reason to know that the subordinate was
about to commit such acts or had done so and the superior failed to take the
necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the
perpetrators thereof.
4. The fact that an accused person acted pursuant to an order of a Government or
of a superior shall not relieve him of criminal responsibility, but may be
considered in mitigation of punishment if the International Tribunal
determines that justice so requires.336
335
336

Prosecutor v. Krstić, Judge Rodrigues, T. 10188.
ICTY Statute, Article 7.

87

Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstić
The Prosecution alleged Radislav Krstić was criminally responsible pursuant to Article
7(1) and 7(3).337 Article 7(3), allowing criminal responsibility to be attributed to superiors based
on the actions of subordinates, spurred conflicting accounts of Krstić‟s position within the chain
of command of the Drina Corps.
Both the Prosecution and Defense agreed that Krstić held the position of Chief of Staff of
the Drina Corps at the beginning of operation Krivaja 95; however, it was the actions following
this operation that were determined to be acts of genocide. The Prosecution presented evidence
that Krstić was appointed Corps Commander on 13 July, and the Defense contended Krstić did
not assume responsibility as the Corps Commander until 20 July.338 This particular point was
very relevant considering there was no clear evidence of Krstić‟s direct involvement in or
presence at any execution.339 Krstić maintained that he was solely focused on his assigned
upcoming operations in Žepa throughout the time frame identified as the end of Krivaja 95 and
the Srebrenica massacres and that he had no knowledge of the crimes committed in Srebrenica
until the end of August at the earliest.340
Written records, eyewitness accounts, and intercepted conversations among high level
Drina Corps staff provided by the Prosecution were accepted by the Trial Chamber as evidence
establishing that General Krstić was appointed to and recognized as, if not yet officially on
paper, the Drina Corps Commander from 13 July 1995.341 This finding allowed the Prosecution
to prove Krstić‟s individual criminal responsibility by the submission of evidence that linked him
and/or subordinate Drina Corps Brigades to the genocide. This included forensic evidence that
linked the Drina Corps Brigades with the detention or execution of Bosnian Muslim men or the
creation and filling of mass graves.
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Two crimes were considered separately when determining Krstić‟s criminal
responsibility: 1) the forcible transfer of women, children, and the elderly from Potocari during
the Krijava 95 operation and 2) the mass execution of military-aged Bosnian Muslim men of
Srebrenica.342

Krijava 95
The forcible transfer of women, children, and the elderly was considered by the Trial
Chamber as crimes against humanity and as a contributing act to the intent to destroy the
Bosnian Muslim group in Srebrenica. Krstić accepted the Drina Corps responsibility for the
military operation in Srebrenica and was captured on film walking the empty streets with
General Mladic after its population was forced to flee.343 At Potocari he witnessed the
mistreatment of the people who fled there looking for safety but found no food or shelter and
were exposed to murders, rapes, beatings, and abuses by armed forces.344 Krstić was responsible
for the procurement and organization of buses to remove civilians from Potocari.345 In
accordance with Article 7(1), the Trial Chamber found Krstić criminally responsible for
inhumane acts and persecution as a crime against humanity, due to his direct participation in the
planning and execution of the crimes committed from 11 to 13 July 1995 at Potocari.346 Krijava
95 would also contribute to his finding of guilt for the crime of genocide.

Mass Executions and Burials
The Prosecution was unable to physically place Krstić at any of the execution sites.347
Krstić‟s liability for the capture, detention, and execution of men from Potocari and from the
column of men in the forest was established by chronicling the involvement of subordinate Drina
Corps Brigades at each step of the process and his own knowledge and actions taken at that
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time.348 Forensic evidence was introduced to support arguments that General Krstić, by virtue of
his position as Drina Corps Commander, must have been aware of the genocide unfolding, the
execution of men, their burial, and subsequent reburial based on the locale of the operation, its
large scale, and the resources required to perform the operation.
Capture and Detention. Several facts concerning the Drina Corps‟ involvement were
established by the Prosecution through written records, eyewitness accounts, and intercepted
conversations, and were accepted by the Trial Chamber as truth. Drina Corps personnel were
present during the separation of men from women, children, and the elderly in Potocari, and were
aware of their transportation to the Bratunac detention site.349 At least two Drina Corps
Brigades, the Bratunac and Zvornik Brigades, engaged in combat with the column of men fleeing
through the surrounding forest.350 The Drina Corps Command was aware of the capture of
thousands of prisoners, their detention at Bratunac, and transport from Bratunac to detention
sites.351 Buses originally procured to transport the women, children, and the elderly out of
Potocari were used to transport men to detention and execution sites.352 The secondary detention
sites were located within the zone of responsibility of the Zvornik Brigade who, aware of the
impending arrival of thousands of men, had prepared for their arrival by visiting locations that
would be used as detention sites.353
The Trial Chamber found that the Drina Corps Command, including General Krstić, must
have known what was occurring in their zone of responsibility up to 13 July 1995, and at that
time a plan existed to execute the thousands of captured military aged Bosnian Muslim men.354
Executions and Primary Graves. Forensic evidence contributed to establishing the
involvement of the Drina Corps in the mass burial of Bosnian Muslim men. Forensic
archaeological evidence indicating the use of heavy construction machinery at primary grave
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sites, corroborated with records kept by Drina Corps Brigades regarding the date and location of
the use of heavy machinery, vehicle transportation records, and fuel logs, linked the Drina Corps
Brigades with the creation and filling of primary graves. In a few instances, aerial photographs
captured the heavy machinery at the site of primary graves the same day as the executions.
Witness testimony also supported the forensic evidence regarding the use of heavy machinery at
primary graves.
The excavation of the graves as evidence in their own right provided details regarding the
construction of graves and the methods of filling the graves with victims. Forensic
archaeological evidence presented to establish the use of heavy machinery at primary graves,
specifically a front loader, included 1) entrance ramps in graves, 2) tooth mark impressions from
the front loader bucket in grave floors, and 3) tire mark impressions around graves.355 At several
primary graves victims were scooped from the ground surface with machinery and dumped in the
graves.356 This process was illustrated by grassy turf found beneath bodies and intermixed
within the body mass of primary graves. The soil was scraped up when the bodies were scooped
from the ground before being deposited in graves.
Aerial photographs were presented to support the claim of heavy machinery use at the
primary mass grave sites. A picture taken 17 July 1995, the day after the Branjevo Military
Farm executions, depicts an ongoing burial complete with victims lying on the ground, an open
grave with an access ramp for a front loader, and vehicle traces in the soil.357 On the same day a
bulldozer is photographed near the Glogova 1 primary grave.358
Witnesses and survivors of the executions also described the machinery being used to dig
graves and fill them with victims, often as executions were taking place. Witness L survived the
Orahovac executions and witnessed the use of machinery at the adjoining gravesite before he
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escaped the execution field.359 He described the two types of machines being used to dig graves,
an excavator and a front loader, and how each functioned.
The witness testimony and forensic evidence at Orahovac was corroborated by written
records documenting the use of the heavy machinery. The Drina Corps Zvornik Brigade kept
records of where particular types of equipment were being used and the length of time in use.360
Fuel dispersal logs recorded the litres of diesel dispensed. Vehicle utilization records recorded
where particular cars and trucks were driven. On 14 July 1995, an excavator and an excavatorloader worked at Orahovac for six and five hours, respectively, and 200 litres of diesel fuel was
provided. An excavator and a loader were recorded working at Orahovac for the following two
days. The Zvornik Brigade was also linked by the use of heavy machinery to the burial of
victims from Petkovci Dam and at the Kozluk grave.361
The forensic evidence collected from the floor and walls of the mass graves proved much
more than the methods of grave construction. It was physical evidence at the scene of the crime
that linked the secondary sources of evidence, the witness testimony and written logs, to the
crimes. The combination of evidence clearly connected the Drina Corps Brigades with the burial
of victims. The Trial Chamber found that the Drina Corps Brigades were directly involved in the
transportation, detention, execution, and burial of victims from 14 July to 16 July 1995. 362 Drina
Corps resources were essential to the operation, planning, and coordination of resources. Toplevel command involvement would have been required to offer such personnel and tangible
support. The Trial Chamber concluded Krstić had genocidal intent to kill Bosnian Muslim men
from Srebrenica from 13 July based on his “informed participation in the executions through the
use of Drina Corps assets.”363
Disturbed Primary Graves and Secondary Graves. In addition to Krstić‟s knowledge of
the executions and mass burials of victims in July 1995, evidence was presented demonstrating
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Krstić‟s awareness of the attempt to conceal evidence of the crime by relocating victims into
multiple secondary graves.364 Similar forensic archaeological evidence was supplied to
demonstrate that an operation was planned, that the plan required the coordination of machinery
and transportation vehicles, and that the logistics involved would require the Drina Corps
Command to be aware of the operation prior to the relocation of graves.
Forensic archaeological techniques demonstrated that the removal of bodies from primary
graves was performed with backhoes and front loaders.365 Primary disturbed graves were not
completely emptied and what remained within revealed how the graves were disturbed. The
Manning Report described the remains at the Petkovci grave:
This site contained grossly disarticulated body parts throughout the filling of the grave,
which appeared to have been caused by the mechanical removal of the bodies during the
robbing process that trapped bodies amongst the boulders.366
Disturbed primary graves also contained bodies transected along straight margins, a direct result
of the removal of bodies by heavy machinery. Haglund described the Lazete 2 primary grave
which was disturbed by the use of machinery:
And what we see here also is that along the margins, between spaces there is no bodies at
all. And along these margins, for instance, the lower boundary of "A," we see a relatively
straight line. And what we have here is the evidence of bodies having been removed from
the grave, removed with a machine, most likely a backhoe, a machine that would reach
down into the body mass, encounter it, press them into the ground, transect whatever
bodies it happened to encounter, and pull them out of the grave. So in these voids or
empty spaces between where the bodies are, bodies have been removed.367
Neatly transected bodies were also observed at the primary disturbed Kozluk grave and Glogova
2 subgraves 02 and 06.368
Trucks were used to transport the bodies the distance between the primary and secondary
grave. The linking of primary graves and secondary graves allowed the distance victims were
Krstić Judgment, para. 415, 476.
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366
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transported to be calculated. The furthest distance was between the Branjevo Farm primary
grave and the secondary Cancari Road 12 grave – 40 kilometers (Figure 11).369
Secondary graves were dug with a front loader, again creating ramps in graves and
leaving behind bucket tooth mark impressions on the grave floor.370 The consistent use of a front
loader led to a consistent size and shape of the secondary graves – approximately 13 meters long
by 3 meters wide by 1.5 to 2 meters deep. Wright testified that Zeleni Jadar was the only
secondary grave not dug by a front loader.371
Aerial photographs of Glogova 1 dated 20 October 1995 depict an excavator at the site
near a deep trench. Photographs of Glogova 2 dated 30 October 1995 depict a front loader in a
grave, indicating active digging into the grave or refilling the hole after bodies were removed.372
A backhoe and front loader were also present at the Branjevo Military Farm on 27 September
1995.373
The Trial Chamber found that there was only scant evidence that the Drina Corps was
directly involved in the disturbing of primary graves and the relocation of their contents to
multiple secondary graves.374 However, the forensic evidence contributed to proving that there
was an operation performed within the Drina Corps zone of responsibility that required the
organization of machinery and transportation and advance logistical planning. The Trial
Chamber found that Krstić could not have been unaware of this operation occurring within the
Drina Corps zone of responsibility.375
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Figure 11. The movement of remains from primary to secondary mass graves.
Source: ICTY, Krstić Case IT-98-33, Exhibits – OTP, available at <http://www.un.org
/icty/cases-e/cis/Krstić/exhibits-e.htm> (accessed 1 February 2009). Map
provided courtesy of the ICTY and amended only for clarity of the text.
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Judgment
General Krstić was the first person tried by the ICTY to be found guilty of
genocide. The Trial Chamber found that the evidence presented by the Prosecution fulfilled both
Article 7(1) and Article 7(3) of the ICTY Statute:
7(1) A person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise
aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime
referred to in articles 2 to 5 of the present Statute, shall be individually
responsible for the crime.
7(3) The fact that any of the acts referred to in articles 2 to 5 of the present
Statute was committed by a subordinate does not relieve his superior of
criminal responsibility if he knew or had reason to know that the
subordinate
was about to commit such acts or had done so and the superior failed to take the
necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the
perpetrators thereof.376
Krstić was sentenced to 46 years in prison for genocide; persecution for murders, cruel and
inhumane treatment, terrorizing the civilian population, forcible transfer, and destruction of
personal property of Bosnian Muslim civilians; and murder as a violation of the Laws and
Customs of War.377

The Appeals Chamber
In the Appeals Chamber Krstić argued against two of the Trial Chamber‟s interpretations
of the mens rea of genocide.378 The first was that the intended targeted group for destruction was
too narrowly defined as Bosnian Muslim men of military age from Srebrenica.379 The Appeals
Chamber corrected the Defense‟s interpretation of the Trial Chamber‟s judgment – Bosnian
Muslims of Srebrenica were the group considered for Krstić‟s intent to destroy.380 It was the
murder of all of the Bosnian Muslim military aged men that led the Trial Chamber to find there
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378
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was intent to destroy the whole group of Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica. The second argument
set forth by the Defense was that the displacement of Bosnian Muslims from Srebrenica did not
qualify as physical or biological destruction of the group as regulated by the Genocide
Convention.381 The Appeals Chamber upheld the Trial Chambers determination of a physical
and biological genocide based on the murder of men and the long term effects their deaths and
the removal of the rest of the population had on the ability of Bosnian Muslims to ever
reestablish as a community in Srebrenica.382 These arguments were dismissed.383
The Appeal Chamber did disagree with some factual findings made by the Trial
Chamber, but none involved forensic evidence. Krstić‟s charge of genocide was reduced to
aiding and abetting genocide and his sentence reduced to 35 years.384 This ruling did not change
the fact that the Krstić case upheld that genocide occurred in Srebrenica. The forensic evidence
used to establish the case set a precedent for following trials regarding Srebrenica in July 1995.
Genocide had occurred; therefore the Prosecution could focus more on individual responsibility
in future cases.
Prosecutor v. Blagojević and Jokić

The next case to consider the guilt of Drina Corps leaders at Srebrenica was the joint trial
held for Vidoje Blagojević and Dragon Jokić. Blagojević was the Commander of the Brantunac
Brigade of the VRS. He was indicted for genocide, or in the alternative complicity in genocide,
as well as a host of other crimes. Blagojević was found guilty of complicity to commit genocide
by aiding and abetting genocide; aiding and abetting murder; persecutions on political, racial and
religious grounds; and the inhumane act of forcible transfer. Jokić was the Chief of Engineering
of the Zvornik Brigade. He was never indicted for any form of genocide and was convicted of
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aiding and abetting extermination and persecution on political, racial, and religious grounds, and
aiding and abetting murder.

Rules of Procedure and Evidence
Blagojević was indicted for very similar crimes as was Krstić. The events in question
overlapped; however, no forensic expert testified in the trial. The ICTY Rules of Procedure and
Evidence provide two rules, Rule 92 bis and Rule 94 bis, that allow for evidence provided by the
expert witness to be submitted without requiring the expert to testify. Rule 92 bis allows the
Trial Chamber to admit written reports prepared by the expert witness:
(A) A Trial Chamber may admit, in whole or in part, the evidence of a witness in the
form of a written statement in lieu of oral testimony which goes to proof of a matter other
than the acts and conduct of the accused as charged in the indictment.
Rule 92 bis also regulates the admission of experts‟ testimony from prior trials:
(D) A Chamber may admit a transcript of evidence given by a witness in proceedings
before the Tribunal which goes to proof of a matter other than the acts and conduct of the
accused.
Rule 94 bis states that an expert witness may be relieved of testifying in person if the statement
of the expert witness is accepted by the opposing party. Only when the opposing party wishes to
cross-examine the witness or challenge the qualifications of the expert or their statement are
experts called to testify in person:
(A) The full statement of any expert witness to be called by a party shall be disclosed
within the time-limit prescribed by the Trial Chamber or by the pre-trial Judge.
(B) Within thirty days of disclosure of the statement of the expert witness, or such other
time prescribed by the Trial Chamber or pre-trial Judge, the opposing party shall file
a notice indicating whether:
(i) it accepts the expert witness statement; or
(ii) it wishes to cross-examine the expert witness; and
(iii) it challenges the qualifications of the witness as an expert or the
relevance of all or parts of the report and, if so, which parts.
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(C) If the opposing party accepts the statement of the expert witness, the
statement may be admitted into evidence by the Trial Chamber without
calling the witness to testify in person.385
Rule 92 bis (D) and 94 bis were applied in Prosecutor v. Blagojević and Jokić:
The Accused do not object to the admission of the statements and transcript testimony of
John Clark, William Haglund, Christopher Lawrence, Richard Wright and José Pablo
Baraybar submitted pursuant to 94 bis and 92 bis (D). This expert evidence deals with
exhumations of mass graves and forensic examination to determine the gender, age and
cause of death of the exhumed people from these mass graves. The Trial Chamber is
satisfied of the relevance and probative value of these reports and transcripts to these
proceedings. The Trial Chamber is further satisfied that none of the information
contained in the statements or transcripts dealing with forensic evidence relates to the
acts and conduct of the accused as charged in the Indictment. It further finds that the
transcript testimonies presented to the Trial Chamber pursuant to 92 bis (D) provides
together with the reports submitted under Rule 94 bis a complete picture of the expert
evidence.386
The forensic reports and transcript testimony of Haglund, Wright, Baraybar, Lawrence,
and Clark from the Krstić trial were admitted as evidence in lieu of their testimony during the
trial.387 The expert reports submitted by contracted experts providing forensic evidence on
excavations, exhumations, and the collection and examination of blood, textile, and soil samples
from execution and grave sites were admitted under Rule 94 bis. The Manning Report and
Additional Manning Report were also admitted under Rule 94 bis, as well as a third Manning
Report that included the autopsy results of Glogova 1 and Ravince 1 and results from
exhumations at Zeleni Jadar 6, Glogova 2 subgraves 7 and 9, and Ravince 2.388 The expert
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report and transcript testimony of demographer Helge Brunborg was also admitted under Rule 94
bis and 92 bis (D), but unlike the other experts, the Trial Chamber granted the Defense‟s request
to cross-examine Brunborg on an updated report.389 The Trial Chamber acknowledged the
admission of these reports and testimony from the Krstić trial in the Judgment and described how
they were evaluated for their evidentiary value. The materials were assessed on:
the professional competence of the expert, the methodologies used by the expert and the
credibility of the findings made in light of these factors and other evidence accepted by
the Trial Chamber.390
Forensic Testimony
The forensic evidence itself was accepted by the Defense unchallenged: the numbers
associated with age-at-death and sex, cause of death, the types of artifacts found, any
identifications made, and the links made between execution sites, primary, and secondary graves.
Although none of the forensic experts testified, Jene-Rene Ruez, Chief Investigator for the
ICTY, and Dean Manning, Investigator for the Office of the Prosecution, did testify to forensic
evidence.
Ruez testified to how execution sites and graves were located based upon aerial photos,
witness interviews, and the movement of the victims from capture site, through detention site, to
the mass grave. Manning testified in summary form on the entire forensic investigation, based
upon his direct experience with the exhumations and morgue investigations, and his review of
the expert reports produced by the forensic anthropologists, archaeologists, pathologists, and
those submitted regarding ballistics, soil and pollen, ligatures, and blindfolds. Manning
described the role of the various experts involved in the investigation, the value of the aerial
photographs, the difference between primary and secondary graves, how the archaeologists
determined whether a primary grave had been robbed, and the process of exhumation. Manning
then summarized the methods used and provided the results for MNI, sex and age-at-death
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estimation, and cause of death which included an explanation regarding how cause of death was
assigned to body parts. Wright‟s estimate of the number of victims contained in the probed
graves was repeated. The various materials that established links between primary and
secondary graves were described. The number of blindfolds and ligatures found at which
particular sites was detailed. Exhibits were shown depicting identification found on bodies and
unique artifacts that led to identifications.
The Defense objected several times to Manning‟s summary of the experts‟ reports. Their
annoyance was evident as they repeatedly indicated that they did not challenge the facts
submitted pursuant to Rule 92 bis and Rule 94 bis and requested the Prosecution to cease the
review of the forensic evidence of mass graves:
If I may interrupt. This material came in through 92 bis. Now, the reason it came in is
because we didn't challenge or we weren't challenging at the time. However, now it
appears they're trying to give some validation to that report through this gentleman, who I
assumed was coming here to testify about the burial process and what he did. Now he's
being used as a summary witness to resummarise the entire Prosecution's case. I do object
to him commenting about the reports unless he generated those particular reports,
otherwise we can read the reports, the Court can draw its own conclusions from the
reports. There is no need to waste time with this gentleman going over material that was
introduced through 92 bis at the behest of the Prosecution. If they wanted to do a long,
delayed process of bringing in all the individuals and getting all those reports in through
the individuals, they could have brought them. Instead, they chose another way. Now
they're trying to revisit all those reports and all those experts through this gentleman. And
if they didn't want to go through the front door, Your Honour, they shouldn't be trying to
get through the back door or through the basement window at this point.391
The Defense spent more than half of their cross-examination of Manning asking questions about
the procurement and interpretation of aerial photographs, and the bulk of the remainder on
Manning‟s investigation of persons and documents not related to the forensic evidence collected
at the execution and mass grave sites. Very few questions relating to the forensic evidence were
asked, none of which challenged the evidence, but rather were asked for clarification purposes
only. There was no cross-examination of the methods used to develop the MNI, age-at-death or
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sex estimates, or cause of death. The Defense was resigned to accept the forensic evidence
presented in the Krstić case, and it was accepted as fact by the Trial Chamber as evidence of
genocide.

Judgment
On 17 January 2005, Blagojević was found guilty of complicity in genocide by aiding
and abetting genocide. The Trial Chamber summarized the findings confirming that genocide
occurred in Srebrenica, much of which was based upon forensic evidence. The acts perpetrated
by Blagojević and/or members of the Brantunac Brigade that contributed to a guilty charge were
detailed: assisting in separating men from the rest of the population in Potocari, guarding the
detained men in Brantunac, and searching the forests for Bosnian Muslim men attempting to flee.
The Appeals Chamber overturned Blagojević‟s conviction related to genocide. It was found that
Blagojević did not have the necessary awareness of other actions taking place against Bosnian
Muslims to establish his knowledge of any genocidal intent on his part or that of anyone with
higher authority.392
Jokić‟s conviction for aiding and abetting extermination and murder were based on his
provision of resources, heavy digging equipment, and personnel to dig mass graves for victims at
Orahovac, the Branjevo Military Farm, and Kozluk.393 Forensic evidence contributed to
establishing the days these graves were dug and the type of machinery used. This evidence
corroborated other evidence that linked Jokić to the crime.
Forensic evidence provided evidence that genocide was committed and it contributed to
assigning criminal responsibility to Krstić. The same forensic evidence admitted and testified to
in the Krstić case was admitted under Rule 92 bis (D) and 94 bis in the Blagojević and Jokić
case. Chapter Seven through Twelve discuss the ICTY‟s third case regarding the Srebrenica
genocide. The forensic evidence is the same, with the exception of some DNA results, but the
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Defense challenges the quality of the investigation and its resultant evidence. The forensic
experts testify again, and defend the methods, standard operating procedures, and their own
ethics and professionalism in order to demonstrate that the investigation was systematic and the
evidence is scientific. To date, this third trial has not concluded; the judgment of this Trial
Chamber will determine if the forensic evidence will continue to attest to genocide and if it has
provided evidence to assign criminal responsibility to several more individuals.
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Chapter Six
EXPERT TESTIMONY:
INTERPRETING FORENSIC EVIDENCE
Well, I just would like again to point out that -- I have investigated many suicides. I have
never seen an individual with their hands bound behind their back shoot themselves
multiple times. Many of these people have multiple injuries which are totally inconsistent
with the circumstances of suicide.394 (William Haglund, responding to the Defense’s
cross-examination)
An “expert” originally defined by the Trial Chamber for Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galic in
1999 and repeatedly referenced by other ICTY Trial Chambers is:
A person whom by virtue of some specialised knowledge, skill or training can assist the
trier of fact to understand or determine an issue in dispute meaning an issue or allegation
upon which the Trial Chamber must make a determination or finding.395
The forensic expert interprets evidence for the Court based on his or her professional experience
with the subject matter. The forensic expert must form their opinion based on the evidence only.
What the forensic expert is asked to interpret reveals salient points for establishing that a crime
was committed. The type of forensic evidence the expert relies upon to make their interpretation
defines what forensic evidence is the most useful to describe relevant characteristics of the
crime. How the forensic expert provides his opinion expresses personal style.
Throughout the forensic experts‟ testimony in Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstić, the
Prosecution, Defense, and the Trial Chamber asked the experts to make several different
interpretations of the forensic evidence. The interpretations asked of the forensic experts were
centered on three main topics: 1) the ability to differentiate combat from execution deaths, 2) the
location of death, and 3) the level of organization required to create and fill mass graves. All
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three questions are relevant to the determination of intent to destroy, what is arguably the most
difficult part of genocide to prove.
The Prosecution needed to highlight evidence of executions as compared to combat
activities, establish the men were killed at the execution sites – rather than during combat in the
woods, and emphasize the high level of organization required to create and fill the mass graves.
The Defense sought to introduce scenarios other than a well organized execution of overpowered
men that the forensic experts could not exclude from the realm of possibility. The Trial
Chamber focused on establishing what the forensic evidence could contribute towards the
determination of the level of organization required to create the mass graves. The questions
asked of the forensic experts by the Prosecution, Defense, and Trial Chamber demonstrates what
each of these actors expects the forensic investigation to contribute to the trial.

Victims of Combat or Execution?

Haglund, Baraybar, Lawrence, and Clark all testified on their interpretation of the mass
grave victims as victims of an execution versus victims of combat. The Defense asked each
forensic expert essentially the same question: could they exclude the possibility of combat and if
so, what factors supported this opinion? More specifically, the forensic experts were asked to
interpret their findings of gunshot wounds to the back and bullets embedded in the grave floor.
The forensic experts were asked to consider several different scenarios: 1) all of the men in a
mass grave were killed in combat, 2) combat deaths and execution victims within one grave, or
3) some mass graves being a result of execution but others the result of combat.
None of the forensic experts ruled out the possibility that the victims may have been
engaged in combat but clearly expressed their expert opinion, based on forensic evidence, that
the victims were executed. Their styles differed in how they answered the question. Each
forensic expert also provided slightly different types of forensic evidence to support their
opinion. The following testimonies are grouped according to a particular style of response given
by the forensic expert when interpreting the forensic evidence.
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Emphasis on the Context
Haglund testified on injuries sustained and the cause of death to support his opinion that
the victims were executed. The Defense asked if he could be certain which injuries could be
attributed to combat and which to executions.396 Haglund did not directly answer the question
but explained his interpretation of the victims‟ manner of death by considering the whole context
of the mass graves:
I think one has to look at a mass grave as a contextual situation, and when I look at a
grave, for instance Nova Kasaba grave number 4, and I see 19 individuals in that grave,
and I see that they're all shot, and I see that 13 of those individuals with their hands
bound behind their backs, it defies reason to me that they would have been combat
soldiers. And it's similar in the other graves.397
The Defense persisted with the same line of questioning:
On the basis of which indicators has it been established that it was an execution, a
murder, in the case of all of the bodies? Could causes of death also include suicide or
combat?398
Haglund‟s response again does not address the question of combat; he generalizes the context of
the graves to emphasize his expert opinion that the victims were not involved in combat at the
time of their deaths. After affirming that he has investigated many suicides, Haglund assures the
Court that he has “never seen an individual with their hands bound behind their back shoot
themselves multiple times” and that many of the victims “have multiple injuries which are totally
inconsistent with the circumstances of suicide.”399 The answer was effective, as the Defense did
not question him further on the topic and never mentions suicide as a manner of death again.
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Baraybar and Clark were also asked questions regarding evidence that may indicate the
deaths were related to combat or an execution, but their style of testimony differed from
Haglund‟s. Each acknowledged the combat scenario but then described the forensic evidence
they used to make their interpretation of the bodies as victims of executions.
The Defense asked Baraybar if he could exclude the possibility that the bodies interred at
Nova Kasaba 4 could have been combat victims from the same road where the majority of
Bosnian Muslim men were allegedly captured and then buried at a later date.400 Baraybar
replied, “I cannot exclude the possibility…” and followed with three reasons why he did not
believe the bodies were engaged in combat: 1) the documents found in the grave identified the
people as those missing between the 11th and 18th of July, 2) it was unlikely that persons carrying
stretchers were engaged in combat, and 3) it was unlikely that the victim with a gunshot wound
to the leg and wearing a splint was engaged in combat.401 The Prosecution reversed the question
in their redirect, and asked Baraybar if he could exclude the possibility that the persons in the
grave were executed. Again, Baraybar replied, “No, I can‟t.”402
The Prosecution preemptively asked Clark to provide an explanation of why he believed
the bodies in the mass graves were not victims of combat. Clark first admitted that although
“There was certainly nothing to suggest that these were combat casualties,” it was not
“something that I could refute entirely.”403 He then described the forensic evidence that
convinced him to interpret the bodies as victims of executions: 1) the use of blindfolds and
ligatures, 2) widespread bullet wounds and a lack of shrapnel or bomb induced injuries, 3) low
average number of wounds per person, 4) the majority of shots were directed from the back, 5)
10% of the victims were shot with a single gunshot to the head, and 6) the lack of survivors from
any combat activities.404 Clark supported the second, third, and sixth point by referencing
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studies on combat that demonstrate the forensic evidence from these graves was not consistent
with other known combat scenarios.405
The Defense limited the graves in consideration for holding casualties of combat in their
cross-examination of Clark:
[…]If we exclude Nova Kasaba grave site, Konjevic Polje, and perhaps a part of the
grave site in Glogova, is there a greater probability that the persons buried in those graves
did not meet their death as a consequence of mass executions?406
These graves were singled out by the Defense due to the lack of blindfolds, ligatures, and
handicapped individuals in the graves. Clark replied:
I think that is fair to say, […] but still doesn‟t take away the fact that there were no
injuries from other military weapons.407
He then reiterated the other forensic evidence that did not support a combat scenario.
Judge Riad summarized his understanding of Clark‟s testimony and asked him to repeat
again his opinion on the matter.408 Clark began by stating that he could not entirely exclude
combat but ended the long line of questioning by affirming that at each grave there were
“pointers” that the victims were executed.409
Baraybar and Clark acknowledged arguments of both the Prosecution and the Defense.
They did not over interpret the evidence or make statements they could not support with forensic
evidence. Both experts supported their opinion that the execution scenario was more likely than
the combat scenario by providing specific evidence for their opinion, including references to
previous research on the subject. The expert witness must be knowledgeable on topics relating
to their own expertise. For modern human rights violations, it is imperative to understand
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military strategy, weaponry, ballistics, and ammunition in order to interpret gunshot wounds and
determine manner of death.410 The ability to specifically reference research and publications that
support expert opinion assists in providing a legally sound forensic testimony.

Staying Within Your Expertise
Forensic experts must not make any interpretations that they are unable to support with
forensic evidence or professional experience. It is both acceptable and required of expert
witnesses to decline to answer questions that extend beyond their expertise.
The Defense singled out a specific observation offered by the forensic experts as support
for the victims being executed – that being shot in the back is evidence of an execution, not a
combat wound. The Defense asked Lawrence where most injuries would be located after an
encirclement conflict. Lawrence replied, “I think they could be anywhere around the body.”411
Judge Riad persisted with the scenario of encirclement, but Lawrence resisted making any
interpretation that he could not support with professional experience or forensic evidence.412 He
stated, “I do not claim to be a military expert,” and explained why he could not provide an expert
opinion:
Again, I was not as successful as Dr. Clark in determining the direction of all of -- from
which these all [bullets] came, so I don't think I can make a strong conclusion as to the
direction, and hence I can't tell which -- can't really answer that question from a
pathological point of view.413
Again, Judge Rodrigues asked about an encirclement scenario to which Lawrence responded:
I'm not familiar with the customs in this court, but I think in Australian courts I would tell
you when I think I'm being dragged out of my area of expertise, and I think I'm being
dragged out of my area of expertise here.414
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Lawrence refused to answer a question that he was unable to support, despite the Trial
Chamber‟s persistence. In several other instances the forensic experts refrained from answering
questions that were outside their area of expertise:
Haglund: I think if you're referring to fleshed remains, I would like to defer to the
medical experts, the physicians, the pathologists who deal with the fleshed remains, and
that's their area of expertise. If you want to talk about bones that are skeletalised and
lying in soil, then I'm happy to discourse on those, but I'd like to stay within my area of
expertise.415
Lawrence: That‟s a question you should probably put to the anthropologists, because
they are the ones who formally did the – [identification].416
Wright: The shell cases were found on the surface on which the bodies lay, amongst the
bodies, and on top of the bodies. But I cannot -- not having any expertise in ballistics, I
cannot comment on the significance of that except to say where I found them.417
By refusing to stray from their field of expertise and always providing an explanation for their
inability or unwillingness to answer a particular question, the forensic experts maintained
neutrality and professionalism.

Acknowledging Limitations
Evidence supporting that the bodies were shot inside the grave was very damaging to the
Defense‟s combat scenario. The Defense questioned Baraybar extensively on embedded bullets
and created a culturally-specific scenario for Baraybar to consider. The Defense began by asking
how deep the bullets were found and how deep a bullet can penetrate the ground after passing
through a body.418 Baraybar testified that bullets were embedded one half inch to one inch
below the bodies, but he had no reference for how deep a bullet could penetrate the ground after
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passing through a body.419 After further questioning, Baraybar limited his interpretation by
stating:
Again, if somebody has bullets under the body embedded in the ground, I am only saying
that the person may have been shot while in the grave. I am not saying whether the
person has been killed while in the grave, nor whether the person has been killed
elsewhere and then transported to the grave. That is something I cannot extract, assess,
nor answer based on the evidence I have recovered.
[…] And the second element is that through all those sediments, there are bullets, and on
some occasions I stated in the report -- not in this specific case, I believe -- there has been
an association between injuries recorded by the pathologist and the position of the bullets.
So I'm leaving all this here very purposely vague in order not to over-interpret my
findings.420
The Defense then described a scenario that they claimed was recorded on many wartime
occasions, one in which a round of bullets was fired into a grave after it was filled with dead
people.421 Baraybar was asked if this scenario could be excluded. He answered:
The answer would be, no, I am not acquainted with that information you have produced.
However, in my opinion again, I would say that if somebody opens a burst of fire against
a body lying on a grave, it is because that person suspects that the individual may still be
alive.422
Judge Wald asked Baraybar to clarify his opinion.423 In response, Baraybar provided
specific forensic evidence to support his opinion that the victims received their fatal bullet
wounds while in the grave:
Your Honour, one of the individuals in grave 2 in the site of Konjevic Polje 2, KP-02,
may answer this question. This body happened to have three 7.62-millimetre bullets
embedded in the grave floor under the body. One was below the waist, at the chest level,
and the right shoulder […] the second body in the same grave has also a bullet under the
chest. I wrote in my report here that according to the pathologist's report, the cause of
death of both individuals was multiple gunshot wounds. […] in both cases the location of
the bullets matched the injuries recorded during the post-mortem examination. So up to
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there, I can say that in this specific case, I have a link, an independent link between the
bullets being found under the bodies and the pathologist's examination.424
The extensive questioning on this single point exemplifies its importance for determining
if the events that occurred in Srebrenica constituted genocide. The interpretation of embedded
bullets in soil beneath victims was not strong enough to support either scenario – executions in
the grave or being shot when already dead. Consequently, the issue of whether or not men were
shot in the graves was not featured in the Trial Chamber‟s judgment. Research on the
penetration depth of various ballistics after passing through a body could have assisted Baraybar
in his interpretation.
Despite the forensic experts not being able to exclude a combat scenario, the Trial
Chamber was convinced that the majority of victims were executed. The Trial Chamber
recognized the value of the testimony in their judgment by reiterating the forensic evidence that
attested to executions and confirming that graves were filled with execution victims, particularly
for the grave sites witnesses testified regarding: Cerska Valley, Kravica Warehouse, Orahovac,
Branjevo Farm, Petkovci Dam, and Kozluk.425

Organization of Mass Graves

The Trial Chamber was especially interested in the level of organization required to
create and fill the mass graves. A high level of organization would suggest preplanning and
involvement by high ranking individuals within the military structure. Many of the
interpretations made by the forensic experts regarding this question were not based primarily on
specific forensic evidence collected at the mass graves but rather on knowledge gained by
experience with mass graves. The organization involved in such an operation will always be of
interest when genocide is in question; organization requires planning, lends support to intent to
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destroy, and the more organization required, the more people that can be held criminally
responsible.
The Trial Chamber questioned the forensic experts on the level of organization as
reflected in the use of machinery to dig and excavate graves, the size of graves, the movement of
remains from primary to secondary sites, and any pattern detected among the grave sites. The
following testimony is grouped according to the types of evidence to which the forensic experts
referenced when interpreting the organization of the operation.

Use of Machinery
Judge Rodrigues asked both Wright and Baraybar questions regarding the organization
required to dig mass graves. Wright testified that a mass grave dug by hand required less
organization than a grave dug using machinery.426 Judge Rodrigues asked Baraybar if the use of
machinery could be associated with “the need to be quick, and organizational needs and
requirements.”427 Baraybar affirmed that the use of machinery requires logistics, is used to do
the job quickly, and has to be organized so the right place is dug.428

Size of Graves
Judge Wald asked Haglund to interpret why some primary graves held few bodies, while
others held hundreds.429 Haglund prefaced his response by referencing his professional
experience as a Chief Medical Investigator to support his opinion. He replied:
I think my experience with homicides, basically, is oftentimes, although there may be
some systematic approach to some killings, some are more opportunistic and you have a
smaller group rather than a larger group. It's as simple as that.430
This answer neither supported nor refuted organized executions.
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Creating Secondary Graves
The Trial Chamber was also interested in the organization required to remove bodies
from primary graves and reinter them in secondary graves. Judge Wald asked Ruez questions
regarding the length of time required to create the secondary graves and the number of trucks
required to perform the operation.431 Ruez answered that the secondary graves were pre-dug,
that it took a minimum of two nights to complete the operation, and that several trucks must have
been involved to move the remains as far as 40 kilometers.432 Wright then testified that bodies
were driven from primary to secondary sites by truck, based on the distance between related
sites, and that this had an effect on the amount of organization required.433 Judge Rodrigues
asked Wright to compare the levels of organization required between creating and filling primary
graves and creating and filling secondary graves.
Wright‟s expert opinion was that collecting hundreds of people in one area and then
executing them would require “much more organization” than moving the bodies to a secondary
grave.434 However, Wright also included that the creation of secondary graves and their filling
was performed over a short amount of time which corresponded with a much greater amount of
organization.435 His testimony emphasized a high level of organization required to produce both
primary and secondary mass graves.

An Overall Pattern
Throughout their testimony, the forensic experts had primarily answered questions by
providing evidence from individual grave sites. Judge Wald asked Clark to give his opinion
regarding patterns seen across all the grave sites:
[…] would you say that your observations of the patterns of injury were more consistent
with all of those burials being under a unified plan or part of a general motus operandi, or
would they be just as consistent with a hypothesis that you could have had four or five
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spontaneous killings, of executions, unconnected with each other, which resulted in the
bodies that went into the different graves?436
Clark described the different patterns identified between the graves, such as the placement of
bullets and the number of bullets per victims, but when pressed by Judge Wald to answer
whether a “general pattern” or “command operation” could be deduced from any pattern, Clark
summarized the context of all the graves:
Well, in the sense that we have what appeared to be deliberately targeted injuries in each
of these grave sites, yes, there is an overall pattern of execution-type injuries.437
Little forensic evidence collected from the Srebrenica graves and no reference to any
other research was provided to support interpretations of the organization required to create the
primary and secondary mass graves. The forensic expert‟s testimony was accepted based upon
their established expertise. The Trial Chamber accepted the forensic experts‟ interpretations of
the mass graves as holding victims of organized executions and reflected this acceptance in their
descriptions of the executions within the judgment with the expressions: “systematically
massacred,”438 “well-established pattern,”439 and “careful and methodical.”440
The forensic experts‟ interpretations addressed key elements that must be established to
fulfill the mens rea of genocide, especially intent to destroy. These elements are common to
many scenarios in which genocide takes place, and overlap considerably with other war crimes,
crimes against humanity, and human rights violations. Forensic experts should anticipate having
to make these interpretations, and the procedures and methods required to provide interpretations
based on evidence should be incorporated into the investigation protocol prior to the collection of
any evidence.
Expert testimony is a skill required of a professional forensic expert. Although personal
style can be reflected in how answers are given, the forensic expert must follow certain rules
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while interpreting evidence. Their primary role is to assist all members of the court, lawyers,
judges and, if applicable, jurors, in understanding the science and technical aspect of their
discipline so the resultant evidence can be evaluated properly by all those concerned.441 Expert
witnesses must remain neutral by entertaining all possible scenarios, staying within their
expertise, supporting interpretations with fact or established professional experience, and
providing reasonable explanation for refusing to answer a question.
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Chapter Seven
FORENSIC METHODS ON TRIAL

An expert witness is expected to give his or her expert opinion in full transparency of the
established or assumed facts he or she relies upon and of the methods used when
applying his or her knowledge, experience or skills to form his or her expert opinion.442
(Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galic, Decision Concerning the Expert Witnesses Ewa Tabeau
and Richard Philipps, 3 July 2002)
An expert witness is differentiated from a fact witness in that his qualifications allow for
the giving of opinions and drawing of conclusions based on “established or assumed facts” and
“the methods used” by the expert.443 The methods, and therefore the resulting evidence, are
evaluated based on several factors outlined in the Court‟s Rules of Procedure and Evidence.
Discussed further in Chapter Eight, these factors require the forensic expert to demonstrate the
methods‟ relevancy to the matter at hand and applicability to the population, and meet several
other set standards to demonstrate the method‟s scientific basis.
In the Krstić trial the Defense briefly questioned the forensic experts‟ methods in their
cross-examination. In the next trial concerning an indictment for genocide at Srebrenica,
Prosecutor v. Blagojević and Jokić, the Defense, seemingly satisfied with the forensic evidence
produced for the Krstić trial or unable to contest it, chose to give up their right to cross-examine
the forensic experts. It was only during the third ICTY trial in which Defendants faced charges
of genocide at Srebrenica, Prosecutor v. Popović et al., that the Defense reassessed the forensic
evidence and took a proactive stance against the forensic methods and evidentiary results. The
forensic evidence available at the time of the Popović trial was essentially unchanged since the
Krstić trial as a result of the ICTY halting excavations for prosecutorial purposes in 2001. Very
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few additional graves were excavated by the ICTY and the International Commission on Missing
Persons (ICMP). The forensic experts were extensively questioned on the forensic methods used
throughout the investigation. The evolution of the Defense‟s ability and/or willingness to
question the forensic methods indicates a more educated Defense, one that understands the
forensic evidence well enough to challenge it.
The forensic methods used in the investigation were discussed by the forensic experts,
including how the method was performed, their relevancy and accuracy, and the results. This
testimony, along with the Defense‟s cross-examination and criticisms of the methods used in the
investigation, reveal some potential methodological problems faced in the mortuary and in the
field.
Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstić
Trial Dates: March 13, 2000 - August 2, 2001
In the Krstić trial, the forensic experts discussed the methods used to estimate age-atdeath and sex, calculate MNI, and determine cause of death. Age-at-death and sex estimation
and calculating MNI was performed solely by forensic anthropologists; cause of death was
determined by a combined effort between pathologists and anthropologists.
The Defense submitted two documents regarding the forensic evidence. Both were
prepared by Dr. Zoran Stankovic, the head of the Institute for Forensic Medicine of the Medical
Military Academy in Belgrade and a listed expert of forensic medicine by the United Nations.444
Stankovic‟s first report, entitled “Forensic Opinion” (Stankovic Report), addressed the expert
reports submitted for the 17 mass graves about which the forensic experts testified during the
trial.445 The document outlines several types of errors that the experts should supplement,
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resolve, or remove before the Court should accept the reports.446 Criticisms included
methodological and standardization issues as well as generalities, missing and deficient
information, and narrow interpretations. Stankovic‟s second report, also entitled “Forensic
Opinion” (Additional Stankovic Report), addressed the forensic evidence submitted and
summarized by the Additional Manning Report and the testimony of the forensic experts.447
This document repeats several points made in the 2000 report and adds additional criticisms.
Combined, these reports consist of 17 pages of text.
The Stankovic Reports outline the Defense‟s perceived weaknesses of the forensic
methodology and the basis of their cross-examination. Both reports criticized the methods used
to estimate age-at-death and sex, the method used to determine cause of death, and the impact
this method had on reported percentages of victims with gunshot wounds. The Defense crossexamined the forensic experts on each of these points, excluding sex estimation. Additionally,
both Stankovic and the Defense cited the low number of personal identifications as an indicator
of questionable methodology.

Age-at-Death Estimation
Stankovic requested that all estimated ages-at-death be disregarded by the Court based
on:
[…] the large discrepancy in estimates, the unclear and non-argumented application of
the methodology adopted for determining the age of persons at death.448
The large discrepancy in estimates referred to by Stankovic was in response to Baraybar‟s
description and use of four distinguishable age groups (8 – 12 years, 13 – 17 years, 15 – 24
years, 25 years and older), while reporting an individual‟s age range that spanned more than one
age group.449 A second criticism involved the reporting of individual‟s age ranges as wide as 30
446
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to 40 years. The other methodological criticism was based directly upon one method used to
estimate age-at-death; Stankovic‟s opinion was that the standard used to estimate age-at-death
was based on a non-representative sample with an insufficient sample size of 52 persons.450 For
these reasons, as well as other standardization problems, Stankovic called for the re-assessment
of the age-at-death of the bodies.
Baraybar spent a significant portion of his testimony describing how age-at-death
estimation is performed by forensic anthropologists. The Prosecution asked Baraybar to
introduce the two methods used to estimate age-at-death in the investigation – the SucheyBrooks and Iscan-Loth methods which rely upon morphological changes to the pubic symphysis
and the sternal end of the fourth rib, respectively. Baraybar emphasized the applicability of the
methods to the victim population:
We have chosen two robust techniques derived from a forensic population and
specifically tested in a Bosnian forensic population. […] Both techniques were derived
originally in a North American forensic population and subsequently, between '98 and
'99, were tested and so-called calibrated, I would say, in a forensic Bosnian population
from Tuzla.451
Baraybar further stated that the Bosnian modified methods were presented at an international
meeting in 1999 by Simmons and Associates.452
The Defense further pursued the topic. Baraybar explained that the age ranges associated
with the Suchey-Brooks and Iscan-Loth methods, not the morphological indicators, were
“calibrated” for the Bosnian population. An example was provided: the pubic symphysis
morphology that would indicate an age between 15 and 23 years for an American male would
translate to between 13 and 25 years for a Bosnian male.453 When questioned on the reference
sample size used to calibrate the Suchey-Brooks method, Baraybar indicated that the male
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sample size was 242 and the female sample size was 52. He compared this to the original
sample size for the method which was 739, but also included that the original Iscan-Loth method
had a sample size of only 118 compared to 233 for the Bosnian calibrated method. Baraybar
defended the method and its sample size:
From a scientific point of view, I think that it is quite sound evidence that this technique
is reliable, the sample taken is quite, quite reliable.454
Sex Estimation
Stankovic had only one criticism of the method used to estimate sex. Sex was
determined by pubic bone morphology only. If the pelvis was not represented, the sex of the
individual was not determined. This resulted in 212 cases of indeterminate sex. Stankovic
questioned why other bones that could have provided information for sex determination were not
utilized.455 The Prosecution had Baraybar explain sex estimation, which he did for the pelvis,
skull, and long bones.456 Baraybar described the approach of requiring the pelvis for a sex
determination as a “very conservative approach.”457 The Defense did not question this method
or its sole use for sex estimation during their cross-examination.

Minimum Number of Individuals
Baraybar presented several exhibits to explain the method for calculating MNI based on
counting the most represented bone. The fragmented bodies required the examination of bone
fragments to count the most represented identifiable portion of bone separated into three
distinguishable age groups.458 The dispersal of the fragmented bodies into multiple secondary
graves added an extra step to the process, namely the consolidation of the bone inventories of
related primary and secondary graves to produce the most accurate MMNI, or merged minimum
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number of individuals.459 No objection was made in Stankovic‟s Reports or during the
Defense‟s cross-examination of this method.

Cause of Death
Medically licensed pathologists are the only experts legally qualified to determine cause
of death. Clark and Lawrence testified extensively on cause of death, and both remarked that the
forensic anthropologist played an essential supportive role by identifying bony injuries on the
skeletonized remains.460 The anthropologist has considerably more experience with bone
trauma, while the pathologist‟s experience lies in soft tissue injury. The pathologist can
determine what soft tissue surrounding the bony injury was affected and if the wound was fatal.
Consultation between the forensic anthropologist and pathologist occurred prior to the cause of
death determination.461
The Defense had several objections related to the determination of cause of death.
Stankovic criticized Clark‟s generalization that all gunshot wounds occurred during life and the
lack of evidence collected to support close range gunshot wounds.462 He also rejected the
methodology of determining a cause of death for body parts based on the finding of more than
one cause of death per person.463 Each of these points was discussed in the trial, either after
prompting by the Prosecution or in the Defense‟s cross-examination.
In his submitted report of forensic evidence Clark generalized that:
any injuries suggestive of gunshot damage were taken to have occurred in life and usually
to have been necessarily or potentially fatal.464
Stankovic claimed that this generalization was unacceptable based upon the expert‟s role of
determining antemortem injuries and cause of death. Clark addressed this statement in response
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to the Prosecution‟s asking if there were any limitations to the pathological evidence.465 After
noting that the bodies were near or completely skeletonized, thereby eliminating evidence on soft
tissue, Clark admitted that the conclusion that all of the gunshot wounds happened in life could
not be made.466 However, due to the large number of gunshot injuries, Clark explained that it
was much more probable that the victims were killed by gunshot wounds rather than having been
killed by some other undetected cause and then shot after death. Furthermore, Clark described
how gunshot wounds were categorized as such – only with clear evidence of an entrance and exit
wound, bullet fragments, or a bullet within the tissue of the body.467 The Defense did not crossexamine Clark on this assumption, perhaps not wanting to hear a restatement of the previous
day‟s opinion made by Baraybar that opening fire on a person can be explained by the gunman‟s
perception that the targeted individual is alive.468
The Defense did ask if cause of death should be determined when parts of the body were
missing.469 Clark responded by explaining the methodology used to determine if a cause of
death could be ascertained:
If there is a part on the body -- even though large parts are missing, if there's an obviously
fatal injury in that body, I think it would be quite justified in saying that was the cause of
death. For instance, if all we had was the upper half of a body with the skull and the
trunk, but both legs were missing, if there's a gunshot wound in the skull, that's
necessarily and inevitably fatal. So it doesn't matter that the rest of the body is missing.
That is the fatal injury.
The reverse does not apply, however. If all we found was a gunshot injury to the leg and
the skull was missing, we would not accept that as the cause of death. But bullet wounds
to certain parts of the body, I think one can assume that that's going to be a fatal injury.470
Clark also remarked that pathologists did not consider all gunshot wounds to be fatal – only
those to the head, chest, trunk, or pelvis were considered fatal.471
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Stankovic rejected the methodology of determining a cause of death for each body bag
holding disarticulated remains, calling the method “unacceptable and illogic” due to the
assignment of several causes of death to a disarticulated person who is represented in more than
one body bag.472 Stankovic repeated this criticism in his 2001 report and calculated a surplus of
1,172 causes of death compared to the MMNI.473 Lawrence explained the reasoning behind this
method in his testimony regarding the Cancari Road 3 secondary grave.474 The MNI was 160
individuals collected in 383 body bags. Lawrence calculated the number of body bags that held
body parts with gunshot injuries that would cause death, probably cause death, and possibly
cause death: 103, 13, and 15, respectively. Additionally, the main point of his testimony, to
demonstrate that the majority of victims were killed by gunfire, was supported with 29 of 35
complete bodies having a cause of death by gunshot wounds. The Defense made no crossexamination of this method.
The forensic experts‟ assessment that some graves held victims with a pattern of gunshot
wounds to the head or spine was interpreted by Stankovic to indicate that the gunshot wounds
were inflicted within close proximity of the victim. 475 With this line of logic, Stankovic found
the lack of evidence regarding close proximity gunshot wounds to be contradictory. During
cross-examination, Clark attested that there was no evidence of close range gunshots found on
the bodies to confirm close-range fire; however, Clark stated that this evidence is mainly found
on the skin, which was absent, and therefore precludes the determination of distance of fire.476

Lack of Positive Identifications
Stankovic portrayed the small number of identifications made by the ICTY forensic
experts as a reflection of the methodology used in the investigation.477 He cited his own personal
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experience with identifying persons from mass graves at 80% compared to the 5% identified by
the ICTY experts. The Defense cross-examined Haglund on this point, asking for the reason
behind the small number of identifications.478 Haglund countered with the scientific rigor
maintained for positive identification, as well as several factors that hindered the identification
process – a lack of fingerprints, dental information, or hospital records, and only anecdotal
information supplied by family members to identify 7,000 men scattered randomly through
multiple graves. The process of contacting the families, creating databases of information, and
matching that information to one body disallowed science-based positive identifications.479
However, the DNA identification program, at that time in its infancy, was referenced as an effort
being made to positively identify more victims.480

Forensic Archaeology
Forensic anthropology and pathology methods were not the only criticized methods.
Stankovic rejected in each of his reports Wright‟s estimation of the number of victims contained
in the probed, but at that time unexcavated graves.481 The Stankovic Report reduced this
estimate to an assumption and claimed an absence of available scientific methodology to make
such an estimate. The Prosecution had Wright describe the method used and comment on its
reliability:
I did it on the grounds that the secondary graves, the seven that we did exhume along the
three roads that we've already discussed, were the same size and shape. What I did was to
average the number of bodies found in those seven graves and extend that average to the
21 places that we had probed and shown to have multiple body parts.
[…] It's a common archaeological practice to expand one's estimates to unexcavated
places from excavated places. Whether or not my estimate is correct could be established
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by the total exhumation of the graves. But it's, I think, a conservative approach to take the
average and then extend it to the other graves. The real number might be less, it might be
more.482
Wright estimated an additional 2,571 bodies were contained in the 21 probed graves. The
Additional Stankovic Report included numerical evidence to support the criticism that an
estimate of unexcavated graves cannot be made based on excavated graves.483 Five of the graves
had since been excavated and the number of victims exhumed was slightly less than what would
be expected based on Wright‟s estimate:
[…] despite the fact that in the meantime the graves Lazete 1, Lazete 2, Kravice, Glogova
1 and Ravince were exhumed with 478 bodies in total!484
No mention of this method was made by the Defense during cross-examination. The Trial
Chamber acknowledged both the estimate made by the Prosecution and Stankovic‟s dissent in
the footnotes of the judgment. However, the Trial Chamber asserted that the evidence “strongly
suggests” that the majority of the 7,000 people missing from Srebrenica were executed and
buried in mass graves.485
A pattern emerged in the presentation of methodology in the transcripts. A method was
introduced by the Prosecution, and the forensic expert described how the method was performed
and the results of its implementation. On several occasions, the word “conservative” was used to
describe methods that produced numerical estimates.486 The expert witnesses responded to
cross-examination regarding the methods by explaining limitations alongside strengths. The
experts often closed their statements with an affirmation of the applicability and reliability of the
method. The Trial Chamber‟s judgment revealed that no methodological problems made any
impact on their judgment regarding the number of victims, the identity of the victims, or their
cause of death.
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Prosecutor v. Popović et al.
July 14, 2006 – current
The Popović et al. trial included seven defendants: Vujadin Popović, Ljubiša Beara,
Drago Nikolić, Ljubomir Borovčanin, Radivoje Miletić, Milan Gvero, and Vinko Pandurević.487
All seven were indicted for murder, persecutions, forcible transfer, and deportation. Popović,
Beara, Nikolić, and Pandurević were also indicted for genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide,
and extermination. Popović was a Lieutenant Colonel and Chief of Security for the Drina Corps,
and Beara was a Colonel and Chief of Security of the Main Staff of the VRS. Pandurević was a
Lieutenant Colonel and Commander of the Zvornik Brigade, and Nikolić was a 2nd Lieutenant
and Chief of Security of the Zvornik Brigade. Borovčanin, Commander of the MUP Special
Police and under the command of the VRS from 11 July through 18 July 1995, was indicted for
aiding and abetting genocide and extermination. Miletić and Gvero were not indicted for any
form of genocide.
The Defense teams chose to reexamine the original forensic experts who testified in the
Krstić trial, namely Haglund, Wright, Baraybar, Lawrence, and Clark. One additional forensic
anthropologist testified, Fredy Peccerelli, Deputy Senior Director of the Archaeology Team in
2000. The same two investigators who testified in the Krstić and Blagojević and Jokić trials,
Manning and Ruez, also summary testified to the investigation of mass graves. Manning
submitted a fourth report detailing the results of the work of the OTP investigations, the ICMP,
and the Bosnia and Herzegovina government, which included identifications made by DNA
analysis (Fourth Manning Report).488 The Defense fought to expose weaknesses in the forensic
methods and cast doubt on the evidentiary strength assigned to the evidence in the Krstić case.
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The Defense team was much more aggressive in their cross-examination than in the
Krstić trial. Five years had passed since the first testimony of the forensic experts in Prosecutor
v. Radislav Krstić. A major factor in the Popović trial involving the forensic evidence that
differed from that of the Krstić trial was the availability of published research performed on the
applicability and reliability of the methods employed in the forensic investigation. The forensic
experts were questioned regarding the methodology used to estimate age-at-death and sex and
calculate MNI. The methodology used to determine cause of death was not examined, but rather
the interpretations of the results produced by these methods received significant attention. The
archaeological aspect of the investigation also garnered much more attention and scrutiny than
the negligible amount applied in the Krstić case.

Age-at-Death Estimation
The Prosecution asked Baraybar very few questions. He explained MNI, during which
he delved into how age-at-death estimation is performed by forensic anthropologists.489
Baraybar‟s explanation was more detailed than any previous descriptions of the method –
epiphyses were described and the varying rates of fusion among bones and between males and
females.490 The ability to more accurately age persons under the early 20‟s than those 25 years
and older was explained. Baraybar was then offered to the Defense for cross-examination.
The Defense confirmed Baraybar‟s testimony that the methods used to determine age-atdeath were morphological changes in the pubic symphysis and the sternal end of the fourth rib.491
The Defense then referred to an article published in 2007 by Forensic Science International that
found only 67% accuracy for the combination of age-at-death estimation methods used in the
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Srebrenica investigation.492 Baraybar attempted to explain these findings and its relevancy to the
accuracy of the Srebrenica evidence:
Well, if you read carefully the article I presented to you, primarily the accuracy is
referred to the precision that they used in determining the age intervals. And what they
said is that when they use for example a plus, minus 2.5 years, of a specific estimate, they
were having a lower, I mean an accuracy that when using a broader range. So that is one
thing.
The second thing is that the application of a specific technique to a specific population
will also reflect the age distribution of the population that you are working with. If I may
explain yet a bit more.493
The Defense stopped Baraybar from explaining any further. The article referred to,
“Identification of Victims from Two Mass-Graves in Serbia: A Critical Evaluation of Classical
Markers of Identity,” states that there was a 67% accuracy in age-at-death estimation found when
pubic symphyseal morphology, sternal rib ends, dental status, suture closure, and “other
macroscopic age indicators” were used.494 However, the article clearly states another level of
accuracy for the age group of most interest to the question of genocide – the age group that
differentiates those too young to fight versus those who were old enough to be affiliated with a
military. The accuracy for persons aged 30 years and younger with an interval of ±2.5 years was
80.95%. Additionally, the accuracy of these methods improved to 92.83% for all age groups
with an interval of ± 5 years. Baraybar did not testify to these findings that are more applicable
to the research results provided by the forensic experts.
The Defense was also interested in the continuing research on age-at-death estimation
methods for Bosnian, Croatian, and Serbian populations. Baraybar explained the purpose of this
research:
So we knew that all we had at the time, and for years, was what was there, you know, set
up in North America, whatever. But there was something needed actually for the types of
Prosecutor v. Popović et al., Defense, T. 8840; see Djurić M, Dunjic D, Djonić D, Skinner M. Identification of
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populations we were working with. So these new standards hopefully will assist in the
age determination of, I mean, thousands of our victims of the war, yes.495
Baraybar referred to a series of papers under peer review that would later be published in the
Journal of Forensic Sciences in May 2008.496 One article, “Analysis of Age-at-Death Estimation
Through the Use of Pubic Symphyseal Data,” co-authored by Baraybar, provides age-at-death
estimates for the Balkan population for each phase of the Suchey-Brooks method for males,
females, and for pubic bones of an undetermined sex.497 The article has the stated purpose of
providing scientific research that can be used to demonstrate the admissibility of methods used
by the OTP in the forensic investigation of crimes for the ICTY. It directly addresses the
Defense‟s question of whether the American standard used to determine age-at-death for the
Bosnian population prior to 1999 was suitable, or accurate.

Sex Estimation
Baraybar faced a similar dilemma during cross-examination regarding sex estimation.
Referencing the same article by Djurić et al., the Defense cited the results of sex estimation using
the skull – 70% accuracy, and then asserted that the accuracy of sex estimation using long bones
is “a less certain system of analysis.”498 Baraybar affirmed this assertion, but added that this
method was not consistently relied upon:
Well, depending on what did you have. If you have, I mean, a complete body, you would
go first for the pelvis. And then you would have a look at the skull as well. Long bones
would not be necessary for that matter. If you had a body part that did not have the pelvis
but only long bones, you would be pretty much left with whatever you could do with the
long bones. So you could measure certain parts of those bones and apply certain formula
that exist or simply you couldn't. And if you couldn't, you would be -- this individual
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would be classified as undetermined. […] We have used the pelvis first, skull later, and
long bones as a last resort, if there is nothing else to determine sex.499
This testimony regarding the use of the skull and long bone to assist in determining sex
contradicts the testimony given by Baraybar during the Krstić trial in which he testified that sex
was determined by the pelvis only. This fact was not raised in the testimony.

Minimum Number of Individuals
The cross-examination by the Defense regarding age-at-death and sex estimation
appeared aimed at minimizing the credibility of the MMNI. Both the age-at-death and sex
estimation questions presented to Baraybar were within the context of explaining how MNI was
calculated, and its reliance upon the age-at-death and sex was stressed.
The Defense asked Baraybar if age-at-death determination, which requires sex estimation
to be accurate, was critical for determining MMNI.500 Baraybar affirmed but maintained that the
Defense‟s concern regarding the aging of bodies and body parts, specifically that two of the age
groups overlap (13-17 years and 15-24 years), did not have any effect on MNI.501 He explained
the process that prohibits the same person from being counted twice:
[…] You use first the most common bone you have in the assemblage, okay. That is your
first -- I mean assumption. You're going to take the left proximal femur, fine. Within the
left proximal femur, the easiest group you will get to, say, rid of would be the adults,
okay, the non-fusing, non-growing, nothing. I mean, you know these people are full adult
bones with nothing missing. That is what you have. So you've got 25 cases.
Then comes the more -- the finer, I mean, things. In other words, any bone, any single
bone be the same type of bone or another bone that show an express juvenile trait that
cannot be covered by the bones you have already counted, is one to be added. But there is
no double counting there. It is not possible to double count. How would you? I mean, I
still -- I mean, maybe it's me who doesn't understand, but it is not possible.502
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The discussion on MMNI continued; the Defense interjected that the age categories used by
Haglund were different from those used by Baraybar.503 Baraybar attempted to explain how
these age groupings have no effect on the summarization of the age groups used to determine
MMNI, but the Defense clearly was not willing to accept or unable to comprehend the
method.504 The cross-examination of Baraybar concluded with the Defense repeating that the
age-at-death determinations and groupings are important for the calculation of MMNI.505
Baraybar was unable to respond.

Forensic Archaeology
Wright‟s estimation of the number of victims contained in the 21 unexcavated graves was
again put under cross-examination. The 2,571 additional bodies were extrapolated from the
averages of other secondary mass graves. The Defense dug deeper into the method used to
determine that these graves were secondary graves holding multiple persons.
The Defense confirmed with Wright that the graves were only assumed to be secondary
rather than primary graves. Wright explained the basis for the assumption:
They‟re assumed to be secondary graves bases of the aerial imagery. They appeared at
the same time as the one we exhumed.506
The Defense then asked about the method used to determine whether the graves held multiple
bodies. Wright described a system of first establishing grave boundaries by scraping the surface
of the ground to reveal soil color differences and then digging a trench until the remains of at
least two individuals were exposed.507 The Defense had Wright confirm that using this method,
he cannot be confident that there were any more than two persons in each grave.508
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The Defense then summarized this part of their argument by asking Wright if he would
agree that several assumptions were made to calculate the 2,571 additional persons figure.509
Wright could only agree and repeat the basis for the assumptions:
The fundamental assumption is that on average those 21 graves on average will reflect
the average for the other - [Defense: Seven?] - graves that we dug, yes.”510
Wright supplemented his assumptions with information gathered from the ICMP.511 The ICMP
had been given responsibility over the excavation of all secondary graves, and some had been
exhumed since 2001. Wright could not provide the number of bodies exhumed as requested by
the Defense but claimed that he asked to be notified of any graves that were empty. He was
notified only that the graves were of “fair, average qualities” by the ICMP.512
The evolution of the Defense‟s ability to ask more technical questions regarding the
forensic methods shows a clear trajectory for the level of standards to which future forensic
investigations will be held. Forensic experts of all disciplines must work together to develop
more accurate and reliable methods; the strictest requirements made by courts regarding
evidence should be considered minimum guidelines for the development of methods. Chapter
Eight discusses legal requirements that may be met to ensure forensic methods are admitted in
court as scientific and how forensic methods can be improved to further solidify their standing
and increase their contribution to a forensic investigation.
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Chapter Eight
FORENSIC METHODS FOR COURTS

Whenever you work in a specific place in a country in a region, you will use whatever
you have at hand. But you know that the best thing you can have is to have standards that
reflect that specific population you are working with.513 (Jose-Pablo Baraybar,
Prosecutor v. Popović et al.)
Forensic investigation of human rights violations, crimes against humanity, and war
crimes will presumably continue on larger scales. The methods used by forensic anthropologists
and archaeologists will be scrutinized and challenged in international courts. In response,
forensic anthropology must address these challenges prior to an investigation and in anticipation
of the defense of methods, their applicability, and reliability in court.
The ICTY trials demonstrate that the Defense will attempt to reduce the methods to less
than scientific processes. These attempts will likely never cease due to the great contribution
these disciplines can make to the judicial process. The evidence produced is that of the physical
crime and describes the victim group. The lessons learned from the ICTY trial, as well as the
ICTR and other international and national trials, must be considered, research must be
performed, and the new or improved methods readied for application to future forensic
investigations. To protect the evidence of heinous crimes, advance preparation is necessary to
bring all aspects of international forensic investigations up to legal standards.

Legal Standards for Expert Testimony and Scientific Evidence

The forensic methods used in a criminal investigation must meet the standards set for
evidence established by a particular court. One difficulty in doing so is a lack of clearly defined
standards in international criminal law. The ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence offer very
513
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general guidelines for the admission of evidence. Rule 89, General Provisions, states “A
Chamber may admit any relevant evidence which it deems to have probative value” and “A
Chamber may exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the need to
ensure a fair trial.”514 The ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence are similar. Rule 63(2) states:
A Chamber shall have the authority, in accordance with the discretion described in article
64, paragraph 9, to assess freely all evidence submitted in order to determine its relevance
or admissibility in accordance with article 69.515
No rules define how the Trial Chamber may evaluate evidence for its relevancy or admissibility.
The ICC Rome Statute regulates a hierarchical body of laws that take precedence in the
Court. The Trial Chamber is to apply the ICC Statute and Rules of Procedure and Evidence first,
then applicable treaties, principles and rules of international law, and lastly general principles of
law derived from national laws which are not inconsistent with the prior three sources.516
National laws of the United States provide conservative rules for the admissibility of evidence in
courts and therefore may serve as guidelines for ensuring that forensic methods and their
evidentiary product will be admissible in an international court.

Historical Context of United States Expert Witness Law
The Court of Appeals of District of Columbia in the case Frye v. United States (1923)
provided early regulation of expert testimony. The Court ruled that the systolic blood pressure
deception test, in which the blood pressure rises in persons who are being deceptive and remains
static if the person is telling the truth, was not admissible by expert testimony because the test
had not gained “general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.”517 This legal
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judgment was maintained until 1993 when the Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
judgment decided that the Federal Rules of Evidence adopted in 1975 supplanted Frye.518
Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence requires that testimony be based upon
sufficient facts or data, the product of reliable principles and methods, and that the expert witness
must have performed a reliable application of the methodology to the facts of the case.519 The
trial judge determines if the methods are scientific and properly applied and whether the
evidence can assist the tier of fact. The Daubert case also provided measures by which trial
judges can determine if these requirements were met.
The Plaintiffs in the Daubert Case, parents of children born with birth defects, had
scientific experts testify that Bendectin, a prescription anti-nausea drug ingested by the mother
while pregnant, caused the birth defects in her children.520 The evidence submitted included
statistical recalculations of epidemiologic data. The evidence was dismissed because the
recalculated results had not been published or subjected to peer review. The Daubert judgment
further clarified standards for scientific evidence. Scientific validity may be based on:
(1) whether the theory or technique in question can be (and has been) tested,
(2) whether it has been subjected to peer review and publication,
(3) its known or potential error rate, and
(4) the existence and maintenance of standards controlling its operation, and
(5) whether it has attracted widespread acceptance within a relevant scientific
community.521
Although the Daubert standards are not specified within international law, it is only prudent to
meet these standards for all scientific evidence. By conforming to the most conservative rules,
forensic methods are ensured to be acceptable in all courts. Forensic methods must be relevant
to the matter in question, applicable to the population, and meet each of the above principles to
ensure that the resultant evidence is admissible and can withstand rigorous cross-examination.
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Forensic Anthropology Methodology

The applicability and reliability of the forensic methods used in the ICTY investigations
have been reviewed, tested, and the results published in several peer-reviewed journals,
including the Journal of Forensic Science, Forensic Science International, the International
Journal of Legal Medicine, and the Croatian Medical Journal. Suggestions have been made to
make methods more applicable to the Balkan population. This research was not readily available
for the Krstić case, but several articles had been published prior to the Popović trial. The
Defense used these articles in an attempt to discredit the forensic methods applied to the
investigation. The Prosecution was not oblivious to this tactic and had, in anticipation of a more
critical and educated cross-examination of the forensic methods, began engaging in research to
ensure that the forensic evidence presented in court was legally sound.522
A joint research project was formed between the OTP of the ICTY and the University of
Tennessee‟s Forensic Anthropology Center (ICTY-UT research project).523 There were two
primary purposes for the research. The first was to determine if the biological variation between
American and East European populations is significant and if so, to recalibrate the parameters for
age-at-death, sex, and stature estimation.524 This research would address the admissibility of
new methods designed for a Balkan population and any revised parameters for methods
previously applied. The second was to apply Bayesian statistics to the methods in order to assign
a quantifiable reliability to the methods. The results were published in the May 2008 Journal of
Forensic Science as a Symposium on International Human Identification. The 10 papers report
the results of research on the forensic anthropology methods of estimating age-at-death, sex, and
stature. By performing this research and publishing the results, the OTP ensured that the
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forensic evidence met legal standards, could be admitted into ICTY cases, and that the forensic
experts had adequate confidence to successfully defend the methods.

Applicability
The fundamental study of biological anthropology involves the analysis of human
variation. Interpopulation variation has stimulated forensic anthropology to devise different
standards for different populations. Methods for estimating age-at-death, sex, and stature have
traditionally been defined for the population for which the standard was developed. For a
forensic anthropology method to be applicable, the population from which the method was
derived must have characteristics similar to the study population.
Age-at-Death Estimation. The most significant methodological problem that emerged
from the ICTY trials was the use of age-at-death methods designed for an American population
applied to a Balkan population. Sex estimation was generally accepted as accurate, race
estimation was not questioned, and stature estimation was not addressed in the ICTY trials. Ageat-death played a very prominent role in the trials due to the implications that age placed on the
genocide indictment. For genocide, the age-at-death of the victims has categorical implications
and may be used by either the Prosecution to deny or the Defense to support a common defense –
that the bodies are victims of war. Being too young or too old contradicts this combat victim
scenario.
The applicability of the methods used to determine the age-at-death of victims in the
mass graves was questioned in both trials. The testimony of two forensic experts might be
construed as in conflict. First, in Krstić, Baraybar described the modification of age ranges
associated with the six stages of the Suchey-Brooks method and explained that the age ranges
were altered to more accurately age the Bosnian population.525 A change in parameters during
any investigation may suggest that the original method was not applicable to the population, and
the Defense capitalized on this point. In the Popović trial the Defense asked Wright if “There are
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racial variations to bone growth and age-induced change?”526 The Defense was not expecting his
answer, that in the post-crania “there‟s not much different between people all over the world.”527
These are seemingly contradictory opinions on the issue of interpopulation variation. The
answer to Wright‟s question from the Defense was a primary objective of the ICTY-UT research
project.
A necessary question for all forensic anthropological methods is whether interpopulation
variation is significant enough to require the method to be calibrated to each population. The
ICTY-UT research project studied interpopulation differences for the use of American standards
in the estimation of age-at-death for the Bosnian population. A proportional odds probit
regression analysis was performed to compare the association between each morphological stage
of the Suchey-Brooks method to age for the two populations.528 An improvement chi-square test
calculated deviance to determine whether the two samples contained the same proportion of
pubic symphyseal phases conditional on age. No significant association was found between
pubic morphology and age in a population, thereby demonstrating no significant difference in the
method‟s reliability between the two populations. The method produced equally reliable results
for both populations.
The applicability of a method should be defined by its accuracy. The accuracy of the
protocol for age-at-death estimation used in the former Yugoslavia, which included the SucheyBrooks pubic symphysis and Iscan-Loth fourth sternal rib morphology stage methods, and the
Lamendin dental technique, was assessed by comparing age-at-death estimates to known ages of
730 positively-identified Kosovians.529 The known age fell within the estimated age range for
75.9% of cases. It was found that persons under the age of 18 years were frequently under-aged;
those between 18 and 50 years over-aged; and those over 50 years under-aged. Therefore,
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although the American standard is producing fairly accurate results, a population specific
modification to the method could improve the results.530
Several other studies have tested the applicability of North American standards for ageat-death estimation in Balkan populations. A study comparing relative-reported age-at-death
against forensic anthropology reports for 63 positively identified Bosnian men from Srebrenica
was correct only 42.4% of the time.531 Another study found 82.98% accuracy for males and 75%
accuracy for females when applying the Suchey-Brooks method to 85 pubic bones collected
from the University of Belgrade.532 These results were published, and in each article the
inaccuracy of the method was attributed in part to the use of North American standards on the
Bosnian population. The authors called for the establishment of population specific standards.
These published results can fuel a Defense; the forensic experts must be knowledgeable
regarding the samples and methods used to produce these results in order to respond
appropriately.
Sex Estimation. Sex estimation methods applied to Balkan populations using American
standards is quite accurate. A study of 262 pelvic bones and 180 skulls resulted in 100%
accuracy using the pelvic bones and 70.56% accuracy using the skull only.533 The ICTY-UT
research project found 95.2% accuracy for Kosovo individuals when utilizing pelvis and skull
morphology; using only the pelvis, the accuracy for classifying males was 98.1% and females
91% accurate.534 These results support the ICTY‟s investigation protocol which utilizes the
pelvis as the main determinant of sex.
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Reliability
The reliability of a method is the factor by which applicability is measured. After
confirming a method is applicable, the reliability of the method must be demonstrated as
adequate. In the Popović trial, the Defense twice quoted an article published in Forensic Science
International on the reliability of forensic methods used in the ICTY investigation. The purpose
of the research was to evaluate the accuracy of the methodology used to estimate age-at-death,
sex, and stature for positively identified Serbian mass grave victims.535 Each individual in the
sample was evaluated anthropologically for these three markers of identity and were later
positively identified by DNA. The Defense cited that sex estimation was correct only 70% of the
time and that the methods used to estimate age-at-death were only 67% accurate.536 Baraybar
began to explain why these results were not comparable to the investigation‟s accuracy due to
the narrow age range. In both cases Baraybar was allowed to briefly answer but was stopped
short by the Defense.537 Baraybar did not defend the reliability of the methods used by error
rates nor did he cite studies that were comparable to the Srebrenica forensic investigation. This
may have had far more impact on the defense of the evidence than the explanation of why those
particular published methods and results were not applicable.
There are several ways for forensic anthropologists to produce a more reliable method for
a population which addresses the legal need for a known error rate. A reference sample can be
prepared if there are skeletal remains of individuals within the population with known age-atdeath and sex. Improvements can be made to an established forensic method by adapting its
individual components or phases to the population in question. The statistical models
traditionally used in forensic anthropology methods can be improved with more advanced
statistical models. A known error rate also needs to consider inter-observer error since most
forensic anthropology methods are based upon morphology and subsequently produce subjective
results.
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Reference Samples. The forensic methods designed for White and Black Americans
were made possible due to extensive research using osteological collections and metric
databanks. A reliable method requires a large sample size, something that is not always
available for the population under investigation. Reference samples for Balkan populations were
only developed after crimes were committed, and the size remains small in comparison to those
available for Americans. Developing a reference sample for a population following genocide is
difficult because of the need to acquire a large sample comprised of individuals of known age-atdeath and sex. Antemortem data is often woefully inaccurate, and positive identifications can
take a considerable amount of time to confirm. The reference samples that do exist for the
Balkan population are a result of the extensive use of DNA to aid in positive identifications well
after the anthropologic examination of victims. The lack of reference populations from various
regions of the world can be and should be addressed prior to their need. An international
forensic databank, similar to the metric forensic databank organized by UT, should be instituted
and biometric data collected on all populations.538
Adapting Current Methods. In addition to reporting whether the North American
standards were applicable to the Balkan population, many of the early publications on the
applicability of methods included adaptations to increase reliability for the Balkan population.
This type of study examines interpopulation variations and proposes adjustments to the existing
methods after testing individual components for independent reliability. An example from the
ICTR demonstrates a situation in which the American standard for sex estimation, based on skull
morphology, was consistently inaccurate when applied to the Rwandan population. 539 Rwandan
male skulls had marked frontal eminences, a trait often observed in American female skulls. The
American population-specific trait was disregarded, and other morphological indicators were
considered the most reliable. The design of these studies may be applied to any method and
population to determine interpopulation variability and adjust the method as necessary.
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The Suchey-Brooks method was subjected to such a study for the Balkan population.540
The method‟s use of age related changes of the pubic symphyseal surface was deconstructed into
10 surface features: changing relief of the symphyseal surface, dorsal margin, ventral beveling,
lower extremity, ossification nodule, upper extremity, ventral rampart, dorsal plateau, lipping of
the margin, and symphyseal rim. Each morphological feature was scored based on its degree of
expression (from 1 to 4) for 85 pairs of pubic bones collected at autopsy from the University of
Belgrade. A stepwise linear discriminant analysis was performed to determine which
morphological features most contributed to accurate age-at-death estimation. The most accurate
features included the relief of the symphyseal surface, lipping of the margin, symphyseal rim,
and dorsal margin. These features should be given more weight when morphological features
appear to span more than one phase. The individual analysis of each feature also allowed for
modification of the method based upon morphological changes that occurred at a different rate in
the tested population than the reference sample. Four recommendations were made to
incorporate different rates of change in the Serbian population.541 For example, the research
showed that the appearance of an oval contour on the symphyseal rim indicates phase V (41 – 55
years old) while complete formation indicates an age over 55 years.542 This confirms the results
of other studies that the Suchey-Brooks method under-ages Eastern Europeans under 50 years
old.
The same method of analysis has been performed for sex estimation. Both cranial
(n=180) and pelvic bone (n=262) morphological features were scored on a five point scale for
262 males exhumed from mass graves near Belgrade. Sex was known from well preserved soft
tissue. The seven features scored for the pelvis include: robustness of the pelvic bones; presence
of the preauricular sulcus; presence of the ischiopubic ramus; shape of the subpubic angle; shape
of the ventral arc; shape of the great sciatic notch; and shape of the composite arch. Nine
features were scored on the crania: size of the mastoid process; size of the occipital
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protuberance; nuchal cresting; sharpness of the supraorbital margin; supercilliary arch form;
prominence of the supramastoid ridge; robustness of the mandible; size of the mental eminence;
and size of the frontal tuber. The most reliable pelvic features, correctly sexing 98% of cases,
were subpubic angle, ventral arc, and composite arc. The least reliable was the shape of the great
sciatic notch at 79.15% accuracy. For the skull, the most reliable trait was the robustness of the
mandible with 100% accuracy; the least accurate was the sharpness of the supraorbital margins
with 28.75% accuracy.543 Any morphological based method can be subjected to such analysis in
an effort to adapt the method to a different population.
Statistical Methods. The traditional method of reporting reliability used in forensic
anthropology, including means, standard deviations, confidence intervals, and percentile ranges,
can be improved upon with advanced statistical methods. A main purpose of the ICTY-UT
research project was to apply Bayesian methods to forensic methods in an effort to produce a
quantifiable reliability to the methods.544 A Bayesian method addresses the lack of a specific
reference population and assesses statistical significance for the method. When applied to staged
forensic methods, such as the Suchey-Brooks method, a Bayesian approach utilizing transition
analysis results in more accurate error estimation by avoiding the assumption of a Gaussian
distribution in the known reference sample and accounting for variation in rates of transition
between stages. 545 The use of a likelihood ratio has the additional benefit of being expressed
graphically, a useful property in courtroom presentation when illustrating reliability.
Inter-observer Variation. A method‟s error rate must take into consideration interobserver error. Many forensic anthropology methods are based upon observed morphological
changes, including the Suchey-Brooks, Iscan-Loth, and Lamendin dental technique age-at-death
estimation methods and cranial and pelvic morphology-based sex estimation methods. These
observations are subjective, requiring repeatability testing and inter-observer variation studies to
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confirm the method‟s reliability. These studies can reveal technical problems and prompt
revision of the method‟s phase descriptions.
A study of inter-observer error was performed as part of the ICTY-UT research project.
Five aging methods were tested: Todd and Suchey-Brooks pubic symphysis methods, IscanLoth‟s sternal rib end method, and the Lamendin and Smith dental wear method.546 The sample
was of Kosovo skeletal material (pubic symphysis n = 296; sternal rib ends n = 622; singlerooted teeth n = 412). The four author‟s observations for the five methods were statistically
different. The experience of the observer is the most obvious variable to consider, but each of
the authors had considerable practical experience with the methods. Closer examination of the
observer variation revealed two patterns in the variation – a one stage difference among
observers and more disagreement for middle phases than the younger and older phases.547
Inter-observer studies may reveal technical problems with a method and can prompt
adjustments to address reliability issues. The ICTY-UT research project indicates that
morphological phase-based methods that attempt to describe morphological traits which span
more than one phase fail by these overlapping assignments.548 The morphology from one phase
to the next are seemingly the most difficult to consistently limit to one phase. Several
approaches may be taken to address this problem. The first, transition analysis, is directed at
examining the change from one phase to another. The second is to distinguish traits that are the
most prevalent as absent or present within a stage and weigh them more heavily than those that
span more than one phase. Lastly, more distinct phase descriptions of the relevant morphology
and illustrations of the variation within a phase may supplement current method descriptions.
Decision-making trees, in which the absence or presence of one trait leads to increasingly
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significant determinants, may also provide more consistent scoring of phases between
observers.549
An inter-observer study based on Balkan skeletal material took the second approach to
addressing variation by singling out the more salient morphological traits for pelvic and cranial
sex estimation. Agreement between an experienced forensic anthropologist and a less
experienced graduate student was determined for individual traits.550 Overall, agreement for the
pelvis was 71.8% and for the skull 90.35%. Each morphological variable was scored to
determine those traits that were the most and least reliable, or the traits most consistently
observed by both examiners. These traits can then be given more emphasis, such as the
robustness of the mandible, mental eminence, and supramastoid ridge, all of which showed the
greatest agreement; or given less emphasis, such as the ventral arc and composite of the pelvis,
which showed the least agreement between observers.
There are several approaches which may be undertaken for repeatability and interobserver tests. The most valuable provide a source of measured differences and address the issue
through practical solutions aimed at improving the method. Studies commonly single out
specific morphological traits or single methods for age-at-death or sex estimation for the ease of
computing statistical differences and pinpointing the morphology responsible for the variation.
However, the use of a single trait or method is not a practical application of the practice of ageat-death and sex estimation by forensic anthropologists. In practice, multiple methods are used
in conjunction to make an assessment based upon all available skeletal material. A multifactor
based decision will always result in a more reliable estimate.
The OTP of the ICTY enacted the steps necessary to protect the admissibility of the
forensic evidence collected from the investigations by entering into research with UT to
determine the applicability and reliability of the forensic methods employed throughout the
549
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investigation. This joint enterprise fulfills the legal standards as set in the Daubert case, namely
a tested method, subjected to peer review and publication, with a known error rate, deliberate
standards for its use, and the chance to gain widespread acceptance within the forensic
anthropology community. As legal standards become more defined in international law, forensic
anthropology must meet and exceed these standards.
Law is invigorating forensic anthropology, forcing the discipline to develop applied
methodologies to solve a case. The research produced for the Balkan population, in direct
response to the forensic experts‟ need to respond to questioning regarding their methods, is a
trend that will likely be repeated for other criminal investigations.551 Population variation will
always prompt questions of applicability and reliability. As each investigation spurs directed
scrutiny towards methodology and the redevelopment of methodology, more will be documented
regarding population variation and the applicability of forensic methods across varied
populations. Forensic anthropological research should be less concerned with seeking human
variation than with describing how this affects the science of the discipline.552 Larger reference
samples from more ethnic populations of the world are required. Advanced statistical methods,
including Bayesian analysis and transition analysis, for age-at-death, sex, and stature estimation
will produce greater accuracy than traditional statistical methods. This increased accuracy serves
to bolster the credibility of the forensic evidence as well as contribute to the humanitarian effort
of personal identification.
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Chapter Nine
STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES ON TRIAL

Your Honours, a protocol was established by the -- normally the chief archaeologist.
They changed over some time, but a written protocol was established. It was normally
included in their report in relation to the exhumation, and it was a protocol known to the
team and to the investigators. A similar protocol was established at the mortuary
complex.553 (Dean Manning, Prosecutor v. Popović et al.)
Standard operating procedures (SOPs) provide the framework for performing a
systematic, comprehensive forensic investigation. SOPs regulate the consistent performance of
all procedures, methods applied, and the way in which evidence is recorded and the associated
data and reports are produced. Each step of the investigation should be purposefully taken
according to established SOPs. SOPs include the minimum acceptable standards of practice,
defined as the lowest standard that must be met or else the integrity of the investigation would be
compromised. Several functions of the investigation are supported by maintaining SOPs that
include minimum standards.

Functions of SOPs

SOPs are designed to meet or exceed the level of scientific rigor required by the judicial
system. Maintaining SOPs at all stages of the investigation ensures that evidence is collected
and handled in a way that produces legally admissible evidence. It is the responsibility of the
experts to ensure that the work they produce is acceptable for the specific court system(s)
involved. Applicable domestic law and the rules of evidence for any involved international court
must be understood and incorporated into the SOPs.554
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For forensic investigations taking place in war torn or impoverished areas, where any
number and combination of constraints can threaten the quality of the investigation, SOPs
provide a set of minimum guidelines. A lack of financial or tangible resources, personnel, time,
and/or space cannot be used as an excuse to circumvent a SOP. The Srebrenica investigation
was affected by the lack of aforementioned resources.555 The forensic experts were responsible
for explaining if and how SOPs were maintained despite these constraints.
Forensic experts can rely upon SOPs when they are pressured by political agendas or
other agencies to neglect some aspects of the investigation, such as positive identification, or
perform their duties in some other less scientific or methodological fashion in order to produce
results more quickly. This very situation occurred during the Srebrenica investigation. The time
pressure put upon the forensic experts was examined by an independent Oversight Committee,
an expert panel brought together by the OTP to subjectively review the investigation following a
series of allegations made against the quality of work being performed:
There were concerns regarding international politics imposing a great deal of pressure on
the teams to complete the exhumations quite rapidly. Even so, there was little or no
evidence that the pace of the examinations adversely affected the overall scientific
quality. Along with the pathologists the most experienced archaeologist stated the
recovery of bodies had been done adequately under difficult circumstances.556
The larger the investigation, the greater the need to maintain well established, rigorous
SOPs to mitigate problems. Factors that make SOPs more vital to maintain the integrity of the
investigation include: a large number of experts, a prolonged investigation, a large number of
graves to be excavated or number of victims to be exhumed, and the physical expanse of the
crime scene. The Srebrenica investigation was characterized by each of these complicating
factors that risked diminishing the quality of the investigation.
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The numerous Srebrenica mass graves were located great distances apart. At times,
excavations took place concurrently at multiple grave sites. The Defense quoted the Oversight
Committee‟s comment regarding the practice of excavating two graves simultaneously:
"Having two sites open at the same time caused severe logistic problems in transportation
and equipment." It says, "Dr. Haglund often spent hours driving between the sites. That
impeded his ability to routinely supervise the work being done."557
SOPs ensure that the same procedures are performed irrespective of who is in charge at the
scene. Haglund defended the procedures put in place in order to maintain the quality and legality
of the investigation despite his intermittent absence. At all times, either Haglund or Baraybar
was at a site and in charge of directing the excavation.558
The investigation required many experts of different specialties, culled from several
different nations, to work collaboratively. In an international project that involves personnel
from varied backgrounds, experience, education and culture, SOPs allow the team of experts to
work harmoniously under one set of expectations.559 The Srebrenica investigation stretched over
many years, resulting in changing chiefs of excavation and pathology as well as other experts
and supporting personnel. Manning explained that the three chiefs of exhumation involved in
the investigation at various times each had different procedures, but all were based upon
“accepted standards of exhumation and examination of graves.”560 As experts enter the
investigation, the SOPs define their role and respective job.
The application of SOPs throughout an entire multiple site investigation allows for
comparability between sites and the ability to combine evidence from several sites. The
capability to produce an overview of the evidence collected throughout the entire investigation is
specifically relevant to describing crimes, such as genocide. The Manning reports served to
summarize the Srebrenica investigation, and experts testified to summary results of the forensic
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evidence to characterize the victims as a group. Genocide is a crime against a group of people;
the evidence must define the group as a whole and describe the crimes committed against the
said group. Many of the Defense‟s criticisms of the forensic experts‟ reports centered on the
process of combining the evidence collected from individual graves. These criticisms raised
issues regarding the compatibility of the methods and procedures performed at each individual
site.
Standardization problems occurred during the Srebrenica investigation. These problems
were reflected in the expert reports and the forensic experts‟ testimony. Standardization
problems were addressed by the Defense in both the Krstić and Popović trials. In Krstić, SOP
issues were focused on the way in which methods were applied, terminology was used, evidence
was documented, and final reports were produced. In Popović, the Defense expanded its inquiry
to SOPs that regulate procedures performed prior to the mortuary analysis and issuing of reports
including procedures at the grave site, the dissemination of SOPs to each contributing member of
the investigation, the use of standardized forms, and the maintenance of an unbroken chain of
custody.

Forensic Methods

Several forensic experts rotated through the roles of Chief of Exhumation and Chief of
Pathology from 1996 to 2001. The Defense tested the investigation‟s SOPs regarding the
application of forensic methods by asking each expert the same questions regarding the mortuary
analysis of the human remains. If SOPs were in place, the forensic experts should have given
similar answers when explaining the method used and how they were applied. However, this
was not the case. In many instances, it was very apparent that various methods were applied.
Consequently, the Defense revealed a lack of SOPs that were clearly definable by each expert
witness. These differences had the potential of depicting the investigation as unmethodical, or
unscientific, and therefore inaccurate.
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The methods used to calculate MNI, estimate age-at-death, and determine cause of death
received the most attention from the Defense. The two issues discussed most frequently were 1)
the Chiefs‟ differing accounts of the individual methods used in the mortuary analysis and 2) the
summarization process applied to the evidence collected from each mass grave which was used
to describe the crimes committed on the group.

Minimum Number of Individuals
Standardization issues regarding MNI were discussed in both the Krstić and Popović
trials. In the Krstić trial, the Defense asked Baraybar to explain how he calculated MNI and then
read Haglund‟s description of how MNI is calculated from his report on the exhumations at the
Branjevo Military Farm.561 Whereas Baraybar included age-at-death into his calculation of MNI,
Haglund made no reference to age. Baraybar admitted the methods were different.562 Haglund‟s
method potentially underestimates MNI. Although this may have affected the MNI at individual
sites, Baraybar‟s calculations of MMNI would not be affected. Baraybar explained that his
calculation of MMNI was based on raw data only and did not rely on the other expert‟s MNI
calculations.563
Subsequently, in the Popović trial, the Defense specifically asked Manning if three
different methods were used to calculate the MMNI for the whole investigation – Haglund‟s,
Baraybar‟s, and the ICMP‟s DNA calculations.564 Manning testified that the earlier reported
MMNI was based solely upon Baraybar‟s work, and the newest figure was based solely upon
DNA results provided by the ICMP. The ICMP‟s MMNI was submitted to the court in the
Fourth Manning Report. Four thousand two hundred and sixty three individuals were identified
by DNA analysis, and an additional 758 unique DNA records of individuals not yet identified or
matched to a missing person combined to establish a MMNI of 5,021 victims.565
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Explaining how the MMNI calculation was performed was difficult enough for the
Defense to comprehend without the added factor of multiple seemingly incompatible methods of
determining MNI. The ICMP‟s MMNI based upon DNA is a much more scientifically reliable
number, and it was appropriate to exchange it for the anthropological-borne calculation once it
became available. However, in most cases, the anthropological calculation will be prepared first
due to the expensive and time consuming nature of DNA analysis. One of the main objectives of
the total investigation was to estimate the number of victims or the quantifiable part of the group
targeted.566 The method for determining MNI, from recording bone inventories to calculating
MMNI based upon age-at-death and sex, should have been standardized with a SOP from the
very beginning of the investigation.

Age-at-Death Estimation
Two standardization issues related to estimating age-at-death were discussed in both the
Krstić and Popović trials. First, the experts‟ use of different age ranges was criticized in both
Stankovic Reports submitted for the Krstić trial, but no forensic expert was cross-examined on
the matter during the trial. In the Popović trial, the Defense addressed this discrepancy and what
impact it might have on the performance of other methods, including the calculation of MNI.
Second, the switch to the calibrated Suchey-Brooks aging method for the Balkan population was
discussed in the Krstić trial, but its significance was not considered until the Popović case.
Inconsistent Age Groups. Baraybar and Haglund used different age ranges to describe
the victim population. For example, the youngest age range used by Baraybar was 8 – 12 years
while Haglund‟s youngest was 11 – 15 years. 567 Baraybar grouped all persons aged over 25
years into one group while Haglund used the age ranges of 25 – 35 years, 35 – 45 years, and 45
years and older. Stankovic questioned the methods used to make age-at-death estimates
considering the different age ranges used by the experts.568
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The Defense did not explore the significance of a lack of standard age ranges until the
Popović trial. The Defense informed Baraybar that his age groups differed from Haglund‟s and
that this was unsystematic. Following a lengthy discussion back and forth about assigning age
ranges, Baraybar confirmed that his age groupings were “more generous”, as described by the
Defense, than Haglund‟s.569 The age range differences were discussed again, and at that time
Baraybar hypothesized that Haglund may have been able to assign narrower age ranges because
the bodies under evaluation were more complete.570 This is a legitimate argument for assigning
comparatively more narrow age ranges. The SOPs should reflect the methods‟ ability to be
performed consistently but be flexible enough to generate appropriately wide age ranges that
may differ depending on the particular circumstances.
Introduction of a Balkan Calibrated Methodology. The second standardization question
regarding age-at-death estimation involved the introduction of the calibrated Suchey-Brooks
pubic symphysis aging method for the Balkan population in 1999. In the Krstić trial, Judge
Rodrigues asked Baraybar if the same method was used for aging individuals throughout the
investigation. Baraybar explained that the observations made did not change; only the age
ranges associated with the observations changed.571 The exchange consisted of one question
and one answer. The issue received much more attention from the Defense in the Popović case.
Through a lengthy series of questions and answers, Baraybar explained that the
calibration only altered the age ranges associated with each particular phase, not the
morphological indicators observed to assign age ranges.572 Baraybar admitted that prior to 1999
it was highly likely that there was an error in the construction of age ranges corresponding to the
Suchey-Brooks phases. Baraybar also provided that the Balkan standard demonstrates older age
ranges associated with the phases than the American standards.573 However, he stressed that this
error would be a systematic one, one that consistently under- or over-ages the population.
Prosecutor v. Popović et al., Baraybar, T. 8857.
Prosecutor v. Popović et al., Baraybar, T. 8880-8881.
571
Prosecutor v. Krstić, Baraybar, T. 3890.
572
Prosecutor v. Popović et al., Baraybar, T. 8850-8851.
573
Prosecutor v. Popović et al., Baraybar, T. 8851.
569
570

154

The Defense clearly did not understand this point; the question was repeated:
It would be systematic if you carried on using the same test. But you changed it in 1999,
didn't you?574
Baraybar repeated his explanation, noting that it was the third time he was describing how the
method was calibrated. The exchange ultimately ended in ambiguity. However, the whole
exchange was to the benefit of the Defense and demonstrated their ability to interject another
aura of discrepancy concerning the SOPs used in the investigation.

Cause of Death
There were several SOP discrepancies regarding the determination of cause of death.
The first was a self-admitted difference in standards between pathologists when assigning a
cause of death due to gunshot wound when the only injury visible on the body was to a limb.
The second and third problems were intricately tied together. The definition of a “body” and a
“body part” differed among experts. Finally, cause of death was not consistently assigned to all
body parts. Together, these three SOP problems resulted in the counts associated with cause of
death being based upon variable standards.
Limb Injuries. The pathologists‟ differences in opinion regarding the assignment of
cause of death due to gunshot wound when the solitary injury was to a limb was introduced by
the Prosecution in Krstić, cross-examined by the Defense, and clarified again by a Judge. Clark
listed this injury scenario among several other limitations in determining cause of death for
skeletonized remains.575 Clark responded to the Defense‟s cross-examination with an example to
illustrate the differences in opinion between pathologists:
This was mostly for people who had been shot perhaps in the legs. Some people felt that
a gunshot injury to, say the thigh, would necessarily have caused damage to blood vessels
and could well have been fatal. Others were a little more cautious and said, "Well, that's
not" -- they weren't entirely happy with that, and we just had to go along with that.576
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Clark also remarked that this situation was rare, and only injuries to the limbs incited debate
among pathologists.
Judge Riad asked Lawrence to explain a comment he made during his cross-examination
regarding assigning a cause of death: “I think I am a little less conservative than Dr. Clark”.577
Lawrence referenced the same example of a gunshot wound to the thigh and explained his
opinion that a gunshot wound to the leg, left untreated, would be fatal. 578 Being less
conservative meant that he labeled gunshot wounds as a cause of death more liberally than Clark
when only limbs were injured. He also attributed the difference in standards to the variability
inherent to the physical condition of the bodies being examined; Clark had more complete
bodies, whereas Lawrence examined more body parts.
Bodies v. Body Parts. The Srebrenica graves, especially the disturbed primary graves
and secondary graves, were filled with transected bodies and body parts. The Krstić case
introduced what constituted a “body part” and the difference between pathologists and
anthropologists when assigning a mostly complete body the term “body” or “body part”, and
how body parts were or were not incorporated into figures concerning cause of death. Only in
Popović did the Defense link the two standardization issues together; the consequence of having
different definitions of a body part was a possible inflation in the number of reported cause of
deaths by gunshot wounds. Clark testified that in modern war conflicts shrapnel injuries are far
more common than gunshot wounds, making this point particularly contentious.579
The Defense found differences in standardization regarding body parts between the
anthropologists and the pathologists, and also between the pathologists themselves. In the Krstić
case, Haglund explained what constituted a body part whilst describing the bodies excavated
from the Branjevo Military Farm:
To give you an idea of what we were labelling as body parts, ten individuals were
individuals that were missing their heads; five body part units were just upper
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extremities; sixteen were individuals who were transected at the torso, and so on; and
then there were individual bones and bone fragments.580
In the Krstić case, the Defense elicited the difference in standards regarding the labeling of
bodies and body parts between anthropologists and pathologists by pointing out a discrepancy in
the reported number of exhumed bodies versus the number of bodies examined in the morgue for
the 1999 Kozluk grave.581 Wright was the Chief of Exhumations and reported 291 bodies were
exhumed. Clark was the Chief Pathologist and reported 292 bodies were examined. Clark
attributed the difference to the environment in which the two experts had to determine if a set of
remains was a body or a body part.582 He explained the anthropologist graveside may have
labeled remains as a body part, but once the remains were cleaned and laid out in the morgue the
pathologists could change its designation to a body after showing that it had “all the significant
parts present.”
In the Popović trial, the Defense asked Baraybar for the definition of a complete body
and specifically asked him to define it “in accordance with the protocols that you used.”583
Baraybar first confirmed what the Defense was clearly aiming to establish – that there had been
“a lot of debate over that.”584 He provided examples of debated body parts and his personal
interpretation of a complete body:
At some point in time there was some internal discussion, […] whether a body would be,
for example, if you found a leg with a pelvis and half of the torso, would that be a body
or would it be a body part, or a body part would be only an arm or a leg or a hand.
My interpretation of complete bodies was primarily, I mean, something as recognisable
of the body as possible. Meaning at least 75 or 80 per cent of what a body is made of
would be present.585
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The Defense asked if Haglund had the same interpretation and Baraybar replied, “I do not
actually know…It was simply a – an assumed – I mean thing.”586 Making assumptions is always
a bad policy in a scientific and legal investigation. The same question was asked regarding
Wright, and Baraybar again described a debate scenario between what was or was not a body or
body part.587 Finally, the Defense asked if from 1996 to 2001 the term “body part” was different
according to different people. Baraybar replied, “I couldn‟t tell you.”588 The Defense made it
clear there was no standard for defining a body part among everyone involved in the
investigation.
Summarizing Causes of Death. A related standardization problem was whether body
parts were included in the experts‟ reported sums for causes of death. The high number of
victims with a cause of death by gunshot injuries was purported by the forensic experts as one
indication that the injuries were a result of executions.589 The Defense was eager to expose that
this number was inflated due to the variable standards. The Defense wanted to minimize this
number and maximize causes of death by blast and shrapnel injuries, causes of death attributed to
combat by the forensic experts.
In the Krstić trial, the Prosecution asked each expert to explain how the numerical
summaries of cause of death were calculated for each grave. Clark considered only complete
bodies in his percentages of victims from each grave with a cause of death by gunshot wound.590
Using an example at the Kozluk grave, 233 body parts were ignored for calculating cause of
death. Lawrence explained that his cause of death figures were calculated by assigning each
body bag, regardless of its contents, a cause of death, and that a separate number was calculated
for cause of death assigned to full bodies.591 The precise effect this calculation had on cause of
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death by gunshot wounds for all the victims exhumed in the investigation, presented by Manning
as 1,424 individuals, was not discussed. 592
In the Popović trial, Clark and Lawrence described their methods again.593 Lawrence
also explained why he calculated two different numbers:
The reason I have included both information on the whole bodies and the body parts is, I
think, in particularly some of the more disrupted graves such as Liplje, it -- it would be
hard to get any useful information. I also needed to indicate, I think, how many gun-shot
wounds we had. But I agree, it -- it is very difficult unless you can completely reunite all
of the body parts to interpret exactly what the results on the body parts means in terms of
an actual cause of death.594
This was the information the Defense was seeking. Bodies were transected and body parts were
assigned a cause of death, therefore the number of individuals reported to have died of gunshot
wounds may have been over-inflated based on the fact that one body may have been assigned
multiple causes of death. In combination with the cross-examination of Clark, in which he
testified that some limbs may have been lost due to blast injuries, the Defense had made its best
attempt at establishing that gunshot injuries may have been overestimated and shrapnel and blast
injuries underestimated. 595

Terminology and Format of Expert Reports
Stankovic made two criticisms regarding the forensic experts‟ reports in the
Stankovic Report. He specifically pointed out the use of different terminology among
pathologists and generally criticized the formatting of all the reports.596 Both issues were
addressed by the Prosecution in their examination-in-chief, but neither issue was addressed by
the Defense in their cross-examination.
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Terminology
The Stankovic Report described the pathologists‟ use of different terms to describe
autopsy results as not acceptable.597 It rejected Clark‟s reasoning for the differences as the
“descriptive style and the form of words” used by pathologists of different medico-legal
backgrounds. Stankovic requested “an explanation of the various medico-legal backgrounds of
the engaged experts” and insinuated that these differences may have adversely affected the
investigation by asking “how it reflected on the forensic examination of the human remains.”
The use of different terminology by the pathologists was discussed during Lawrence‟s
examination-in-chief. 598 His explanation was similar to Clark‟s written justification:
I was dealing with a number of people from different jurisdictions. A lot of my training is
American based, and I tend to use the term "undetermined." A lot of the British
pathologists use the term "unascertained," "unascertainable," or "not ascertained." For
veracity, I have written down what the pathologist who handled the case called it, not
what I would call it.599
A difference in terminology explained as a personal choice of words hints at an unsystematic
mortuary analysis. The continued use of the terms by Lawrence to maintain the integrity of the
report is commendable and avoids further criticism, but predetermined standards for common
medico-legal terms should have been instituted.

Formatting
Both Stankovic Reports made a sweeping criticism of all the forensic experts‟ reports:
[The documentation] is too extensive, non-systematical and, therefore, difficult for
analysis and for drawing individual and general conclusions.600
The Stankovic Report and Additional Stankovic Report provided Stankovic‟s opinion of how the
reports should have been written: the investigator responsible for each grave should have
incorporated all of the forensic evidence from that grave into one report, and all of the reports
597
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should have followed a certain order according to a work methodology established by the Hague
Tribunal.601
The Prosecution was aware of the difficulties in composing a clear overview of all the
sites investigated. In the Krstić trial, Manning confirmed that the expert reports were
voluminous and consisted of thousands of pages in several volumes.602 The Manning Reports
were introduced as a summarization of the findings and included conclusions of the experts.
These reports present key information for each grave, but its lack of detail prohibits critical
evaluation of the investigation‟s SOPs for methods, standards, and other procedures.
A more consistent format for the case reports would have assisted both the Defense and
likely the Prosecution, as comparison between the experts‟ methods and standards would have
been more easily executed with standardized reports. A standard methodology for reports also
ensures that no valuable evidence is overlooked from any of the graves or execution sites.

Standard Operating Procedures: Additional Criticisms

The standard procedures performed to locate graves, the excavation of remains and
artifacts, their transfer to the morgue, and all subsequent examinations performed on the bodies
and artifacts were detailed throughout the Krstić and Popović trials by the respective Chiefs of
Exhumation or Pathology. The forensic experts touted the standards used in the Krstić case, and
the Defense made few inquiries on the standards implemented. The use of specific standards
was certainly questioned more frequently in the Popović case, and the forensic experts were
forced to reveal standardization problems.
Standards in the Krstić Case
Several forensic experts commented generally on the standards maintained throughout
the investigation. The impetus for the remarks stemmed from questioning regarding the effect
601
602

Stankovic Report, 12; Additional Stankovic Report, 7.
Prosecutor v. Krstić, Manning, T. 3548.

161

numerous experts working together had on the overall investigation. The experts celebrated the
diversity of the personnel and presented the international team as a positive feature of the
investigation:
Clark: It worked very well. Obviously, everyone had their own medical-legal
backgrounds and were used to carrying out examinations in different ways. But we had a
fairly common standard, and everything did work very well.603
Haglund: […] The individuals are briefed on what those protocols are. They are made to
adhere to international standards and sometimes above those international standards. The
people come and they work as a team, and they work very hard and they do the best job
they can, and I think the results are very credible.604
Specific standards were not discussed in depth during the Krstić trial, and the Defense did not
question any standards outside of those described above – the forensic methods applied in the
mortuary and the style of report writing.
Reflected in the minimal amount of attention the Trial Chamber gave the Stankovic
Reports and the Defense‟s cross-examination arguments in the judgment, the judges were
apparently not particularly swayed by the Defense‟s criticism of the forensic investigation. The
Trial Chamber Judgment summed up Stankovic‟s report in two sentences.605 The argument that
some graves held victims of combat, and the criticisms made regarding the methodology of
determining cause of death, were acknowledged. The Trial Chamber accepted that there was
ongoing combat in the vicinity of some graves, and the evidence of execution at graves devoid of
blindfolds and ligatures was “less compelling”. Finally, the Trial Chamber commented on the
overall tone of the Stankovic Report and quoted Stankovic‟s summation of the forensic experts
and the investigation:
The Defence expert, Dr. Stankovic did not however, fundamentally challenge the
substantive findings of the Prosecution experts and accepted that the exhumations were
conducted by experts with “substantial professional experience and adequate technical,
scientific and moral integrity.”606
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The Trial Chamber made no further reference to a lack of standards, nor any criticisms of the
investigation‟s integrity or quality, in their summarization of the forensic evidence in the
Judgment.607
Standards in the Popović Case
The specific SOPs followed in the exhumation and mortuary analysis was in much
greater focus on the part of the Defense in the Popović trial. The experts were asked to describe
the SOPs of the investigation, and the Defense was particularly interested in any changes to the
procedures that occurred during the investigation. Two additional witnesses testified in Popović
that did not testify during the Krstić case, Stephanie Frease and Fredy Peccerelli, both of whom
were cross-examined regarding SOPs. The results of the Oversight Committee were extensively
utilized by the Defense to implicate a lack of standards. The most discussed SOPs, besides those
that changed within the investigation, were those of chain of custody and the use of standardized
forms. Both are forms of documentation: one protects the legality of the physical evidence and
the other the quality of the product of that evidence. Any fault in either would have a negative
impact on the evidentiary value of the forensic evidence and the experts‟ testimony.
Changes in SOPs. Baraybar was asked about “protocols and procedures” in the mortuary
and whether they were “constant throughout the period of 1996 to 2001 or could they
change?”608 Baraybar was very candid in his answer that certain procedures changed and agreed
with the Defense that they were “less than perfect” in 1996.609 He explained that changes
occurred every season and procedures that could be improved upon were adjusted. Baraybar
blamed some changes on early limitations in their work and the conditions under which they
were working – lack of water, improvised tables, and problematic electricity.610 These are some
of the potential problems the minimum standards as outlined in SOPs should be designed for and
Krstić Judgment, para. 71-79.
Prosecutor v. Popović et al., Defense, T. 8816.
609
Prosecutor v. Popović et al., Baraybar, T. 8816.
610
Prosecutor v. Popović et al., Baraybar, T. 8826.
607
608

163

protected against. The expert can then present the SOPs to defend the quality of the work despite
any changes during the investigation due to uncontrollable constraints.
Manning also prefaced his description of the SOPs performed during the exhumation of
victims with the observation that the protocol “varied slightly over the years.”611 Manning
agreed with Baraybar that “better”, “more efficient ways”, and “improvements in technique”
stimulated changes in the protocol.612
Disseminating SOPs. SOPs are irrelevant if they are not known by all members of the
team and consistently applied. When experts and supporting staff rotate in and out of an
investigation, it is necessary to provide consistent SOPs that regulate their participation. A
complaint regarding the dissemination of SOPs was made to the Oversight Committee and read
by the Defense for Haglund:
It says, "There were no systematic briefings at the sites upon arrival. No one seems to
have been given any standard plan of operation."613
Haglund provided many reasons as to why this statement was, admittedly, true:
Essentially there was systematic briefings for the majority of people at the beginning of
the project, but as the project went on it became impossible to indoctrinate everybody
about the project as they came in, because they come in at different times, different
places et cetera. And again, the initial individuals, the initial individuals which were the
bulk of them, did get a standard plan of operation where they were going to be. I don't
know what that really refers to, but where they were going to be, what work was expected
of them, and how we were going to go about it.614
The influence that a small number of individuals working without clear SOPs had on the quality
of the investigation could have been negligible or disastrous. In either case, testifying that
everyone was not aware of the SOPs reflects negatively on the overall quality of the
investigation.
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Forms. Haglund described a scenario in which it was difficult to continuously update
everyone on the investigation‟s procedures. A mitigation tool used to ensure that the same
procedures are performed irrespective of who is involved is the use of standardized forms.
Standardized forms are used to record every aspect of the investigation. Excavation forms allow
for the precise reconstruction of a grave after the destructive act of excavation is performed.
Chain of custody forms record the movement of evidence from its initial discovery to its
submission as evidence in court. Mortuary forms record the results of analyses. Forms ensure
that every requisite procedure is performed and all results are properly documented in a
standardized fashion.
Baraybar described the purpose of using forms in the mortuary:
Primarily try to give some consistency to the analysis that will be undertaken. In some
occasions we had a lot of people, I mean over a dozen experts working simultaneously in
different autopsy tables and the way they were recording things has to be protocolised,
the types of forms that we use has to be protocolised as well. We try to be as consistent as
possible in -- in recording things. Also because, based on that information, we will be
able later to calculate things like the minimum number of individuals, for example. So
primarily that, trying to ensure consistency and continuity, if you wish.615
Haglund was confronted with a complaint made by an anthropologist to the Oversight
Committee: forms were not always used during the investigation under his command.616
Haglund did not specifically address this complaint in his response, and the Defense did not
press for an explanation.
Large scale forensic investigations are no longer novelties, and standard recording forms
are available for each step of a forensic investigation. All published results are a product of data
drawn from documentation, or forms. If forms are not detailed enough, filled in correctly, filled
in by the wrong expert, or not completed at all, then the product of the investigation, the
evidence that was collected, analyzed, summarized, and presented in court could be dismissed as
inaccurate, unscientific, not comparable, and lacking the scientific rigor required to be
admissible as evidence. Lastly, the forms themselves are also evidence and must be submitted to
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the courts as such. Any omission on the forms needs to be explained to protect the work from
accusations of missing data, incomplete analyses, or omission of procedures. Any changes to the
SOPs also need to be written and explained.
Chain of Custody. One specific form requires special mention due to its necessity in the
maintenance of evidence legality. A chain of custody form must document the movement or
transfer of all collected evidence, whether human remains or artifacts, from original discovery to
analysis and final disposition.617 All generated evidence, such as drawings, photographs, and log
books, also must be documented with an unbroken chain of custody. Without chain of custody,
the Defense can claim the evidence is contaminated and it will lose its evidentiary significance.
Any disregard for chain of custody undermines the legality of the investigation. Consequently,
the Defense was very interested in the SOPs regarding chain of custody.
Frease was asked to testify for Popović regarding her role in documenting chain of
custody at exhumation sites.618 Her involvement with the cataloging of evidence was limited to
surface finds collected during initial site visits to identify the location of the mass graves.
Despite this limited exposure to the investigation, her lack of qualifications displayed a disregard
in respect to chain of custody for the initial evidence collected. Frease had no experience
inventorying evidence or maintaining chain of custody prior to her employment with the OTP.619
Two recommendations made by the Oversight Committee were quoted for her to comment on:
Develop a standard operating procedure for the collection and handling of evidence.
Develop a double 'up down' chain of custody system and form.620
Frease not only claimed that she was never informed of these recommendations, but she admitted
she couldn‟t explain an „up down‟ chain of custody system.621 This process dictates that the
617
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person transferring and the person taking possession of the evidence sign the chain of custody
form. Frease‟s testimony was to the detriment of the OTP‟s standards for chain of custody and
therefore the legality of the investigation.
Manning was also confronted with the Oversight Committee‟s report in regards to chain
of custody. The Defense exposed allegations that were made regarding methods of collection,
chain of custody, loss of chain of custody of bones, and the related activity of coordinating
operations between anthropology and pathology during the 1996 exhumation season.622
Manning, having not been involved in the investigation of mass graves at the time the complaints
were made, only confirmed that a review of the materials produced on the mass graves revealed
no significant problems beyond some misnumbering, mislabeling, and general errors that are not
uncommon in such a large investigation.623
The Defense made advances in their ability to question the quality of the investigation
from the Krstić to Popović trial. Defense teams will likely become more educated regarding
forensic methods, demand much higher standards, and question the legitimacy of the forensic
investigation more critically in the future. Many more forensic investigations of mass graves
have been performed following the Srebrenica investigations. Experienced experts can design
SOPs that function well for the excavation and analysis of mass graves and human remains to
produce evidence for judicial purposes and collect information for the humanitarian purpose of
victim identification. These SOPs must be developed and instituted as a standard for all
investigations of mass graves.
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Chapter Ten
STANDARDIZING OPERATING PROCEDURES
We have prepared this text as a move towards what will be a long and iterative process –
the establishment of internationally accepted protocols and standard operating procedures
for the scientific investigation of mass graves, similar crime scenes, and mass fatality
incidents. They are intended for other practitioners to use as they see fit, within an everchanging political, economic, legal, and humanitarian context. 624 (The Scientific
Investigation of Mass Graves)
An increase in large scale criminal forensic investigations conducted for judicial purposes
has stimulated the need for procedural standardization. From site assessment to the excavation
of graves through the analysis of human remains and artifact evidence, the SOPs used in an
investigation ensure the legality and scientific reliability of the collected evidence. Standards
must be rigorous, clearly defined, and continuously maintained.625 A main tenet of archaeology
is relevant to every investigational procedure: excavation is a destructive process and history can
only be unearthed once. The ability to examine evidence is also often only afforded once;
therefore the SOPs should guide collection of the maximum amount of evidence in this initial
opportunity.
SOPs must serve more than the judicial purpose of the investigation. They must also
incorporate the procedures required to fulfill the humanitarian needs of the community
surrounding the investigated crime. Although a crime may be investigated for the primary
purpose of collecting evidence, humanitarian needs must be concurrently met. Personal
identification efforts must be undertaken and histories reconstructed to bring justice to those
affected. All investigations, whether for judicial, humanitarian, or both purposes, benefit from
SOPs.
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The problems that occur when SOPs are not initially instituted or maintained throughout
the entirety of the investigation were detailed in trials regarding the Srebrenica investigation.
Much was learned from this largest forensic investigation of mass graves to date. The need for
SOPs in the forensic investigation of mass graves was demonstrated. The International
Committee of the Red Cross‟s 2002 “The Missing” workshops focused heavily on SOPs.
Although SOPs have been generated for mass grave investigations, it may be beneficial for a
particular set to be recognized as an international standard that may be referenced in courts.

Early Established Bodies of SOPs

The UN Manual on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-legal, Arbitrary
and Summary Executions (The Manual) is a set of SOPs for the legal investigation of executions,
disinterment of human remains, and autopsy and/or analysis of skeletal remains.626 The Manual
provides guidelines for protecting the legality of evidence while maximizing the amount of
evidence collected. Specific procedures are outlined in the protocol for the analysis of skeletal
remains: the application of radiography; forensic anthropologic analysis for individualization,
trauma, and cause of death; the retaining of skeletal samples; and photography of the remains.
The included model protocols for autopsy, disinterment, and analysis of skeletal remains are
complimentary protocols designed to be applied to the range of decomposition that may be
observed. The Manual includes as a distinct SOP that any significant deviation from the SOPs
ought to be explained by the investigator in a final report.627
A second well established body of standards is the Disaster Victim Identification (DVI)
guide first published by Interpol in 1984 and under continuous revision to incorporate emerging
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methods and technologies.628 The purpose of the guide is to establish compatible procedures in
disaster situations that can be applied across international boundaries. Its focus is on the
standardized collection of antemortem data, the recovery and examination of human remains to
produce postmortem data, and the use of comparison matching systems for the two sets of data.
The DVI guide provides protocols for victim recovery, morgue procedures, and the comparison
of ante- and postmortem data. It is much less specific in its guidelines for the collection of
postmortem data than the UN Manual; it outlines the use of external and internal examinations,
dental examinations, and genetic identifications.
Interpol has recently adopted the role of addressing the investigation and prosecution of
genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.629 Through a series of international
meetings, the needs of member States were identified and included an increased use of Interpol
databases, the development of a best practice manual, and a list of relevant contacts in member
countries. An agreement was made to cooperate with the ICC and make Interpol databases
available to the court.
Both of these well established protocols provide good general outlines for the main
phases of an investigation involving unidentified persons, but retain many deficiencies. Neither
was designed for application to the investigation of mass graves or a criminal investigation that
incorporates multiple events across time and space. These protocols do not describe the specific
forensic methods that ought to be applied to human remains, nor the minimum requirements for
establishing personal identification. Legal issues relevant to a criminal investigation are also not
discussed, such as forms, chain of custody, and final report writing. Minimum standards are not
provided. The forensic disciplines that contribute to a criminal investigation must develop
standards for their respective profession, and through interdisciplinary collaboration, each
discipline‟s contribution should be incorporated into a comprehensive, internationally recognized
set of SOPs with best practices and minimum standards.
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New SOPs for Criminal and Humanitarian
Investigations of Mass Graves
The ICRC has played a very active role in defining the best practices for responding to
unidentified human remains. In 2002, a series of six workshops were conducted among
governmental and non-governmental entities involved in the investigation of missing persons
from armed conflicts and other types of violence.630 The purpose of the workshops was to
develop operational practices to prevent and respond to missing persons. One workshop dealt
specifically with the role of forensic sciences and the management of human remains and
information on the dead. In December 2003, the recommendations and best practices developed
in this and five other workshops were adopted by the ICRC and Red Crescent.631
A main goal of the management workshop was the development of minimum standards
of practice for forensic experts under various constraints.632 The need for standardized forms to
record antemortem data and the required autopsy and/or skeletal analysis results, the postmortem
data, was also emphasized. Both the Minnesota Protocol and the Interpol DVI autopsy protocol
were considered for their advantages and disadvantages in detailing SOPs and recording data.633
A merging of these two protocols was recommended. A third concern was to ensure that
remains were subjected to only a single examination by which all of the forensic evidence
relevant to the criminal investigation and the information needed to identify the person was
collected.634 Other topics included the development of guidelines for exhumation, means of
personal identification including the use of DNA analysis, and the ancillary involvement of
families in the exhumation and identification process.635
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The recommendations made in The Missing workshops have been incorporated into a set
of SOPs developed by a forensic group with extensive experience in forensic investigations. A
2008 publication, The Scientific Investigation of Mass Graves, provides protocols and SOPs for a
complete forensic investigation of mass graves that fulfills both judicial and humanitarian needs
of the affected community. This volume defines protocols for a forensic investigation of mass
graves and the necessary minimum procedures. SOPs then detail how to perform each protocol.
A chapter is devoted to SOPs for each of the following topics: health and safety; scene of crime
examination; search, location, excavation and recovery of remains; mortuary procedures
including pathology, radiology, and anatomical pathology technologist; mortuary procedures
including skeletal analysis for demographic assessment; mortuary procedures for determining
identity; and supporting forensic sciences – entomology, environmental (soil, palynology and
mineralogy), DNA analysis, and forensic odontology; and antemortem data collection. Its
purposeful design for use in criminal investigations of mass graves was prompted by some of the
editors‟ and authors‟ experiences in the ICTY as forensic anthropologists, archaeologists,
pathologists, crime scene investigators, forensic photographers, and radiographers. Many of the
editors of this volume are also affiliated with Inforce, an independent NGO with the purpose of
providing forensic expertise in the process of locating, recovering, and identifying victims of
human rights violations. The NGO has the specific purpose of adopting
protocols and SOPs for forensic investigations.636
There are two unique characteristics of this volume that set it apart from other texts on
the investigation of mass graves. The first is the inclusion of specific forensic methods in the
SOPs. Methods are detailed for determining demographic information, including ancestry, sex,
and age-at-death estimation, and methods designed for individualization, including stature,
skeletal pathology and trauma, dentition, handedness, and sampling for DNA analysis.
Similarly, SOPs for the excavation of the mass graves, analysis of fleshed remains, and the
collection of antemortem data are as detailed.
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The second unique trait is the provided forms, logs, and registers that support the SOPs.
The 223 pages of forms are provided in PDF and Word format on CD-Rom. Personal experience
using the forms at an Inforce Mass Graves Excavation and Mass Fatality Incident Mortuary
Workshop allows for personal comment regarding their ease of use and functional style. The
forms balance detail with the necessary flexibility under varying circumstances, are for the
majority self-explanatory, and comprehensively document all investigative procedures.
The anthropology recording forms are very detailed, and unique forms are specialized for
individual adults, individual non-adults, multiple heat modified adults, and multiple heat
modified non-adults. The specific information necessary to perform forensic methods is
incorporated into the recording forms. For example, the non-adult recording form includes tooth
eruption pattern figures, a figure depicting the metric measurements of the pars lateralis and
basilaris to estimate age-at-death, and ages associated with post-cranial fusion of ossification
centers.637 The adult recording form includes stature formulae for White and Black Americans,
metric cut-offs for estimating sex, and the cranial landmarks used by Fordisc for craniometric
analysis. 638 An additional form is provided for inventorying surface scatters and commingled
remains that will not be analyzed in the mortuary. This form is purposefully designed to assist in
calculating MNI. The Word format allows these forms to be edited to insert methods applicable
to the particular population being investigated.
The Scientific Investigation of Mass Graves details a set of SOPs that are functional, a
characteristic that most publications on forensic anthropology and/or archaeology and human
rights investigations fall short on. Other volumes that attempt to address minimum guidelines,
best practices, and SOPs are written in narrative form and demonstrate the information through
case studies. These types of publications are an interesting read and informative, but lack the
specifics that would make it possible to serve an investigation as functional SOPs. Clearly
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stated, internationally recognized SOPs are necessary to formalize the systematic application of
forensic disciplines to criminal investigation of human rights infractions.
Other SOPs included in The Missing are the establishment of minimum requirements
when it is not possible to conduct a full autopsy, the collection of antemortem data, the criteria
required for personal identification, standards for the use of DNA analysis, exhumation
standards, the management of human remains when forensic specialists are not available, and the
involvement of families in the investigation. The lists of minimum guidelines provided can be
incorporated into the protocols of any judicial or humanitarian investigation of mass graves, and
the legality of the investigation can be backed by the international standing of the ICRC.

Humanitarian Needs

The second main focus of the ICRC workshops was the tension between the justice and
the humanitarian need for identifications. Families have a right to know the whereabouts of their
family members. In the former Yugoslavia many families of the victims refused to believe their
loved ones were buried in mass graves, and held out hope that the missing were being held in
detention camps.639 Without identification, families of the missing live with fear of the truth
weighing against the hope of a joyful return. Personal identification allows for proper grieving
and emotional closure.640 The families of the victims do not receive full justice until the remains
are identified. Therefore, efforts must be made to collect information regarding victim identify
concurrently with that for judicial purposes.
In times past, identification has been neglected due to constraints involving resources,
time, money, facilities, and the personnel required to collect the additional ante- and postmortem
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information required to identify victims.641 The collection of information related to
identification must have an explicit purpose in the analysis of the remains. This must be
addressed when developing minimum standards and requires incorporation into SOPs.
Evidence should only be examined in a mortuary once; all information that can be
observed and is relevant to identification ought to be recorded during the initial analysis, and no
procedures should be performed that would hinder identification at a later time.642 The
information needs to be recorded in a manner that allows it to be functional for judicial purposes
and to facilitate identification.643 The analyses performed for identification purposes should be
incorporated into the standard forms used for recording information for judicial purposes. The
Inforce SOPs record both types of information.
The equal treatment of the humanitarian effort together with the judicial purpose of the
investigation is a professional and ethical responsibility of the forensic agencies and experts
participating in a forensic investigation.
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Chapter Eleven
PROFESSIONALISM AND ETHICS ON TRIAL

No, I'm board eligible. They accepted my case work, they accepted my professional
standing, they accepted my experience, and they accepted my training. I just did not take
the test…644 (William Haglund, explaining why he is not an ABFA diplomat, Prosecutor
v. Popović et al)
The forensic expert, in order to maintain that title, must commit himself to maintain
professional standards and uphold certain ethical practices. Organizations involved in
investigations must also have established guidelines for professional conduct and ethical
practices.645 The ICTY trials revealed several indicators of professionalism and ethical behavior
expected of both a forensic expert and contracted organization. These topics were minimally
addressed in the Krstić trial but used more heavily by the Defense in the Popović trial in an effort
to diminish the validity of the forensic experts and the overall investigation. The legitimacy of
an investigation, in part, depends upon the recognition of the forensic experts‟ standing as
respected professionals in the field in which they practice. Unethical behavior and practices
reflect negatively on the forensic expert and diminishes the integrity of the entire investigation.
Professionalism and Ethics in the Krstić Case
In Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstić, each expert began their testimony by stating their
profession, educational background, employment history, professional affiliations, and field
experience. The experts described when they were active in the investigation, the title they held,
and what particular contribution they made to the investigation. Their curriculum vitae were
submitted to the Court as written documents.
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Critiques of the professionalism on the part of individual forensic experts were limited to
one individual. The Prosecution revealed in the Krstić trial that colleagues of Haglund had
criticized his work. Haglund described the complaints as regarding the “rate and quality of the
work” and briefly summarized the results of the Oversight Committee:
[…] the expert panel's opinion was that the criticisms really had nothing to do with the
quality, did not jeopardise the scientific quality of the work, and they added that it wasn't
surprising to them to have brought together people from disparate lands and disparate
backgrounds and experiences and not have some different perceptions of how things
should go.646
Only one specific complaint was discussed by Haglund – while reviewing autopsy reports,
supervising pathologists changed the causes of death of other subordinate pathologists in an
effort to standardize the work. The Oversight Committee reviewed all the original autopsy
reports and agreed that the opinions were consistent. Changing causes of death without
consulting the original pathologist was found to be an inappropriate act, but the scientific
findings were not jeopardized.647 The Defense did not cross-examine Haglund on this issue.
Other criticisms by the Oversight Committee, which was concluded well before the Krstić case
began in November 1997, were not raised by the Defense.
The only direct comment from the Defense regarding the professionalism of the forensic
experts was in the Stankovic Report. This concluding and supportive remark followed the
critique of the forensic investigation:
Regardless of the above remarks, my view is that the persons committed for the forensic
examination of the exhumed human remains revealed in the graves around Srebrenica
have substantial professional experience and abundant technical, scientific and moral
integrity, and that the mentioned failures result from the absence of a unique work
methodology, and also from certain inexperience and personal ego of some of the experts
engaged in the mission.648
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The Stankovic Report did, however, comment on an issue that is both a professional and ethical
concern for the investigation – personal identification of the victims:
[…] the prime principle of the autopsy is to ascertain identity, which in the examination
of the bodies was not the priority task, and the result of such a stand is that only about 5%
of the bodies was identified.649
Stankovic requested that the pathologists explain why identification was not a priority of the
investigation, considering its dual purpose of supporting the case and serving the needs of the
missing persons‟ families. Haglund replied in his cross-examination that there were several
thousand victims spread among many graves, and there was a lack of antemortem data such as
dental and medical records available to the investigators. DNA analysis was required to confirm
a positive identification but Haglund described this analysis as expensive.650 The OTP did not
provide the resources required for DNA analysis.
The humanitarian efforts made by the mortuary team during the investigation were
described in response to a question posed by Judge Rodrigues. The Judge asked what questions
guided the investigation and the objective of the research applied. Baraybar explained the two
objectives as 1) to establish a demographic profile of the population including MNI, age-atdeath, and sex estimation and 2) to assist in identification of the victims by recording stature
estimations and unique features such as old fractures.651 Clark and Lawrence also described
efforts to assist in the personal identification of the victims.652 It was explained that the results of
these inquiries were not contained within the reports submitted to the ICTY because of their
perceived irrelevance to the legal case.653
There were no inquiries or accusations made against the ethical conduct of the two main
organizations in the investigation, PHR or the OTP.
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Professionalism in the Popović Case
The Defense‟s favorable, or at least neutral, view of the forensic experts and the
management of the investigation was decidedly different in the Popović case. The Defense
probed much further into Haglund‟s review by the Oversight Committee and raised several other
professional and ethical issues regarding the forensic experts and the investigation. The
professional qualifications and conduct of forensic experts was examined by the Defense.
Professional conduct indices included the forensic experts‟ prior knowledge, what information
regarding the mass graves and the actions that may or may not have preceded their creation was
supplied to the experts, the management of the grave excavations and mortuary, their personal
interactions with other team members, and public speaking and the media. The forensic experts
were also asked to comment on specific ethical practices. Ethical questions were raised
concerning the involvement of NGOs in the investigation, which agency paid the forensic
experts, and the lack of personal identifications.

Professional Qualifications
The Defense questioned the forensic experts‟ professional qualifications during
Baraybar‟s cross-examination. Baraybar was asked if he was a member of the American Board
of Forensic Anthropology (ABFA) and when he replied, “No, I‟m not. I‟m not – I‟m not
American,” the Defense asked if he was aware that Haglund was not a diplomat of the ABFA.654
The Defense named several individuals who had participated in the investigations, referred to
many as students, and asked what role they played in the investigation. Baraybar responded to
the Defense by providing those “students” qualifications: some students had Ph.D.s.655 Another
list of names was read along with their role in the investigation, and Baraybar was asked if he
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considered each person “competent”.656 Baraybar affirmed his belief in the listed persons‟
competence.

Preconceived Notions
The forensic experts were asked questions regarding their interpretations of the mass
graves and the circumstances surrounding the victims‟ interment. These questions were phrased
differently than during the Krstić trial. Many questions did not require forensic expert direct
interpretation, but rather asked what factors beyond the forensic evidence may have led the
experts to make those particular interpretations. The Defense‟s questions probed what
information was provided to the forensic experts by the Prosecution, and which interpretations of
forensic evidence were influenced by this information, or not made solely based upon the
forensic evidence. This delves into the forensic expert‟s professional responsibility to testify
based on established forensic evidence only, and their ethical responsibility to maintain
neutrality despite having been hired by the OTP or having been an existing contract between the
OTP and the forensic expert‟s employer, PHR.
The Defense asked if the OTP had provided any information to the forensic experts
pertaining to what precipitated the creation of the mass graves or what they expected to recover
from the graves. Baraybar was asked whether the OTP informed him that he was going to find
military-aged civilian men.657 Haglund was asked whether the OTP told him how many bodies
they believed were buried in the graves.658 Both denied receiving any prior information from the
OTP regarding expected finds. Wright recalled being told that one site was a place of execution,
where the bodies were buried, and that it was an undisturbed grave.659 He also explained that he
did not accept the information provided to him as fact:
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I was thinking of all sorts of possibilities for these graves, that they might for instance
date from the 1992 war and so on. We were always on the look-out for evidence that
would test the propositions that had been put to me.660
Clark claimed that he received very little information regarding the victims prior to autopsy and
described his position on the subject:
[…] There is argument whether we should be -- do a case sort of blind or with some
information. I think there is a happy medium. I think we probably reached this here, and
certainly we had little detailed information about the cases. Other than to the extent that
we were generally informed whether this was a primary grave or whether this was a
grave which had been disturbed, and that explained why so many of the bodies were
disrupted. Things like that. But in terms of what weapons had been used, whether
grenades had been used or whatever, we were the main instigators of that information
from our findings.661
However, within the remaining transcript, Clark confirmed that he was informed regarding the
“perceived circumstances under which these victims had met their deaths” and that prior to
conducting the autopsies he did have a preconceived notion:
The balance weighed in favour of the fact that these were people who had been the
victims of an alleged execution.662
This preconceived notion reflects poorly on the neutrality of the investigations, particularly the
pathologists‟ autopsy reports.

Management Skills
The Oversight Committee focused heavily on a lack of appropriate management. Most of
the blame was placed on Haglund, the Chief of Exhumations in 1996. The Defense
systematically introduced the “criticisms” and “recommendations” made by the Oversight
Committee and asked for Haglund‟s comments. The following is an edited list of management
complaints not aforementioned:
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There should be a transmittal of knowledge, both up and down the chain of command
frequently.663
There was a lack of stating who the volunteer was specifically working for, and little
thought as to positioning less experienced personnel with more experienced
anthropologists and pathologists.664
There was a total lack of communication between supervisors and between supervisors
and volunteer personnel.665
Haglund defended his practices, but also agreed that the Oversight Committee made valid
recommendations. The Defense summed up their line of questioning with a very blunt question
for Haglund:
Well, I put it to you that the Office of the Prosecutor put together the panel of the
independent experts to whitewash the shoddy job and sloppy science that was done by
you and others at Srebrenica?666
The Judges stopped Haglund from answering the question, stating that Haglund was not present
to answer for the Prosecution. Even without this blatant criticism, it was clear that one of the
Defense‟s tactics was to reveal a cover up of a less than scientific, methodological, and accurate
investigation. The results of the Oversight Committee were often returned to by the Defense
during each of the forensic expert‟s cross-examinations. The Defense asked the other forensic
experts if they agreed that Haglund mismanaged the investigation. They were asked to comment
regarding his professionalism.667 The forensic experts refuted some claims, but agreed there
were problems with Haglund‟s management style.
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Personal Character
The Defense also attacked the personal character of Haglund. Excerpts were read from
the book, The Key to My Neighbor’s House by Elizabeth Neuffer, a journalist who observed and
then wrote about the exhumations:
“Some of Haglund‟s team members accused him of being high-handed.”668
“Others found him too dictatorial for their tastes.”669
“Haglund, exhausted, worried, frantic, obsessed with getting things done, had lost the art
of polite conversation.”670
Baraybar was asked to recall how Haglund reacted at the time Baraybar became seriously ill.
The Defense asked if it was true that Haglund told him he was “gold bricking”, a term used to
describe someone who avoids their duties, and that Haglund “wouldn‟t even give you a ride [to
the hospital]?”671 Baraybar recalled the argument between Haglund and himself but denied
having to walk to the hospital.
Haglund replied to one accusation, made by administrator John Gems, that he was
“aggressive” and had a “condescending attitude which had an adverse effect on the mission”
with a simple statement: “that‟s personality, not science.”672 However, all of these character
attacks reflect poorly on Haglund‟s ability to manage an investigation.
Actions and words of those in a supervisory position are relevant to the perceived control
of the investigation and the ability to conduct a proper investigation. Professionalism must be
maintained in all aspects of the job. During an exhumation in which the teams must live and
work together, the boundary between the two, being on or off the job, is blurred. A person in a
supervisory role must maintain a professional demeanor at all times in order to gain the
confidence of the team members and exhibit control of the investigation.

Prosecutor v. Popović et al., Defense, T. 8994.
Prosecutor v. Popović et al., Defense, T. 8994.
670
Prosecutor v. Popović et al., Defense, T. 8995.
671
Prosecutor v. Popović et al., Defense, T. 8893.
672
Prosecutor v. Popović et al., Defense, Haglund, 8940-8941.
668
669

183

Public Speaking and the Media
The Defense also used Haglund‟s own words against him. A quote in The Key to My
Neighbor’s House was read by the Defense:
It says," -- this is quoting you, "'I never thought I would have to do more than one site at
a time,' he said some years later reflecting on that summer of 1996. 'I knew it would be
horrible and it was horrible. The whole summer was beyond The Hague's vision. They
didn't realise how much time it would take, there was no clear direction, and we didn't
have a good sense of what we were getting into.'"673
Another quote was taken from a seminar given by Haglund for The Crimes of War Project and
The Freedom Forum:
“I slow plate this one and that's one of the reasons -- I had a four-ring circus going on. I
was going absolutely crazy here. But sometimes you're lucky and you have had the
resources to cover the grave and sometimes you're not.”674
Haglund described these comments as having been taken out of context and as characterizations
of “how you feel.”675 He denied that there was any chaos. The lesson to be learned, however, is
clear: as a Chief of Exhumations in a criminal investigation, your words, whenever or wherever
they are spoken, are binding and may be used against you. As a professional, a current
investigation should not be discussed glibly or in any manner that may interfere with future legal
proceedings.
A related topic involves speaking with the press. The Oversight Committee agreed that
there was “too much concern with regard to media involvement.”676 Haglund attributed his
frequent press briefings on the OTP. He stated that he was designated as the only person
authorized to speak with the press and to speak with them regularly.677 Haglund assured the
Court that the aim of these meetings was to provide information regarding only the procedures of
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the investigation, and not the evidence being collected. Involving the media, he said, was not
something that would have occurred during a criminal investigation in the United States. The
Defense asked why Haglund did not use his position to stop the OTP from allowing the media to
take a picture of remains with wrists bound with wire because “It may affect the integrity of the
site.”678 Haglund replied that measures were taken so that it did not affect the integrity of the
site.679
Large scale forensic investigations are quite different from those of an individual criminal
act; a whole community is invested in the investigation. The media can serve a functional role to
inform and update the community regarding realistic expectations of the investigation, but the
crime scene and evidence thereof must be protected.
Ethics in the Popović Case

Finances
Without using the word “ethical” the Defense probed the potential ethical compromise
related to financial arrangements among PHR, the OTP, and the forensic experts. PHR was
contracted by the OTP in 1996 to provide forensic experts and conduct investigations in Bosnia
and Herzegovina, including the Srebrenica mass graves. The Defense again attempted to use
Haglund‟s own words against him regarding the acceptance of financial payment for his work.
Quoted in an article in The Science of Human Rights, the Defense read:
[…] it says, "Accepting support directly from national governments would compromise
the perception of independence and, consequently, their credibility."680
The Defense asked Haglund if he believed that accepting money from the OTP would also have
“the same effect.” Haglund corrected the Defense, explaining that the quote applies to NGOs
accepting money, not forensic experts, and that he was unaware of any money paid by the OTP
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to PHR. 681 He further explained that he received money from the NGO for doing a job, not for
his opinion, but for his time.

Lack of Identifications
The lack of identifications made during the OTP investigation was portrayed as a
reflection of the quality of the investigation and as a poor ethical choice on the part of the
forensic experts. While discussing a criticism of the Oversight Committee, specifically that there
was “apparent disagreement as to the primary purpose of the mission,” Haglund explained that
identification was not a part of the mandate:
Yes, and I do agree about the -- the difference of the purpose, because many people were
from human rights backgrounds and thought we were there basically to identify people,
and that was not our purpose or our mandate.
And that all again falls under the personal identification. We passed on the personal
identification to other organisations; that was not something in our mandate. Only if we
had leads to specific identifications, we followed those up.682
If the prosecutorial investigation was working in cooperation with another organization to
identify the remains, this arrangement would be ethical. However, another quote from an article,
written by an employee of PHR, was read by the Defense which contradicted this arrangement:
The survivors wanted the world to acknowledge that they had been victims of genocide,
and the remains provided their proof. But the ICTY's timetable for exhuming the
Srebrenica graves held the unearthed remains essentially hostage to prosecutorial
priorities and The Hague's logistical capacity.683
The Judges kept Haglund from responding to the Defense‟s question whether this statement was
true. He was relieved from answering due to the fact that the article references 1998, a time
when Haglund was not actively participating in the investigation. That referenced article
describes how the OTP returned the unidentified human remains that were exhumed in 1996 to
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Bosnian authorities who also lacked the capability to identify the victims.684 The result was the
interment of the victims into an underground tunnel with no efforts made for identification.
PHR began identification efforts in 1997, facing many obstacles, and few persons were
identified. In 2000, the ICMP began its DNA identification program, greatly increasing the
number of identifications.685 Investigations with a restricted mandate for judicial purposes only
must still conform to minimum practices that include identification.686 Families should be
granted the right to know the final disposition of their loved ones.687

Research Ethics
The Defense questioned Wright‟s ethics, asking if “that practicing as an anthropologist
you have to be very careful of the ethics of what you do?”688 Wright agreed and the Defense
followed with:
And, presumably, you would agree that, in the work that was carried out in Bosnia,
researchers should have obtained the informed consent of any persons they intended to
study.689
The Prosecution objected to the relevancy of the question and the judges concurred. Some of the
forensic experts did, however, engage in research, such as the ICTY-UT research project.
Samples of human remains were retained from autopsy in order to perform studies on the
anthropological methods. This is a valid ethical question: is consent necessary or the most
ethical manner to obtain reference samples? This question has not been answered conclusively
for osteological samples.690
Professionalism and ethics are similar to methods and SOPs in that they must be guided
by procedures and standards that are recognized as best practices.
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Chapter Twelve
PROFESSIONALISM AND ETHICS:
BEST PRACTICES
Well, let me tell you, there is no written rule or no law that regulates matters in that way.
But I repeat again that there are situations and cases, and that was the situation in Croatia,
that we did have experienced people, people who during their long careers, did also
engage in forensic medicine, and that is why they were qualified enough to be able to do
that work.691 (Davor Strinovic, responding to Milosevic questioning the qualification of
pathologists performing autopsies, Prosecutor v. Milosevic)
Being professional and working under ethical practices produce overlapping
expectations. To be professional requires ethics, and performing ethically bolsters professional
practices. Personal integrity and moral standards are required for both.692 Human Remains:
Law, Politics and Ethics was the title of a workshop organized by the ICRC.693 Several
recommendations were made regarding ethical guidelines for the forensic expert, and other
recommendations were made to protect the forensic expert from accusations of unethical
practice.

Qualified for the Unique Context
The forensic expert must be qualified and competent to work in a missing persons‟
context and must work only within his field of expertise. It is unethical to perform a job if at any
time you are unable to meet standards due to professional deficiencies.694 The Defense targeted
this responsibility in Popović by questioning the “student” status of some members of the
investigation team. Frease‟s professionalism was also targeted based upon her lack of
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qualifications to supervise chain of custody. A missing persons‟ context is different than most
forensic experts‟ regular practice and requires different skills – technical, logistical, and related
to the judicial process – than most medicolegal investigations.695 Additional experience is
required to address these unique challenges.
The professional qualifications of the expert must be recognized by the authorities over
the investigation, which may vary in different contexts, prior to any involvement in the
investigation.696 The determination of cause of death is restricted to licensed physicians. The
American Board of Forensic Anthropology bestows professional credentials on forensic
anthropologists. Only as of 2009 may any forensic anthropologist, regardless of nationality, be
examined for Board certification.697 There is no Board certification for archaeologists, but
holding a Ph.D. and experience are considered markers of a professional status. It is the
responsibility of the expert to ensure that his or her professional qualifications are accepted as
sufficient to practice in a particular country and therefore qualify as an expert witness.698

Affiliations

The contracting agency must be recognized and legally approved by any involved
government entity.699 Any other agenda on the part of the contracting agency, for example,
human rights advocacy or international justice, must be considered for its compatibility with
ethical standards. The agency‟s mandate must also be compatible with ethical practices. As
seen in the Popović case, any agencies with which experts are personally or professionally
affiliated and the agency that provides financial compensation to the experts can be portrayed
negatively by the Defense as a sign of partiality. The affiliation may be with a political or
military group, an NGO with a conflicting mandate, or a personal interest group.
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In its most basic form, the forensic expert should not belong to a group that was or is
actively involved in the investigated crime. Investigations into the disappeared in Argentina
started almost immediately after the military regime was ousted. Analysis of the remains was
performed by medical experts linked to the police.700 These were the same people who were
complicit in the crimes; some even contributed to covering up the crimes through misreporting
the cause of death on death certificates. The EAAF could not have any relationship with the
medico-legal system in order to establish their independence and gain the trust of the families of
the victims.
A forensic expert‟s nationality can in some instances also be an affiliation, albeit one not
under the control of the expert, which might be portrayed negatively. Many of the forensic
experts participating in the Srebrenica investigations were citizens of NATO countries that
defended Bosnian Muslims in 1995. These experts could have been perceived as prejudiced
based upon the influence of their home countries.701 Other affiliations are much easier for the
forensic expert to recognize and thus avoid any bias inferred by the relationship. For example,
being a member of a human rights organization that has openly spoken out against a government
or indicted group would be a conflict of interest for an investigating expert. Transparency,
neutrality, and impartiality must be apparent in all aspects of the forensic expert‟s affiliations.

Identification

Human remains must be identified. Forensic experts have the ethical duty to advocate for
the identification of human remains and perform analyses that contribute to the identification
process. If the mandate of the contracting agency does not include identification, the forensic
expert still has ethical duties to perform. While performing the examination of the remains, they
must record all information that may contribute to identification. No procedure that destroys
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material with future potential should be performed. Body parts deserve the same respect as
whole bodies. For remains that are unidentifiable, their disposal must be performed in a way that
adheres to the context of the situation.702
In June 2003, Jose-Pablo Baraybar spoke to the Prosecutor of the ICC during a public
hearing held to elicit recommendations for the future work of the ICC.703 He chose to discuss
several “mistakes” made in the investigations performed under the auspices of the ICTY and
offered recommendations regarding ethical practices for the ICC to consider. Baraybar
described one particular mistake on the part of the OTP during their investigation of crimes
committed in Kosovo: a heavy focus on performing as many post-mortem examinations as
possible to fulfill the required mens rea for crimes against humanity – that a systematic,
widespread, large-scale crime was committed. This haste resulted in only one-half of the victims
being positively identified which Baraybar described as “a humanitarian tragedy”.
Baraybar made several recommendations regarding how forensic evidence should be
incorporated into the Prosecution‟s investigation. First, an autonomous scientific advisory unit
should be formed and implemented as a responsibility of the chief of investigations. Their
function would be to determine what forensic evidence could and should be collected. This
includes considering the amount, quality, and characteristics of the potentially available forensic
evidence based upon the local technical capacity in and around the area to be investigated. The
Prosecutor would use this information to determine the impact this evidence may have in any
particular case. If the evidence proved potentially valuable to the overall investigation, the
scientific advisory unit would initiate the forensic investigation and assume responsibility for its
final outcome. However, Baraybar requested that the ICC Prosecutor:
Calculate the cost benefits of a forensic intervention prior to undertaking one which may
satisfy the needs for the prosecution but cause humanitarian damage.704
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The need for evidentiary information from victims should not outweigh the need for
identifications to satisfy the humanitarian needs of the affected community.

Professional Development of the Discipline

Human Rights Law
To contribute to a criminal investigation, the forensic expert must understand the crime
being investigated. Human rights investigations require knowledge of current human rights and
humanitarian law. This work has attempted to demonstrate how a working knowledge of the
substantive law of a single particular crime, genocide, can assist the forensic expert in collecting
the evidence necessary to assist the court in determining if the crime was committed. Crimes
against humanity and war crimes each have their own mens rea and actus reas that need to be
proved to convict a perpetrator of that crime. A crime must first be understood before it can be
properly investigated. The procedural law of the Court must also be understood.

Training Future Experts
Knowing the future likely holds many more opportunities for forensic anthropologists
and archaeologists to contribute to international criminal missing persons investigations, students
must be trained in preparation for the work.705 An interdisciplinary program that incorporates
historical, legal, and cultural aspects of conflict and human rights law with anatomy,
archaeology, geology, and forensic and physical anthropology training would provide a well
rounded background for international criminal investigative work.706 International humanitarian
and human rights law should to be incorporated directly into the basic training of forensic
specialties.707
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An International Body of Forensic Specialists
Lastly, the Missing workshops recommended that a team of specialists be established in
order to address the broader need for forensic specialists involved in the coordination and
regulation of criminal investigations.708 This team of specialists would disseminate guidelines
and standards of practice as well as serve the forensic community by: drawing together the
different disciplines of forensic science; regulating ethical issues; providing professional
credentials; providing advice to contracting bodies and forensic scientists auditing and evaluating
of field activities; reconciling language issues including translations and professional lexicon;
and lobbying governments for the further application of forensic work within international
contexts. The international community and forensic disciplines would benefit from an
established relationship that bridges disciplines and incorporates all aspects of the pursuit of
humanitarian and legal justice for those who suffer from human rights abuses.
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CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we in the Prosecutor‟s Office have no doubt that undertaking professional
forensic investigations provided vital evidence and corroboration which establish the
commission of serious violations of international humanitarian law, including
genocide.709 (Graham Blewitt, Deputy Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia, 1997)
Genocide is a crime that has occurred too many times in our history yet the perpetrators
of this crime have rarely been punished. A crime cannot be prosecuted without it first being
recognized. The more people who comprehend the true essence of Lemkin‟s crime of genocide,
the more likely it will be recognized when it has occurred and acknowledged as a heinous crime
deserving of the international community‟s insistence upon justice.
This study offers a detailed appreciation of the crime of genocide and its legal
interpretation. The forensic expert plays a unique role in the prosecution of genocide; the
evidence collected can contribute to identifying the victims, their manner and cause of death, any
patterns of injury, and time of death. It can also be used to corroborate witness testimony.
Forensic evidence can be used to satisfy both the mens rea and actus reas of the legal definition
of genocide. It is imperative that this crime, and all other human rights and international
humanitarian laws, be understood by those responsible for providing and testifying to the
evidence.
This study demonstrates both strengths and weaknesses of the forensic investigation in
Srebrenica. This investigation was the largest forensic investigation to date. The forensic
experts applied their disciplines to the task of unearthing thousands of victims from dozens of
mass graves with no prior example to guide their work. The results can be scrutinized and
mistakes identified. Despite any shortcomings, the ICTY trials continue to uphold the forensic
evidence as scientific evidence of proof of genocide committed against the Bosnian Muslim
people of Srebrenica. These trials demonstrate the enormous contribution forensic science lends
709
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to a case and offer a wealth of information on the role of forensic evidence in fulfilling legal
interpretations of human rights and humanitarian laws. Those involved in the ICTY
investigations should make honest assessments of the investigation and make recommendations
to the ICC based upon both the successes and failures of the investigations.
The increasing involvement of forensic anthropologists and archaeologists in
international investigations of human rights violations demands improvement from within these
disciplines. There is a pressing need for the development and regulation of methods, minimum
standards, best practices, and professional and ethical standards to address the unique needs of
investigations of violations of human rights and international humanitarian law. All of this
emerging material must be coordinated among international experts to develop standards that
fulfill the legal and humanitarian purposes of a forensic investigation.
The guilty pleas of Momir Nikolić and Dragon Obrenović, the Assistant Commander for
Security and Intelligence of the Bratunac Brigade and the Chief-of-Staff and Deputy Commander
of the 1st Zvornik Infantry Brigade of the Drina Corps, respectively, highlight the purpose of the
ICTY. Both were indicted for some form of genocide and their reasons behind pleading guilty to
a lesser charge were similar – to contribute to establishing the truth about Srebrenica, to
contribute to reconciliation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and to relieve the families of the victims
from being subjected to additional suffering by having to testify again.710 Perpetrators are being
punished to this day for the crimes they committed in the former Yugoslavia. The ICMP
continues to make positive DNA identifications and return remains to families. The success of
the ICTY and the creation of the ICC will hopefully contribute to deterring future acts of
genocide as well as punishing those who commit this heinous atrocity.
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